Equal Protection
Category > Equal Protection
Updated 9/25/2023Allowing pretrial custody credits for those on electronic monitoring programs but not to those on home detention–subject to monitoring while on bail is an equal protection violation.People who participate in electronic monitoring programs under Penal Code section 1203.018 are entitled to preconviction custody credits. People on home detention and subject to electronic monitoring while on bail are similarly situated and denying preconviction custody credits to these people would deny equal protection.id: 28038
Updated 9/23/2023Denying SVP’s a full jury trial advisement required under other civil commitment statutes may violate equal protection.Defendant challenged his Sexually Violent Predator commitment based on the trial court’s failure to provide a full jury trial, advisement, as required under other civil commitment statutes. The equal protection claim likely has merit, and the case was remanded to allow defendant to raise the issue in the trial court and allow the prosecution an opportunity to provide a legitimate government purpose to justify different treatment of SVPs.id: 27943
Updated 8/10/2023Defendant was entitled to pretrial conduct and custody credits for time spent out on bail subject to electronic monitoring on home detention. People like defendant who were out on bail and subject to electronic monitoring on home detention are similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic monitoring program under Penal Code section 1203.018, and a rational basis did not exist for treating these categories of people differently. Defendant was entitled to preconviction custody credit under section 2900.5(a), and preconviction conduct credit under section 4019 under the state and federal equal protection clauses.id: 27778
Updated 6/19/2023There is no rational basis for distinguishing between young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and other young adult offenders for purposes of section 3051.There is no rational basis for distinguishing between young adult offenders sentenced to life without parole and other young adult offenders for purposes of Penal Code section 3051. Defendant, convicted in 1990 of special circumstance murder when he was 25, was entitled to a youth offender parole hearing and a meaningful opportunity to be released on parole at some point. He was also entitled to a Franklin hearing to gather information concerning his youth-related mitigating factors.id: 27577
Updated 6/19/2023Denying resentencing after 15 years of functional LWOP for a juvenile violates equal protection.Under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170 (d)(1)(A), juvenile offenders sentenced to life-without-parole terms (not “functional equivalent” cases) may seek recall for resentencing after 15 years in prison. Denying juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP of the same treatment violates equal protection.id: 27570
The provision requiring mandatory sex offender registration for those who engage in oral copulation with 16 or 17 year-olds violated equal protection since people who engage in intercourse with same-aged minors are subject to discretionary registration. The mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for those who engage in unlawful voluntary oral copulation with a minor who is 16 or 17 years old (Penal Code section 288(a)(1) violates equal protection principles because those who engage in unlawful voluntary intercourse with a same-aged minor (Penal Code section 261.5) are subject to discretionary sex offender registration. The matter was remanded with directions to remove the mandatory registration requirement and determine whether defendant was subject to discretionary registration under section 290, subd.(a)(2)(e).id: 18941
Case of SVP claiming equal protection violation was remanded so the state could provide a compelling justification for disparate procedures regarding compelled testimony for SVPs and NGI’s.Defendant was found to be a sexually violent predator. He argued an equal protection denial given that he was compelled to testify in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, and defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be compelled to testify at hearings to extend their commitments. The matter was remanded to allow the prosecution to show, under the strict scrutiny test, that the state has a compelling interest that justifies the disparate treatment. id: 25632
Denying conduct credits for time defendant spent in home detention before sentencing violated equal protection. Defendant sought conduct credits for the time he spent in an electronic monitoring program on home detention prior to his sentencing. No statute provides for such credits. However, recent amendments to Penal Code section 4019 have made conduct credits available to individuals who are placed on electronic home detention after imposition of sentence. Denying defendant’s eligibility for conduct credits for time spent in home detention before he was sentenced violates equal protection guarantees.id: 26510
Section 4852.01 denied defendant of equal protection by allowing eligibility for a certificate of rehabilitation for those who served a prison sentence and were rehabilitated but not for those who served a probation sentence. The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation under Penal Code section 4852.01 because he was incarcerated after completing a sentence of felony probation. However, the statute grants certificate eligibility to felons who have completed a prison sentence and are subsequently incarcerated. The statute denied defendant equal protection by denying certificate eligibility only to those who have served probation sentences.id: 24857
Section 3051 violates equal protection by denying youthful offender parole hearings for those sentenced under the one strike law.Defendants were convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and robbery based on incidents that occurred when they were 19 years old. They received life terms under the one strike law. The sentences were not cruel and unusual. However, the sentences violated equal protection provisions in that they were excluded from the provisions of Penal Code section 3051, which mandates youthful -offender parole hearings for most who receive de facto life sentences for crimes they committed at or before age 25.id: 26144
Requiring defendant to testify at his SVP trial may violate his equal protection rights and the prosecution must show under the strict scrutiny test why SVP’s should be treated differently from NGI’s.The trial court allowed the prosecutor to call defendant as a witness at his SVP commitment trial. SVPs are similarly situated with not guilty by reason of insanity commitees who have a right not to be called to testify. The prosecution must establish under the strict scrutiny standard that the disparate treatment is justified. The matter was remanded for a hearing to allow the prosecution a chance to make the required showing.id: 24793
Defendant convicted in 1987 of oral copulation by someone over 21 with someone under 16 was given relief under Hofsheier in a matter the court treated as an action for declaratory relief. Defendant pled no contest in 1987 to oral copulation by a person over the age of 21 with a person under 16. Following his release from prison he was subject to mandatory sex offender registration. He moved for relief under People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185. Treating the issue as an action for declaratory relief against the Department of Justice, the court found that mandatory sex offender registration violated defendant’s equal protection rights since the defendant was similarly situated to others who had committed like offenses but not subjected to mandatory registration. id: 21440
Defendant's felony sentence for placing a fake bomb violated equal protection because there was a similar misdemeanor provision and no reason to differentiate between the two.Defendant was convicted of maliciously placing a false bomb with the intent to cause others to fear for their safety in violation of Penal Code section 148.1, subd.(d). He was sentenced to 25 years-to-life under the three strikes law. However, he was denied equal protection as he was similarly situated to someone convicted of the misdemeanor of placing a fake weapon of mass destruction that did not cause sustained fear, and the legislative history of the latter provision shows no reason exists to treat the offenses differently for purposes of punishment. His conviction was punishable only as a misdemeanor.id: 21497
Section 4573.5, which requires prison for bringing alcohol into a custodial facility violates equal protection since a similar provision addressing controlled substances allows for jail terms under section 1170, subd.(h).Penal Code section 1170, subd.(h) provides that those who violate section 4573 by knowingly bringing a controlled substance into a custodial facility are eligible for sentencing in the county jail whereas those who bring alcohol or a noncontrolled substance into a facility (in violation of section 4573.5) are to be sentenced to prison. The latter provision violates equal protection principles because it treats similarly situated individuals differently without a rational basis for doing so. The court “reformed” the statute to provide for a county jail term for violations of section 4573.5. id: 23924
Mandatory sex offender registration for minors found to have annoyed or molested a child and committed to the DJJ violates equal protection. Mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is both adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.6, and committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice, but not for a juvenile who is only adjudicated of violating section 647.6, violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.id: 23970
The denial of defendant’s petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and relief from sex offender registration violated his right to equal protection under People v. Hofsheier. People convicted of violating Penal Code section 288.7 (prohibiting sex with a child under 10 years old) are eligible to obtain a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01 and relief from registration under section 290.5, while others (like defendant) convicted of violating section 288, subd.(a) (lewd acts with a child under 14) are not. There is no rational basis for the unequal treatment of these similarly situated groups of sex offenders. Sections 4852.01 and 290.5, subd.(a)(2) violate equal protection to the extent they exclude people convicted of violating section 288, subd.(a) from obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation and relief from the section 290 registration requirement.id: 23385
Subjecting defendant to a longer certificate of rehabilitation procedure than similar defendants violated his right to equal protection.The statutory distinction in Penal Code section 4852.03, subd. (a)(2) that requires persons like defendant who were convicted of possessing pornography under section 311.1 to wait 10 years before becoming eligible to seek a certificate of rehabilitation, while allowing a shorter, seven year waiting period for those convicted of similar offenses violates defendant’s right to equal protection. The error required remand to allow defendant to seek a certificate of rehabilitation.id: 23011
A defendant convicted of violating section 288, subd.(a) must be permitted to seek a certificate of rehabilitation as defendants convicted of more serious offenses can apply.The statute banning persons convicted of crimes under Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) from petitioning for a certificate of rehabilitation while allowing other similarly situated persons who have committed more serious crimes under section 288.1 to file such a petition violates equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. Section 288, subd.(a) must be removed from the list of crimes from which an absolute prohibition on petitioning for a certificate of rehabilitation exists.id: 23568
Provision denying automatic sex offender relief conveyed by a certificate of rehabilitation to those convicted of oral copulation with a minor violated equal protection under Hofsheier. Penal Code section 290.5, subd.(a)(2)(N) denies the automatic sex offender registration relief conveyed by a certificate of rehabilitation to persons convicted of unlawful oral copulation with a minor under section 288a, subd.(b)(1), although such relief is available to those convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under section 261.5. It therefore results in the denial of equal protection under People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185.id: 22921
Failure to apply the amendment to section 4019 retroactively violates equal protection principles.Irrespective of the date a prisoner’s judgment became final, equal protection principles require that the amendments to Penal Code section 4019, which increase the rate at which certain prisoners earn conduct credits, must be applied retroactively. The purpose of the bill was purely economic and the date of finality of judgments (the fact which divided the two groups) did not affect that purpose. Moreover, applying the provision retroactively did not violate California’s separation of powers doctrine.id: 22024
Juvenile was entitled to a jury trial on the Jessica’s Law residency restrictions because they were so overwhelmingly punitive. The lifetime residency restrictions the minor faces (under Jessica’s Law) as a result of his juvenile adjudication are punitive in nature. As a result the state must provide the minor a jury trial before imposing that consequence. The denial of the right to a jury trial violated due process and equal protection principles and the residency restriction was enjoined absent a jury trial on remand. id: 21943
Municipal curfew ordinance violates equal protection principles as it violates protected activity without being narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest. A municipal curfew ordinance (San Diego Municipal Code section 58.0102) violates equal protection principles by sweeping too broadly as it included innocent and legal conduct by minors even when they had their parents permission. The court used the intermediate scrutiny test in finding the ordinance was unconstitutional as it imposes de facto restrictions on First Amendment rights (traveling unaccompanied to school or religious functions) and it restricts a minor’s abilities to engage in activities after 10:00 p.m. in an otherwise safe or supervised environment without any suggestion that attending such functions implicates the juvenile crime prevention goals of the ordinance.id: 21397
The trial court erred under Hofsheier, in finding that defendant’s conviction of sodomy of a 17 year-old subjected him to mandatory registration as a sex offender.Defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse and sodomy with a 17 year-old minor. The court found the sodomy conviction subjected him to mandatory registration as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290. That ruling violated his equal protection rights as provided in People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185. The matter was remanded for a determination of whether he was subject to discretionary registration, and if so, to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion.id: 21107
The sex offender registration requirement imposed 20 years ago violated equal protection under Hofsheier and was set aside.In 1987, defendant was convicted of oral copulation with a minor in violation of Penal Code section 288a, subd.(b)(1). The court ordered sex offender registration under section 290. However, mandatory sex offender registration violated defendant’s equal protection rights as stated in People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185. The Superior Court had the authority to hear the motion 20 years later. Neither defendant’s 1987 conviction nor his subsequent history supported an order requiring him to register as a sex offender. The order was set aside.id: 20710
Battery on an officer statutes violate equal protection principles because they permit prosecutors to arbitrarily subject violators who commit lesser acts to greater punishment than those committing more serious acts.Battery on a custodial officer may be punished as a felony under Penal Code section 243.1, a misdemeanor under section 243, subd.(b) or a wobbler under section 243, subd.(c) which contains the additional requirement of an injury. The statutes violate equal protection principles because they permit prosecutors to arbitrarily subject violators who commit less egregious conduct to greater punishment than those committing more serious acts.id: 16911
Denying custody credits to defendant who spent time in home detention as a condition of his O.R. release while allowing them to persons in electronic home detention programs was a denial of equal protection.Penal Code section 2900.5, as amended in 1991 did not require that defendant receive presentence custody and good time/work time credits on his sentence for the time he spent in home detention as a condition of release on his own recognizance. The words home detention program in the amended statute refer only to statutorily authorized electronic home detention as a condition of O.R. However, denying such credits to defendant while allowing them to persons in electronic home detention programs is a denial of equal protection. The procedural differences are not legitimate bases for treating defendant differently from those placed in electronic home detention programs pursuant to section 1203.016. Defendant was not entitled to conduct credits under section 4019 for the time spent in house arrest because the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not require that such persons receive conduct credits as incentives to properly behave.id: 9531
To avoid an equal protection violation section 12021, subdivision (c) must be extended to all those who committed qualifying misdemeanors at a time when the offenses were not listed in section 12021(c) and thus did not subject them to a firearms prohibition.Penal Code section 12021 prohibits any person convicted of a specified misdemeanor from possessing a firearm. Defendant was convicted in 1992 of spousal abuse and at that time the offense was not one of the listed misdemeanors supporting a violation of section 12021, subdivision (c). In 1993, the statute was amended to include spousal abuse. Defendant, unlike persons who committed misdemeanors prior to January 1, 1991, could not seek a modification or elimination of the weapons prohibition. However, the court determined this to be an equal protection violation in that section 12021, subdivision (c) denied the opportunity for relief to post-1991 misdemeanants who suffered qualifying convictions at a time when the convictions did not subject them to the firearms prohibition because the misdemeanors of which they were convicted had not yet been added to the statute.id: 9538
Penal Code section 1367.1 violates equal protection principles by requiring misdemeanor defendants to undergo evaluation and treatment under the LPS prior to a competency determination.Penal Code section 1367.1 pertains to evaluations of misdemeanor defendants whom a trial judge believes may be incompetent to stand trial. The provision calls for treatment pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act before competency proceedings. A felony defendant is not required to undergo evaluation and treatment under the LPS prior to a competency determination. Using a strict scrutiny analysis, the court found section 1367.1 deprives misdemeanor defendants of the equal protection of the laws, and that it cannot be construed or reformed to preserve its constitutionality.id: 17179
Updated 9/25/2023The county's failure to grant the same program credits as the state prison did not violate equal protection.Defendant was convicted of an assault while on probation and his probation was revoked. He was sentenced to a single term of five years in county jail under Penal Code section 1170(h). Contrary to defendant’s claim, Napa County’s failure to grant county jail inmates the same opportunities that state prison inmates have to earn rehabilitation program credits did not violate equal protection principles.id: 28025
Section 3051 does not deny equal protection by expressly excluding LWOP offenders who were over 18 years old from youthful parole hearings.Penal Code section 3051 provides for a youthful parole hearing but excludes LWOP offenders who were 18 or older at the time of their offense. Section 3051 does not violate equal protection as there is a rational basis for distinguishing
between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context.id: 27291
There was no equal protection violation in denying youthful offender parole consideration to the defendant who committed violent sex offenses at age 17.A defendant who was sentenced for 66 years-to-life for violent sex offenses he committed at age 17 is not entitled to youth offender parole consideration under Penal Code section 3051, on equal protection grounds. A rational basis exists for treating one strike offenders like defendant differently from other youthful offenders entitled to the benefit of the statute.id: 27205
Exclusion of vehicular homicides from involuntary manslaughter statute did not violate due process or equal protection.The statutory scheme eliminating involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of implied malice murder committed by an intoxicated driver did not violate due process given that a defendant has no fundamental right to instructions on lesser offenses. There was also no equal protection violation since the exclusion of manslaughter as a lesser included offense of Watson murder doesn’t implicate a fundamental right.id: 26041
The one-year waiting period for conditional release under the SVP Act does not violate equal protection. Defendant argued that the SVP Act violates equal protection because mentally disordered offenders unlike SVPs have an opportunity to petition for immediate conditional release. However, the one-year waiting period is necessary to further the compelling state interest in providing treatment to SVPs and protecting the public, and there is no less burdensome alternative to effectuate those interests.id: 25980
Provision rendering youthful offenders sentenced under the three strikes law ineligible for youth offender parole hearings was not an equal protection violation.Penal Code section 3051 provides for parole-type hearings for youthful offenders sentenced to life terms. Section 3051, subd. (h) provides that those sentenced under the three strikes law are ineligible for youthful offender parole hearings. The differential treatment for three strike youthful offenders does not violate equal protection principles as there was a rational basis for the provision given that they had in all cases previously been convicted of multiple serious felonies.id: 26718
43 years-to-life term for a juvenile offender with a parole eligibility date at age 55 did not violate equal protection and was not cruel and unusual. Defendant was convicted of multiple violent crimes including robbery, rape and assault with a firearm for acts he committed as a 14 year old. He was sentenced to 43 years-to-life, with a parole eligibility date at age 55. The sentence was not cruel and unusual. Moreover, there was no equal protection violation by excluding one strike offenders from Penal Code section 3051, which provides for earlier parole type hearings for non-recidivist offenders.id: 24919
Different requirements for former probationers and prisoners seeking a certificate of rehabilitation doesn’t violate equal protection. Former probationers face different eligibility criteria than former prisoners when seeking relief under Penal Code section 1203.4, which allows former probationers to move for a dismissal of their conviction upon successful completion of probation. Once the cases are dismissed, another provision, Penal Code section 4852.01, renders them ineligible for a certificate of rehabilitation if they are subsequently incarcerated. In contrast, former prisoners, whether incarcerated or not, face no such restriction. The separate requirements don’t violate the equal protection rights of former probationers given the rational basis for the distinction - as including probationers would create a large burden on state resources. id: 25506
Provision that tolls parole period for SVP’s does not violate equal protection where there is no similar tolling provision for MDO’s and does not violate ex post facto.Defendant argued that Penal Code section 3000 (a)(4), which tolls the parole period for a sexually violent offender, violates his right to equal protection because he is similarly situated to mentally disordered offenders who do not have a similar tolling provision. However, this is not a situation where MDO’s are treated differently. California has shown a compelling interest in tolling the parole period for SVP’s so that SVP’s receive parole supervision after they have been fully discharged from their commitment. Defendant also argued application of the provision to his case violated ex post facto provisions, but the SVP Act is not punitive in nature.id: 25631
The trial court did not err by denying Prop 47 resentencing for a defendant convicted of access card forgery even though other types of forgery are eligible for Prop 47 relief. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her Prop 47 request for resentencing on the access card forgery offenses, because those convicted of other types of forgery are eligible for Prop 47 relief. However, access card forgery is not one of the offenses listed under Penal Code section 473.1 subd. (b) that are now misdemeanors, so there was no error. Moreover, there was no equal protection violation where there was a plausible basis for treating access card forgery different than the other offenses - that is, it carries a greater potential for identity theft. id: 25309
MDO’s, like people facing involuntary civil commitments after a NGI finding, have a statutory right not to testify at commitment proceedings.Persons facing involuntary civil commitment as mentally disordered offenders are similarly situated with people subject to civil commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. The latter group has a statutory right not to be compelled to testify at their commitment proceedings. Denying potential MDO’s the same right would violate equal protection. However, the issue was moot because the petition for recommitment was denied.id: 24751
Juvenile detained while incompetent was not similarly situated to those civilly committed under the LPS act. The minor was found incompetent to stand trial and detained in juvenile hall for 294 days while efforts were made to restore his competency. He argued an equal protection violation because those committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act receive procedural protections that he wasn’t given. However, the minor wasn’t similarly situated to those who fall under the LPS Act because he had no mental abnormalities that caused him to be dangerous to himself or others.id: 24396
The trial court did not violate equal protection principles by denying the indigent defendant transcripts of the opening statements and closing arguments of the first trial that ended in a hung jury. Defendant represented himself at a trial that ended in a hung jury. Before the retrial he requested transcripts from the first trial and the court ordered transcripts of all of the witness testimony. He argued that he should also have been provided with the opening statements and closing arguments. There was no equal protection violation in denying the indigent defendant transcripts that would have been available to a non-indigent defendant, absent a showing of need for the transcripts of the arguments.id: 24291
Attempted car theft is not among the offenses that can be reduced to misdemeanors under Prop 47 and the scheme does not violate equal protection by including similar offenses. Defendant filed a Prop 47 petition to have his 2012 felony conviction for attempted second degree burglary of a vehicle reduced to a misdemeanor. However, attempted auto burglary is not among the offenses that can be reduced to misdemeanors under Prop 47. There was no equal protection violation even though a vehicle theft involving a loss of less than $950 is among the offenses included under Prop 47, as the Legislature can rationally extend misdemeanor punishment to some nonviolent offenses but not others. id: 24406
There is no equal protection violation in requiring defendant convicted of annoying a child to wait 10 years before seeking a certificate of rehabilitation even though child pornographers need only wait seven years. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.03. He claimed there was an equal protection violation in requiring a 10 year waiting period for those convicted of annoying a child since there is only a seven year waiting period for those convicted of producing child pornography. However, the groups were not similarly situated even though both had sex offender registration requirements and there was no equal protection violation.id: 23785
There was no equal protection violation in treating oral copulation with a 16 or 17 year-old as a wobbler while sexual intercourse with a person the same age is a misdemeanor. Defendant argued his felony sentence for oral copulation with a minor under age 18 (Penal Code section 288a, subd.(b)(1)) violated his equal protection rights under People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, because if he had sexual intercourse with the 16 year-old minor the crime would have been punishable as a misdemeanor under section 261.5, subd.(b). However, it is “reasonablely conceivable” that the Legislature could have had a rational basis for classifying oral copulation with a 16 or 17 year-old as a wobbler while treating sexual intercourse with a person the same age as a misdemeanor.id: 23826
Sex offender registration for a juvenile found to have annoyed or molested a child and sent to DJF after committing another offense but not for a juvenile who committed the offense and was not sent to DJF does not violate equal protection. Mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.6 (annoying or molesting a child) and is committed to the DJF only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is found to have committed the offense and never committed to the DJF does not violate equal protection principles.id: 24031
The court reverses Hofsheier after finding a rational basis for mandating sex offender registration for oral copulation with a 16 or 17 year-old but not for intercourse with someone that age.In People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, the court found the differential requirement for mandatory sex offender registration for those convicted of oral copulation with a 16 or 17 year-old, but not for those convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor of the same age violated equal protection principles. Upon reexamination, the court found the constitutional analysis in Hofsheier was faulty, and reversed itself. The court found that because intercourse could lead to pregnancy, the need for financial support of children conceived as a result proves a plausible basis for allowing judicial discretion when considering whether to order registration.id: 23979
The disparate treatment of mentally retarded committees based on their first commitment did not violate equal protection. Defendant was determined to be mentally retarded person who was a danger to herself and others and committed in a locked facility for a year under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500. Based on legislation passed in 2012, she couldn’t have been committed for more than six months if her first commitment hearing had been held on or after July 1, 2012. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the disparate treatment of mentally retarded committees based on their first commitment date did not violate equal protection principles as the Legislature had a rational basis for changing the law and the modification was reasonably related to that goal. id: 23501
Defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of the Prop 36 Three Strikes Reform Act.In the fall of 2011, defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana in prison and sentenced to 25 years-to-life under the three strikes law. In November of 2012, the voters approved Prop 36 which restricts application of the three strikes law to cases where the current crimes is a serious or violent felony. Defendant was not entitled to retroactive application of the amended sections. However, defendant will still have the option of filing a petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126 and may get relief unless the trial court finds he poses an unreasonable public safety risk.id: 23053
There was no equal protection violation where defendant was convicted of contacting a minor in Indiana and suggested she penetrate herself whereas there would have been no violation if he said he was going to Indiana to have intercourse with her.Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 288.3, which prohibits contacting a minor for purposes of committing various crimes including sexual penetration with a minor. There was no equal protection violation under Hofsheier simply because it was not unlawful for an adult to tell the minor he was on his way to Indiana (where the victim lived) to have intercourse with her but it was unlawful to encourage the victim to penetrate herself. Defendant here encouraged the minor to penetrate herself with the handle of a hairbrush that was potentially more harmful than intercourse.id: 23689
Denying retroactive application to the 2011 Realignment Act did not violate equal protection. The 2011 realignment legislation need not be applied retroactively to all defendants whose convictions are not yet final. The Legislature’s limiting the application of the act to felons sentenced on or after its operational date of October 1, 2011, does not violate equal protection.id: 22894
Defendant was not deprived of equal protection where his workers comp fraud conviction required concealment and the “similar” Labor Code provision did not. Defendant was convicted of insurance fraud under Insurance Code section 11880, subd.(a). He argued the conviction violated equal protection principles because his underreporting payroll to the workers comp insurance company was similar to an employer who underreports payroll by not securing the required workers comp coverage under Labor Code section 3700.5, subd.(a), and the punishment for his offense was more severe. However, defendant was not similarly situated to a person who violated section 3700.5 as that offense does not involve concealment or calculation of the policy’s cost.id: 23292
Amended SVP act providing for an indeterminate commitment did not violate double jeopardy or equal protection provisions.The SVP act, amended by Prop 83 to allow for an indefinite commitment did not violate double jeopardy principles as the commitment furthered a nonpunitive governmental objective. Moreover, because SVP’s are clinically distinct from MDO’s and NGI’s, the indeterminate term did not violate equal protection principles.id: 23100
Booking fee does not violate equal protection due to the lack of an ability to pay requirement. Defendant challenged the imposition of a $129 “criminal justice fee” under Government Code section 29550.1, also known as a “booking fee.” His failure to object in the trial court did not preclude review where the court found it is a legal issue that is being frequently raised. The provision does not violate equal protection principles even without an ability to pay requirement because defendant was not similarly situated to the local arrestees to whom he compared himself. Moreover, the statute does not require a finding by the sentencing court of the actual costs in which the fee originated.id: 22731
There was no equal protection violation in punishing false bomb possession as a felony and false WMD possession as a misdemeanor. Defendant was convicted of the felony of maliciously placing a false bomb with the intent to cause fear under Penal Code section 148.1, subd.(d). His sentence also included a three strikes life term. He argued the felony provision denied him equal protection when compared to a different statute, section 11418.1 which makes it a misdemeanor to place a false weapon of mass destruction with the intent to cause fear in others. However, the Legislature could have determined under the rational basis test that a legitimate distinction existed where the public is likely aware of objects that look like bombs and are almost certain to cause disorder unlike WMD’s which include a vast array of chemicals and biological substances as well as radioactive and mechanical devices. id: 22827
There is no equal protection violation in treating SVP’s more harshly than MDO’s or NGI’s. The prosecution presented substantial evidence to support the perception by the electorate that sexually violent predators present a substantially greater danger to society than do mentally disordered offenders (Penal Code section 2960) or those committed after being found not guilty be reason of insanity (section 1026.5). Therefore, the disparate treatment of SVP’s is necessary to further the state’s compelling interests of public safety and humane treatment of the mentally disordered.id: 22809
Mandatory sex offender registration for those who commit lewd acts on children under 14 does not violate equal protection under Hofsheier.Defendant was convicted of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subd.(a). Contrary to his claim, mandatory sex offender registration did not violate his right to equal protection under Hofsheier because offenders convicted of offenses under section 288, subd.(a) are not similarly situation to persons convicted of other sex offenses for which sex offender registration is discretionary. Section 288, subd.(a) affords specific protection to minors under 14 and is a specific intent offense whereas sections 261.5, 288a(b)(1) and 299, subd.(h) are general intent offenses against minors under age 18.id: 22341
There is no equal protection violation in treating SVPs more harshly than MDOs given the low rate of success in treating SVPs. Defendant argued that an indeterminate life term for sexually violent predators violates equal protection guarantees because mentally disordered offenders (under Penal Code section 2962) do not receive such harsh treatment. While the groups may be similarly situated, the disparity in treatment is supported by the statutory differences between SVPs and MDOs and the statistical reasons to treat the two classes of offenders differently.id: 22149
There was no equal protection violation for defendant who was convicted of two misdemeanor sex offenses for the same conduct and one required sex offender registration. Defendant was convicted of one count of lewd conduct in violation of Penal Code section 647, subd.(a), and one count of indecent exposure in violation of section 314, subd.(l) based on the same conduct. The latter offense required lifetime sex offender registration. Defendant argued there was an equal protection violation since one but not both of the offenses required registration. However, there are meaningful differences in the offenses and defendant failed to show offenders charged with the two offenses are similarly situated. id: 21650
Amended SVP Act may violate equal protection since SVPs are similarly situated with other persons committed civilly because they are dangerous to society.Defendant argued that his indefinite commitment as a sexually violent predator under the amended act (Prop 83) violated his right to equal protection because the law treats SVPs worse than similarly situated people civilly committed under other statutes. SVPs are similarly situated with other classes of people subject to civil commitment because of their danger to society. The matter was remanded to permit the prosecution to justify the differential treatment.id: 21378
Defendant convicted of lewd acts with 14-15 year olds was not similarly situated with a defendant convicted of oral copulation with 16-17 year olds as in Hofsheier.After defendant pled no contest to six counts of lewd acts with 14 or 15 year olds at least 10 years younger (Penal Code section 288(c)(1)) he argued successfully that the imposition of mandatory sex offender registration violated his equal protection rights as described in People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185. First, the matter is an appealable postjudgment order under Penal Code section 1238, subd.(a)(5). Next, there was no equal protection violation because defendant facing the present charges was not similarly situated with those convicted of oral copulation of a 16 or 17 year-old victim as in Hofsheier.id: 21106
There was a rational basis for the deferred entry of judgment law’s focus on juvenile felons. The minor was a first-time juvenile misdemeanant. He argued the deferred entry of judgment program for first-time juvenile felons which allows them to have their charges dismissed and the records sealed after successfully completing probation violates equal protection principles by denying him the benefits afforded juvenile felons. However, the DEJ laws benefits were rationally restricted to juvenile felons because of the severe consequences otherwise applicable to them. id: 21074
There was no equal protection violation as in Hofsheier where the law permits probation for rape of defendant’s wife but not for rape of defendant’s wife using a foreign object.The trial court indicated it would have granted probation for defendant’s conviction of rape with a foreign object if permitted to do so, but it was prohibited by Penal Code section 1203.065. While rape of defendant’s wife would have allowed for a grant of probation there was no equal protection violation in prohibiting probation for raping his wife with a foreign object since the former could result in conception and the birth of a child. id: 21043
The misdemeanor provision regarding the prosecution of false immigration documents did not repeal the felony provision, was not an LIO of the felony, and there was no equal protection violation in charging the felony.Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 113, which prohibits the manufacture and sale of false immigration documents. Contrary to defendant’s claim, section 112, which punishes similar conduct as a misdemeanor, did not implicitly repeal the felony described in section 113. Moreover, the misdemeanor provision was not a lesser included offense of section 113. It was essentially the same offense with a different penalty, and the prosecutor had wide discretion regarding which crime to charge. Finally, there was no equal protection violation since a prosecutor’s decision on how to prosecute a crime does not violate the equal protection clause.id: 20969
Because crack presents a larger problem than powder cocaine abuse there is a rational basis for imposing a longer sentence. Defendant argued the higher statutory sentence for possession for sale of cocaine base (Health and Safety Code section 11351.5) versus possession for sale of cocaine powder (section 11351) violated substantive due process and his right to equal protection. However, although crack and powder cocaine are different forms of the same drug, they are objectively distinguishable. Crack has brought cocaine to the streets and created additional problems both in the number of users and the drug’s effect on an individual. There is therefore, a rational basis for distinguishing between cocaine powder and cocaine base for sentencing purposes.id: 20608
Application of amended SVP law did not violate equal protection when compared to treatment of MDOs or those found not guilty by reason of insanity.Defendant argues that his involuntary commitment under the amended SVP act violated his federal constitutional right to equal protection because SVPs are similarly situated to mentally disordered offenders who are committed under Penal Code section 2960 and to persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, and that the disparate treatment provided to SVPs is not necessary to further a compelling state interest. However, assuming SVPs are similarly situated with MDOs the disparate treatment is necessary in part because they are not likely to be cured. Assuming they are similarly situated with NGIs, there is no equal protection violation because NGIs are treated less favorably than SVPs.id: 20222
The statutory scheme for battery on a custodial officer does not violate equal protection even though the provision relating to injury of an officer is punishable as a wobbler.The Court of Appeal ruled the statutory scheme pertaining to battery on a custodial officer violates equal protection principles because the statutes allow battery on an officer without injury to be punished more severely than battery on a custodial officer with injury. In the case of the latter, the Legislature has given the prosecution discretion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. However, a rational basis for these statutes exists; the Legislature could reasonably have concluded the reduction of the Penal Code section 243.1 offenses is not appropriate in cases of battery that is deemed serious enough by the prosecutor to warrant felony prosecution under section 243, subd.(c).id: 18022
SVPs are not denied equal protection when compared to other civilly committed persons due to the less severe definition of mental disorder.Defendant argued California's civil commitment statutes uniformly require a degree of mental impairment that is more severe than the Sexually Violent Predator Act's definition of mental disorder. However, SVPs are similarly treated to other persons involuntarily committed for purposes of the law. Consequently, there is no equal protection violation with respect to the nature of the impairment addressed by the SVP Act. Similarly, there is no equal protection violation in that the SVP Act's evidentiary standards are easier to meet, or that the SVP Act provides less treatment for the mental disorders of SVPs.id: 15279
Spousal abuse statute does not violate equal protection in that it does not apply to same-sex cohabitants.
Defendant argued that Penal Code section 273.5 which criminalizes abuse of a spouse or cohabitant of the opposite sex, violates the equal protection clause because it does not apply to abuse of a cohabitant of the same sex. However, the mere omission to deal with domestic violence in same sex relationships cannot be seen as rendering section 273.5 so irrational or invidiously discriminatory as to warrant judicial interference, and the statute is not unconstitutional.id: 9535
Juvenile court's imposition of the theoretical maximum term did not violate Cunningham, due process or equal protection.The juvenile court did not violate Cunningham, due process or equal protection principles by committing the minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice for the theoretical maximum term which was longer than the 12 year mid term the Determinate Sentencing Law authorized for his crime. There is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings so Cunningham does not apply. Moreover, minors who commit crimes are not similarly situated with adults and, therefore equal protection principles do not apply.id: 20016
Use of a prior conviction as a strike did not violate equal protection even though the offense, committed by the 16 year-old, if tried in juvenile court, would not have been a strike.Defendant's prior conviction used to double his term involved a Penal Code section 288, subd.(a) offense committed when he was 16. The conviction occurred in adult court. He argued that use of the strike violated equal protection since a juvenile adjudication for the same offense would not have been a strike. However, a youthful offender prosecuted in adult court is considered a more serious offender. Moreover, the state has an interest in punishing an adult offender who was not deterred by a previous adult conviction committed when he was a juvenile.id: 19693
Amended law requiring the collection of DNA samples for all convicted felons does not violate equal protection or due process principles.The trial court did not violate defendant's equal protection rights by ordering him to submit to DNA testing under Penal
Code section 296.1. The statute treats all persons convicted of felonies in the same manner. Neither does the provision violate a defendant's right to substantive due process where the
testing requirement is minimally intrusive, does not infringe upon reasonable privacy rights, and serves a compelling state interest.id: 19089
Exclusion of voluntary intoxication evidence on the issue of implied malice did not violate due process, equal protection or the terms of section 22.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder (based on implied malice) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Contrary to defendant's claim, the exclusion of defense evidence of voluntary intoxication under Penal Code section 22 did not violate due process. Moreover, neither due process nor the terms of section 22, subd.(b) prohibit the prosecution from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication to establish implied malice. Finally, section 22 does not violate equal protection principles by permitting a voluntary intoxication defense to second degree murder based upon express malice, but not as to the same crime based upon implied malice.id: 19015
There is no equal protection violation in denying the privilege not to testify to potential MDO committees.A jury determined defendant to be a mentally disordered offender under Penal Code section 2970. He claimed an equal protection violation in that persons in MDO proceedings are not afforded the privilege not to testify, whereas the privilege is afforded potential civil committees in extended not guilty by reason of insanity proceedings (Penal Code section 1026.5) and extended youth authority commitments (Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800-1803). However, the Legislature, in enacting Penal Code section 1026.5(b)(7) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5 did not intend to require that persons subject to commitment under those provisions have the right not to testify. There is therefore no disparate treatment in not affording that right to MDO committees.id: 19016
There was no equal protection violation in finding the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to MDO defendants since it does not apply to other civil committeesDefendant argued the right not to testify should be extended to
those facing a mentally disordered offender trial (Penal Code section 2970) based on the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. However, the Legislature in enacting section
1026.5(b)(7) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5 did not intend to require that persons subject to commitment under those provisions have the right not to testify. That being
the case, there is no disparate treatment in not affording that right to MDO committees, and there is not equal protection violation.id: 18970
The court applied the rational basis test in rejecting the equal protection claim - complaining that under section 12022.53 aiders and abettors of gang related murders are punished more severely than aiders and abettors of murders committed to benefit other dangerous groups.Under Penal Code section 12022.53, subds. (d) and (e)(1), an aider and abettor who is found guilty of murder is subject to a 25 years-to-life enhancement if the crime was committed for the benefit of a street gang. Defendant argued the provision violates equal protection principles because it punishes aiders and abettors of crimes committed for the benefit of street gangs more severely than aiders and abettors of crimes committed for the benefit of other such groups including hate groups or terrorists. First, the rational basis test applied since the question was not whether to deprive defendant of his liberty, but for how long. Next, the Legislature had a rational basis for imposing the increased term on a person who aided and abetted a gang related murder where the perpetrator used a gun.id: 18827
Defendant, who waived time and fled, was not entitled to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days of her reappearance.Defendant, while out in custody, waived her right to have a preliminary hearing within 10 and 60 days of her plea. She failed to appear for a settlement conference and was arrested on a bench warrant. The preliminary hearing took place 15 court days after her reappearance in custody. The magistrate erroneously dismissed the complaint after finding the preliminary hearing untimely since Penal Code section 859b does not require that a preliminary hearing be held within 10 court days of a defendant's appearance in custody. Contrary to defendant's claim, a defendant who waives time and fails to appear is not similarly situated to one who remains in continuous custody from the time of the arraignment.id: 18751
There was no equal protection violation where suspected drunk driver's blood was drawn by an unauthorized person unlike other drunk driving suspects around the state.Defendant was arrested for suspected drunk driving and argued for suppression of the blood test results since the tests were administered by phlebotomists rather than licensed persons authorized by Penal Code section 23158, as it existed at the time. The courts had previously held the use of phlebotomists did not violate due process or the Fourth Amendment. Defendant here argued an equal protection violation in that he was treated differently than other drunk driving suspects arrested elsewhere in the state. However, there was no equal protection violation where defendant was not subjected to prosecution on an arbitrary and invidious basis, and because the means employed in prosecuting him was not chosen on an arbitrary or invidious basis.id: 18539
There was no equal protection violation in denying credits to participants in a voluntary work release program while allowing credits in an involuntary program.Defendant argued he was denied equal protection of the law in that he was not entitled to custody credits for his participation in work release under Penal Code section 4024.2, whereas another work release statute, section 4024.3, does allow conduct credits. However, inmates involved in the two programs are not similarly situated since the inmates in a section 4024.2 program have chosen the benefit of remaining out of custody whereas inmates in a section 4024.3 program are there because of crowded jails in their county, and their participation is intended to benefit the county. Moreover, there is a rational basis for treating the inmates differently in light of the state's interest in preventing overcrowding of county jail facilities.id: 18482
Prop 36 does not violate equal protection principles since a probationer who commits a nonviolent drug possession offense (NDPO) while still on probation for a non-NDPO is not similarly situated to a parolee who commits a NDPO after completing a prison term for the non-NDPO.Proposition 36 requires that the courts order probation and community-based drug treatment rather than incarceration for people who commit nonviolent drug possession offenses. Defendant argued the Act violates equal protection by failing to make the probation requirement applicable to defendants who commit NDPO's while on probation for offenses that are non-NDPO's. However, a probationer like defendant who commits a NDPO while still on probation for a non-NDPO, is not similarly situated to a parolee who commits a NDPO after completing a prison term for the non-NDPO.id: 18443
An LWOP sentence for second degree murder of a peace officer in the performance of his duties did not violate equal protection principles.Defendant was convicted of second degree murder of a peace officer in the performance of his duties and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. He argued the LWOP sentence violated equal protection principles because it was more harsh than the sentence imposed for the more serious offense of first degree murder. However, a rational basis exists to punish the aggravated form of second degree murder committed by defendant in the same manner as first degree murder committed without aggravating circumstances. The Legislature could reasonably determine this was an egregious form of homicide. Moreover, the denial of a trial on mitigating circumstances did not violate equal protection or due process.id: 18374
The difference between civil and criminal case voir dire did not deny defendant equal protection.Defendant argued Code of Civil Procedure section 223 violated equal protection principles in that it unfairly placed voir dire in criminal cases in the hands of the court whereas counsel in civil cases have more control over voir dire. However, by enacting section 223, the voters sought to prevent abuse of the jury selection process in criminal cases, and the classification was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.id: 18210
There is no equal protection violation in requiring sex offender registration for a defendant convicted of oral copulation with a minor but not for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.Defendant argued the order requiring him to register as a sex offender violated his equal protection rights in that Penal Code section 290 mandates sex offender registration for the crime of oral copulation of a minor (Penal Code section 288a, subd.(b)(1) ) but not for the "substantially similar" crime of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (section 261.5, subd.(c)). However, there is a plausible reason the Legislature made registration optional for the latter offense. The Legislature may have believed that oral copulation with a minor is more likely to occur and to reoccur because it: does not pose the risk of pregnancy, is easier to commit than sexual intercourse, is more difficult to detect by a third person, and may in the case of an adult male offender be committed against boys and girls.id: 17894
1999 San Diego injunction preventing 10 year firearm prohibition for peace officers convicted of simple battery did not collaterally estop the present challenge since it would be unfair to allow the prohibition to apply to all counties but one.In 1999 the San Diego Superior Court enjoined local prosecutors from imposing the 10 year firearm prohibition (Penal Code section 12021, subd.(c)) on a peace officer convicted of simple battery. In the present case, defendant sought relief from the prohibition following a conviction of simple battery. The injunction did not effect his case since he was not being charged with violating section 12021 (c), but rather was seeking relief from the prohibition. Moreover, the 1999 order did not collaterally estop the prosecution from challenging the trial court's order (granting relief from the prohibition) as this would result in an injustice because section 12021(c) would be unenforceable in San Diego County, but enforceable in the rest of the state.id: 17765
Juvenile court's failure to apply Prop 36 to minor did not violate equal protection principles.The juvenile court's failure to apply Proposition 36 to a minor did not violate equal protection principles because minors adjudged in violation of nonviolent drug possession offenses are not similarly situated to adult convicted of these offenses with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law.id: 17772
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 does not violate equal protection by failing to include alcohol as a substance that can lead to civil commitment rather than confinement in prison.Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 provides for suspending execution of sentence and committing to the California Rehabilitation Center a defendant who is addicted to narcotics, but the definition for "narcotic drug" does not include alcohol. Defendant, who was convicted of felonies relating to drunk driving argued the provision violates equal protection principles by not including alcohol as an addictive substance. However, the use of alcohol is not illegal and the state does not incur a cost by confining those who use or possess alcohol. As a result, the Legislature acted rationally in deciding those who are addicted to alcohol are not similarly situated to those who are addicted to narcotics.id: 17754
Application of Prop 21 provision restricting the sealing of juvenile records did not violate ex post facto or equal protection principles.The trial court granted defendant's petition to seal his juvenile records, concluding the application of the amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 781, enacted as part of Prop 21, would violate state and federal equal protection and ex post facto principles. However, application of the amended section 781 does not violate ex post facto laws since the amendments are not punitive in nature. Moreover, there is no equal protection violation in allowing adults convicted of certain offenses to expungement of the convictions while denying minors the opportunity to seal their juvenile records, because the juvenile and adult justice systems are different, and the affected parties are therefore not similarly situated.id: 17130
There is no equal protection violation in requiring sex offender registration for a person convicted of oral copulation with a minor even though the registration requirement does not apply to a person who has intercourse with a minor.Defendant argued his right to equal protection was violated by the fact that he was required to register as a sex offender due to his conviction of violating Penal Code section 288a, subd.(b)(1) (oral copulation of a person under the age of 18) because registration is not required of persons convicted of violating section 261.5 (unlawful intercourse with a person under the age of 18). However, defendant failed to show that the Legislature had no rational basis for requiring persons convicted of violating section 288a, subd.(b)(1) to register as sex offenders under section 290.id: 16974
The Proposition 21 provision giving prosecutors discretion to charge minors in adult court does not violate equal protection principles.The Proposition 21 provision that gives prosecutors discretion to charge minors in adult court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d)) does not violate equal protection principles by permitting similarly situated minors to be subject to disparate treatment - juvenile court law versus the criminal justice system. The prosecutor's discretion is not unfettered and is subject to constraints against invidious discrimination and vindictive prosecution. The discretion is based upon permissible factors such as the circumstances of the crime, background of the minor, or a desire to show leniency, and does not violate the equal protection clause.id: 16714
Dispartity in charging criteria by a prosecutor following Prop 21 does not violate equal protection absent proof of discriminatory factors.Defendant argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subd.(d), as amended by Proposition 21, violates equal protection because similarly situated minors who commit the same offenses are treated differently, with some being prosecuted in adult court and others in juvenile court depending solely on the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. However, disparity in charging criteria by a prosecutor does not violate the equal protection absent proof of intentionally disparate treatment based on invidiously discriminatory factors such as race.id: 16580
Defendants convicted of baby-shaking resulting in death are not similarly situated with those who murder children.Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code section 273ab - aggravated assault on a child resulting in death. The statute requires a 25 years-to-life prison term. Defendant argued she was denied equal protection of the law since the intent requirement for section 273ab is no more than that required for simple assault yet the sentence exceeds the term for second degree murder which requires an intent to kill. However, the element of the care and custody of the child (rather than the assault) distinguishes section 273ab from murder. Therefore treating murderers and those who violate section 273ab differently bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.id: 16594
Inclusion of attempted robbery in section 12022.53 enhancement did not violate equal protection even though armed assault was excluded.Defendant argued the application of the Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(b) enhancement to his attempted robbery conviction violated state and federal equal protection principles since there was no rational basis for including attempted robbery within the confines of the section, and not including other crimes such as assault with firearm. However, armed assaults and attempted robberies do not carry the same risks, and the latter usually involves the application of violence. There was no equal protection violation.id: 16540
No equal protection denial in preventing expungement for child molesters while the procedure remains available to convictions involving other serous offenses.Defendant argued the amendment to Penal Code section 1203.4 which prevents expungement of child molest convictions denies equal protection of the law since people convicted of other heinous offenses, including murder, mayhem, and rape can still obtain the benefit of expungement. However, under the rational basis standard both the high rate of recidivism for child molesters and the particular interest society has in protecting its children justify the different treatment of those convicted of molesting children.id: 15275
Provision making it unlawful for a young person to drive with a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or more does not violate equal protection.Young people who drink and drive are a greater accident risk than older people and they are not similarly situated. Therefore, Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a) (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) does not deny equal protection in making liable persons under 21 years who drive with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05 and all other drivers when they drive with a 0.08 concentration.id: 15276
SVP Act does not violate equal protection in that the criteria for commitment are less exacting than those under analogous statutory schemes.Defendant argued the Sexually Violent Predators Act under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 denies equal protection of the law because the criteria for commitment, particularly dangerousness, are less exacting than the standards used under analogous statutory schemes. However, the other cited commitment statutes have been interpreted in a manner consistent with the SVPA. Assuming SVP's are similarly situated to other persons subject to civil commitment, no disparate treatment occurs under the relevant statutory provisions.id: 15277
SVP law does not violate equal protection by permitting hearsay to be introduced to prove the prior qualifying convictions.The Legislature did not offend equal protection principles by permitting hearsay contained in documents to be introduced as proof of the fact of prior qualifying convictions or as proof of the details of those offenses in trial on the Sexually Violent Predator petition. The SVP law, by not according persons subject to a petition all rights accorded criminal defendants, does not on its face violate equal protection principles.id: 15278
There was no equal protection violation where one county prosecutes a minor drug offender under the three strikes law and another county does not.Defendant was arrested for possession of .1 gram of rock cocaine. He argued application of the three strikes law violated his equal protection rights since his case would not have been prosecuted as a three strikes case in another county - San Francisco. However, the differences in the application of the law by local prosecutors, not based on invidious discrimination, do not rise to the level of a denial of equal protection.id: 15207
25 years to life firearm use enhancement does not violate equal protection despite the fact that it is far more harsh than enhancements for other murders where different weapons are used.In addition to his murder sentence, defendant received a 25 years to life term for use of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subd.(d). Defendant argued the sentence violated equal protection principles because similarly situated murderers using other kinds of deadly weapons are not subjected to such a harsh penalty enhancement. Using the rational basis standard, the court found there was no equal protection violation since section 12022.53, subd.(d) targets more serious offenses than those included in the other enhancement provisions.id: 14827
Permitting refiling of misdemeanor complaints does not deny juveniles equal protection of the law.Juveniles are not similarly situated with adults, such that a minor is denied equal protection because juvenile proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are not protected (unlike adult proceedings) by the misdemeanor refiling prohibition of Penal Code section 1387.id: 9534
Statute criminalizing possession of more than $100,000 in drug proceeds did not deny equal protection for failure to criminalize possession of a lesser amount.Defendant was convicted of possessing over $100,000 obtained from drug sales. (Health and Safety Code section 11370(b).) She argued the statute deprives her of equal protection under the law because persons possessing over $100,000 are subject to criminal prosecution while those possessing less are totally exempted from liability. The strict scrutiny standard was not utilized despite defendant's claim that the statute discriminates on the basis of wealth, a suspect classification. The failure to make possession of lesser amounts of money a misdemeanor did not render the statute unconstitutional. The statute is aimed at large scale drug operations so the Legislature rationally limited culpability to possessors of large amounts of cash. Showing precisely what would most effectively carry out the law was not required.id: 9536
Supreme Court holds that Batson challenge may not be precluded even though jury represents a fair cross section.Under <i>Batson v. Kentucky,</i> 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a defendant may challenge a prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory challenges to remove black jurors. Defendant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptories, but the trial court rejected the challenge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the grounds that not Batson challenge could be maintained on appeal if, regardless of the motivation for peremptory challenges, the jury finally chosen represented a fair cross section of the community. In urging denial of defendant's petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General agreed that the appellate court rejected defendant's argument on improper grounds, but suggested that certiorari should be denied because alternative grounds supported the judgment. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the positions asserted in the Solicitor General's belief. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented from the practice of vacating a judgment because the Solicitor General has confessed error when the government nevertheless asserts that the outcome below is correct.id: 9537
Sexually Violent Predator law requires a finding of mental illness and present danger, and therefore does not violate equal protection or due process.Defendant argued that the Sexually Violent Predator Law (Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, et seq.) which continues the commitment for certain sex offenders whose diagnosed mental disordered has not abated, violates equal protection and due process principles in that it subjects him to long-term confinement in the absence of the requisite proof that he is mentally ill and currently dangerous and without providing him effective treatment. Contrary to defendant's claim the law requires a finding of a present mental disorder making the person presently dangerous to others, and there is therefore no equal protection violation. Moreover, the law does not violate due process for allowing an indefinite restraint on liberty without providing adequate and effective treatment since the treatment provided is current with modern medical practice and provides a realistic opportunity for improvement. Due process requires no more.id: 9519
Denial of diversion to those who possess a small amount of cocaine base while personally armed did not violate equal protection.Appellant was convicted of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1 possession of half a gram or less of a substance containing cocaine base while in the immediate personal possession of a loaded firearm. He argued the provision denied him equal protection of the laws by punishing him more harshly than someone charged under a possession statute augmented by a firearm enhancement. Specifically he claimed a fundamental liberty interest was impacted by the statutory denial of diversion under section 11370.1. However, the denial of diversion under the provision is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of the statute and the Legislature may single out a particular threat to society and punish as a separate category from other types of threats.id: 9530
Fifteen percent limit on conduct credits for violent felons does not deny equal protection because a defendant confined in a local detention center is not similarly situated to a person in state prison.Under Penal Code section 2933.1, the conduct credits for a violent felony shall not exceed 15 percent of his time served prior to sentencing. Defendant argued this limitation on presentence conduct credits violates equal protection in that it causes a person who is confined in county jail prior to sentencing, to earn fewer credits than a person who receives the same sentence but serves the entire term in prison. However, a violent felon confined in a local detention facility prior to sentencing is not similarly situated for equal protection purposes to one serving a term in state prison and enrolled in a qualifying work program.id: 9532
Hate crime statute does not deny equal protection and properly punishes the discriminatory violent offender more harshly than the random violent offender.Defendant argued Penal Code section 422.7 denied him equal protection of the law in that it punishes the discriminatory violent offender more harshly than the random violent offender. However, contrary to defendant's argument the distinction drawn by the statute between random and bigoted perpetrators of violent conduct is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny but violates the equal protection guarantee only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interests. The statute is rational and reasonably related to legitimate state interests in both curbing hate crimes and providing protection against the special harms they inflict on individual victims, their communities and society at large. Thus, the perpetrators of violent acts who select their victims because of their status and those who select victims randomly are not similarly situated.id: 9533
Cross burning statute is not an impermissible content-based prohibition on speech and does not violate equal protection.Penal Code section 11411, subdivision (c), makes it a crime to burn a cross on the private property of another for the purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant or in reckless disregard of that risk. The provision is not unconstitutional as to either its specific prohibition against cross burning or its general prohibition against desecration of religious symbols. The statute targets only acts of terrorism on the private property of another person, not the expression of ideas. It is neither overbroad nor vague, it is not an impermissible content-based prohibition on speech, and does not deny equal protection.id: 9477
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850