Exclusionary Rule, generally (good faith exception)
Category > Exclusionary Rule, generally (good faith exception)
Updated 9/12/2023Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850
Odor of marijuana and the observation of a small amount in a baggie in the center console did not provide probable cause to search the car.The odor of marijuana in a plastic baggie knotted at the top in defendant’s parked car did not provide probable cause to justify a search of the car. Pre-Prop 64 case law did not apply to the search. Moreover, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because there was no binding law specifically authorizing the search when it occurred.id: 26882
Good faith exception did not apply to pre-Riley cell phone search conducted after a stop for an infraction where there was no arrest.Defendant was detained for failing to stop at a stop sign (an infraction). He was not under arrest when police conducted a warrantless search of his cell phone. In People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, the court found police could perform a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest. In Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473, the court held to the contrary. The present search violated the Fourth Amendment under Riley, and could not be justified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because reasonably well trained officers would have known the Diaz rule only applied to searches following an arrest. id: 25002
Sale of a controlled substance in a business establishment by a patron did not provide probable cause to search the establishment.When a search warrant for a business establishment open to the public is based on the sale of controlled substances by a target who is neither an owner nor employee of the establishment, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant must establish probable cause to believe controlled substances will be found at the business establishment. The sale of controlled substances alone is insufficient, because there is no probable cause to believe the controlled substances are stored in the business establishment rather than on the person or in the possession of the target. However, the police relied in good faith on the search warrant in the present case since there was no prior legal authority on the issue.id: 17551
Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a motion to suppress unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence.The wiretap evidence was unlawfully obtained because the wiretap orders failed to identify any of the persons who were targets of the wiretaps, and the prosecution failed to disclose all statements of the defendant intercepted by the wiretap. Moreover, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a motion to suppress unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence. However, the failure to suppress the evidence was not prejudicial due to the compelling evidence of guilt independent of the wiretap evidence.id: 18528
Exclusionary rule applies to unreasonable searches and seizures by tribal officers in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Section 1302(2) of the Indian Civil Rights Act (25 U.S.C. section 1302(2)) prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by tribal police officers similar to the Fourth Amendment. Given the purpose of the Act there can be no legitimate basis for arguing evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed but evidence obtained in violation of section 1302(2) can be used at trial. Under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, Penal Code section 28(d) cannot require the
admission of evidence that is subject to an exclusionary rule imposed by federal law.id: 19514
Court properly suppressed evidence of weapons violations gained from defendant's compliance with National Firearms Act and the Leon exception did not apply where the local police received the evidence from federal authorities.Defendant was charged with multiple weapon possession violations. The trial court properly granted his suppression
motion because the evidence was obtained from the defendant's compliance with the National Firearms Act. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply where local police obtained the information from the federal agent who had to the power to inspect the records but was ordered to keep confidential all information he inspected.id: 19486
Good faith exception did not apply where officer should have known the 52 day-old information in his affidavit was stale and did not support probable cause.A police officer bought drugs from a defendant, then waited 52 days before seeking a warrant to search two residences where defendant allegedly lived. The trial court found the warrant was based on stale information but denied suppression after finding the officer executed the warrant in good faith. However, the good faith doctrine did not apply since the officer who both sought and executed the warrant, should have known the stale information contained in the affidavit lacked the necessary indicia of probable cause.id: 17503
Good faith exception does not apply to a probation search which relied on a probation roster that, by design, omitted information on the limitations of the authority to conduct a probation search.The good faith exception rule does not apply to a probation search conducted by police officers in reliance on a probation roster that, by design, omitted information concerning judicially imposed limitations on the authority to conduct a probation search.id: 17277
Search warrant was invalid due to unsworn Statement of Probable Cause but evidence was admissible under the good faith exception.Because the Statement of Probable Cause which contained all the information relied on by the magistrate issuing the search warrant was unsworn and not signed by the affiant, it did not support the warrant. Nor did the affidavit support the warrant since it set forth only the officer's sworn belief in the existence of probable cause, a legal determination which is exclusively vested in the courts. However, the affidavit and Statement of Probable Cause were not so defective on their face that a well trained officer should have recognized the error and not sought the warrant. The evidence obtained from the search was therefore admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.id: 10878
Supreme Court rules that illegally-obtained statements may not be used to impeach defense witnesses.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the exclusionary rule, holding that statements obtained from the defendant after his illegal arrest were improperly used by the prosecution to impeach a defense witness. The majority ruled that permitting illegal evidence to be used to impeach defense witnesses would significantly weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct because the occasions for introducing illegally obtained evidence at trial would vastly increase. Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor and Scalia.id: 10881
Good-faith exception is inapplicable where the search warrant is based on illegally seized evidence.Officers searched defendant's purse which they retrieved from the living room after her arrest. There was no probable cause to search the purse and no exception to the search warrant requirement applied. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to the subsequent search of her house because the warrant was based on illegally obtained evidence.id: 10868
Good faith exception did not apply where the search was based on incorrect information from police department records.Information contained in the police officer's computer readout, as well as her probation book erroneously showed that defendant was subject to a Fourth Amendment search waiver. The officer conducted a warrantless search on the basis of that erroneous information. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule cannot be expanded to prevent suppression of evidence collected in good faith reliance upon erroneous information generated within the police department.id: 10863
Good faith exception did not apply where a well-trained officer would have known there was an insufficient nexus between the drug dealing and the residence searched.The search warrant affidavit indicated that defendant, a known narcotics dealer, once parked the Camaro that he had driven to a controlled buy behind the 610 Orange Drive residence. It was silent as to whether he even entered the residence. Weeks later police saw another car that had been driven by defendant parked behind the residence although no one saw defendant park the car. The presence of the vehicles raised suspicions but failed to establish a nexus between the criminal activities and the residence. No information was presented that defendant owned the vehicles, lived at the 610 Orange Drive residence, received mail or calls there, or was seen carrying packages to and from it. There was no substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the residential search. A reasonable and well trained officer would have known more was needed to establish a nexus for the search of the residence.id: 10864
Good faith exception does not apply to Fifth Amendment and suppression was required where deaf defendant unequivocally invoked his Miranda rights.Defendant who was deaf was accompanied by a sign language interpreter during interrogation. The officer advised defendant of his rights and, while there was some confusion through the translation, defendant invoked Miranda rights. He stated that he did not really want to talk and preferred to go to court. The officer attempted to clarify the response and defendant gave incriminating statements. Defendant's unequivocal assertion of his rights should have put an end to the interview. Contrary to the trial court's finding it was immaterial whether the officer was acting in good faith when he pursued the matter further. The error was prejudicial where the conviction was based in substantial part on defendant's statements.id: 10866
Local ordinance could not justify an arrest where it was preempted by state law and there could be no good faith reliance on the ordinance by the police where the preemption issue was decided long ago.Defendant was arrested for violating an Oakland ordinance that prohibits standing in a roadway in a manner that interferes with traffic. In a search incident to arrest, the police found drugs on her person. The trial court properly granted the motion to set aside the information since the Oakland ordinance used as the basis for arrest and search was preempted by state law published in the California Vehicle Code. The continuing enforceability of the ordinance had been so undermined by earlier precedents that the police could no longer reasonably rely upon it as basis for making an arrest.id: 16736
The exclusionary rule applies to deter misconduct by the probation staff who were acting as adjuncts to law enforcement.The trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, which had been discovered by police in a search following a traffic stop. The search was conducted based upon the erroneous information that defendant was on probation for a drug offense. The prosecution sought to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule since the erroneous information was provided by the clerical staff at the county probation department. However, the clerical staff at the probation department are adjuncts to the law enforcement team in that they enter and maintain the records relied upon by the police. The good faith exception did not apply. id: 17365
Good faith of executing officers did not preclude suppression of evidence where affidavit was sealed in its entirety.Petitioners' motion to quash search warrants of their residences should have been granted on the ground that the affidavit supporting the warrants was sealed in its entirety. That the officers executing the warrant acted in good faith did not preclude suppression of the evidence seized.id: 10870
Illegal execution of administrative search required exclusion of evidence.The illegal execution of an inspection warrant required exclusion of the evidence seized at the premises.id: 10872
Good faith exception to warrant requirement did not apply where the officer failed to corroborate information from the confidential informant.Officer's failure to corroborate the evidence he received from the anonymous informant did not meet the standard of objective reasonableness. The officer failed to directly establish the veracity or basis of knowledge of the anonymous informant, and the informant's information as to the alleged criminal activity was not self-verifying, and the record did not suggest there was no reason such corroboration could not be obtained. His corroboration of appellant's residence and vehicle were detailed, but unrelated to the bank robbery, and he admitted a six-inch height discrepancy in corroborating appellant's physical description.id: 10869
Arrest is not valid if the arrest warrant is negligently delayed in being recalled.Police officers cannot rely on the good faith exception to validate an arrest if the arrest warrant is negligently delayed in being recalled and the warrant is erroneously shown as still outstanding.id: 10858
Good-faith exception does not relieve prosecution of proving the arrest warrant was not based on falsely manufactured evidence.The good-faith exception enunciated in <i>United States v. Leon</i> (1984) 458 U.S. 897, relied on to validate an arrest, does not relieve the prosecution, on demand therefore, of the necessity of proving that the arrest warrant information furnished to the arresting officer and justifying the arrest was not falsely manufactured. Moreover, the means of proving such arrest warrant information was not falsely manufactured is not exclusively limited to production of the original arrest warrant or a certified copy thereof.id: 10867
Supreme Court finds the good-faith exception under Leon did not apply where the affiant failed to clarify the conflict regarding whether officers had consent to enter the house.There was a factual conflict in the search warrant affidavit as to whether the defendant consented to the officers entering his home with him to examine his weapons as the officers were investigating a shooting. The trial court erred in applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to uphold the validity of the search warrant because the Fourth Amendment violation was the product of police rather than magisterial conduct. The affiant's failure to clarify for the magistrate the ambiguity inherent in the affidavit precluded the police from entertaining a good faith belief that the warrant was properly issued.id: 10879
Good faith exception does not apply to a search where the parole officer and police erroneously believe defendant is on parole and subject to a warrantless search condition.Federal constitutional principles require the suppression of evidence discovered by a state parole officer and police during a search they conducted under the erroneous belief that the defendant was on parole and subject to a warrantless search condition. On these facts, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rules does not apply.id: 16828
Updated 8/8/2023Good faith exception justified the officer’s warrantless entry into the defendant’s home after hot pursuit since California case law supported the action before it was prohibited in Lange v. California. Defendant’s case was on remand following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lange v. California (2021) 141 S.Ct. 2011, where the Court found that flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. On remand, the prosecution argued an alternative theory - the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, that theory was not forfeited due to the failure to raise it in the trial court. Where binding precedent supported the search, the prosecution was not required to further allege good faith. Moreover, the good faith exception applied given appellate case law supporting a warrantless entry into a home following hot pursuit. The prosecution was not required to prove the officer was aware of the law since its an objective test, and a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the law.id: 27742
The good faith exception applied where the police conducted a search in good faith reliance on bail terms that were later found to have been improperly imposed. Defendant argued that because the search was premised on a bail condition that was later found to be invalid, all evidence had to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. However, under these circumstances, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.id: 27133
The exclusionary remedy of section 632 (d), which prohibits secretly recording calls, did not survive the passage of the truth-in-evidence provision in Prop 8.Penal Code section 632, prohibits secretly recorded conversations. However, to the extent that section 632 (d) demanded suppression of relevant evidence in criminal proceedings, it was abrogated when the voters approved Prop 8, which included the “truth-in-evidence” provision. Although the Legislature amended section 632 several times after the enactment of Prop 8, none of the amendments revived the exclusionary rule of section 632 (d).id: 26557
Prop 8 truth-in-evidence provision from prevents suppression of evidence from illegally recorded phone call. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a recorded telephone conversation between a defense witness and the mother of one of the victims. He argued the ruling violated Penal Code section 632, subd.(d), which prohibits the admission of evidence obtained as a result of recording a conversation without the consent of all parties. However, the “truth-in-evidence” provision added to the state constitution as part of Proposition 8 in 1982, abrogated the exclusionary rule to the extent it is invoked to suppress relevant evidence in a criminal case. id: 25233
Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to a warrantless cell phone search conducted after Diaz.In People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, the California Supreme Court authorized the cell phone search of an arrestee under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement . In Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473, the United States Supreme Court disagreed and found that absent an emergency, police need a warrant before searching the digital content of a cell phone incident to arrest. The search in the present case took place after the Diaz decision. Because Diaz was applicable at the time of the search, the officer’s conduct in searching the phone was in good faith and the court did not err in failing to exclude the evidence obtained from the cell phone.id: 23796
Good-faith exception applied to warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect that occurred before McNeely opinion. Defendant argued the warrantless nonconsensual blood draw taken after his drunk driving arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights. While such searches had been approved for years in order to prevent dissipation of alcohol levels in the bloodstream, the practice was repudiated in McNeely v. Missouri (2013) 133 S. Ct. 1552, which requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an exigent circumstance existed that would justify a warrantless search. However, the search took place before McNeely and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Moreover, the police did not use excessive force in drawing the blood where the defendant was kicking and the officer didn’t strike or abuse him. id: 23849
McNeely did not require suppression of evidence of warrantless blood draw following the drunk driving arrest.Defendant was arrested for drunk driving causing injury and police took a blood sample over his objection and without a search warrant. Defendant moved to suppress the result of the blood test in light of Missouri v. NcNeely (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1552, where the court held a warrant may be required for such situations. However, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied since all binding precedent permitted warrantless blood draws incident to arrest if done in a medically approved manner. In any event, defendant’s mandatory postrelease community supervision search and seizure condition authorized the warrantless blood draw.id: 23895
Good faith exception applied because of a case that allowed the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device to a car before U.S. v. Jones.Police placed a GPS tracking device on defendant’s car without getting a search warrant. In United States v. Jones (2012) 132 S.Ct. 945, the court ruled that procedure violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the bad search did not require exclusion of the evidence because the searching officers reasonably relied in good faith on the binding appellate precedent from an earlier case holding that the installation of a GPS device was not a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.id: 23952
Defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw at the police station even though the officer partially misled him regarding the consequences of a refusal.Defendant argued the forced blood draw following his drunk driving arrest was unlawful under Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1552. However, defendant consented to the blood draw and his consent was voluntary even though he gave it in response to a partially misleading claim about the consequences of his refusal. And the blood was drawn in a reasonable manner even though done at the police station rather than a medical facility. Finally, even if defendant’s consent was invalid, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the police reasonably relied on binding precedent to support the warrantless blood draw.id: 24008
The exclusionary rule is not required in SVP proceedings.SVP cases do not present a compelling need for an additional deterrent to unlawful searches or seizures over and above exclusion in a criminal prosecution. Therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply in SVP proceedings. id: 23097
Even though the vehicle search was improper under Gant, the good faith exception applies because the search was valid at the time under Belton.Incident to defendant’s arrest, police search the glove compartment of his car while he was seated in the rear seat of the patrol car. The procedure was proper at the time of the search pursuant to New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, but improper later under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___. Gant must be applied retroactively and therefore applies in the present case. However, reversal is not required because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies as the officers performed a search that was lawful at the time.id: 21322
Supreme Court rejects exclusionary rule for evidence seized by officers acting in good faith reliance on negligent record keeping. Police officers in one county arrested defendant based on a warrant listed in the database of a neighboring county. A search incident to that arrest yielded drugs and a gun. About ten minutes after defendant was arrested, law
enforcement personnel learned that the warrant had been recalled months earlier, but the recall
had not been entered into the database. In defendant’s federal prosecution for being a felon in
possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance, the district court denied
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search incident to his arrest because
the police had acted based on a good faith belief that the warrant remained outstanding. The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored by the Chief Justice, held that the exclusionary rule
does not apply when officers act on the basis of negligent record-keeping error by other law
enforcement authorities. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent. id: 21349
Suppression was not required where the initial detention was improper (local ordinance defendant violated was preempted by Vehicle Code) where defendant’s resistance to the arrest was an independent act that dissipated the taint.Defendant was improperly detained for walking down the middle of a street in a business district, because the Sacramento City Code provision that prohibits such conduct is preempted by the Vehicle Code which considers his action lawful. The police therefore lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply since the officers were reasonably expected to know the California Vehicle Code. However, defendant’s resistance to arrest was an independent act that dissipated the taint from the illegal detention and so the trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion.id: 20673
There was no Fourth Amendment violation where the search of defendant’s barracks was authorized by the base commander rather than a civilian warrant.Defendant argued the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence that was the product of two warrantless searches of his barracks at the air force base. He did not question the existence of probable cause to procure a warrant or procedural compliance with military law. He argued that since he was tried by a jury in state court, a search warrant founded in civilian law was the only legally cognizable basis for the search of his quarters. However, the search which was valid under military law did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and if it did, the investigating officers’s reasonable good faith reliance on that authorization justified the denial of the suppression motion.id: 20624
Supreme Court holds that knock-and-announce violation does not require suppressionThe Fourth Amendment requires police officers executing a search warrant to knock on the door of the premises for which they have the warrant and-announce their presence before entering. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search.id: 20180
Supreme Court holds suppression is not a remedy for violations of Vienna Convention.The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provided that when a national of one country is detained by authorities in another, the authorities must notify the consulate of his country without delay if the detainee so requests. A foreign national arrested by State authorities was not informed of his right to have his consulate informed of his detention. Defendant claimed that his subsequent statement should be suppressed because of a violation of the Vienna Convention. Without determining whether the Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, the Supreme Court held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Convention.id: 20172
Searching officers relied in good faith on search waiver even though the guilty plea to which the probation condition attached was later vacated.In 1995, defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography. As a condition of probation, he waived his Fourth Amendment rights. In 1999, police searched his home and found more child pornography. Thereafter, defendant succeeded in having the 1995 guilty plea withdrawn because the court had failed to advise him of the mandatory sex offender registration requirement. Defendant argued that the 1999 search was invalid and that the search condition was nullified when the 1995 judgment was vacated. However, the officers conducted the search in good faith reliance on the probation condition. There was nothing the officer could have reasonably done in advance of their search that would have put them on notice that the Fourth Amendment waiver was anything but valid.id: 18203
Speed trap exclusionary rules do not apply to drunk driving cases.The Commissioner held defendant's initial stop for speeding was the result of an illegal speed trap and all evidence obtained thereafter was inadmissible under Vehicle Code sections 40803 and 40804. However, the speed trap exclusionary rules set forth in section 40803 and 40804 only apply when a defendant is charged with an offense involving the speed of the vehicle. The statutes did not apply to the present case in which the defendant was charged with drunk driving.id: 17786
Good faith exception applied to stop which was based on erroneous data from the DMV suggesting the vehicle's registration was expired.Vallejo police stopped defendant's car based on a computerized report from the Department of Motor Vehicles, stating that the vehicle's registration had expired. The subsequent search produced drugs. In fact, the vehicle registration was current and the DMV data was erroneous. The suppression motion was properly denied under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule since the clerks who generated the DMV database are not police officers, law enforcement officials or adjuncts of law enforcement, and therefore have no stake in the outcome of criminal prosecutions.id: 17039
Suppression of contraband was not required following search of minor at police station after arrest for misdemeanor offense despite possible Welfare and Institutions Code violation.Minor was arrested for a curfew violation and detained at the police station since it was determined his parents were not at home. He argued a Welfare and Institutions Code provision requires a "cite and release" for a first time curfew violator, and therefore, the contraband seized during the search at the station should have been suppressed. However, under Proposition 8, suppression of evidence is proper only if required by the federal Constitution. There is no federal Constitutional provision prohibiting a peace officer from detaining a juvenile arrested for a misdemeanor offense and searching the minor at the police station.id: 15599
Suppression was not required where the police officer relied on incorrect information from the probation officer regarding a probation search condition.Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a police officer, acting in reasonable reliance on information obtained from a juvenile probation officer that a search condition exists, need not be suppressed if it is determined subsequently that the information was correct.id: 15600
Good faith exception applied where the officer omitted from the search warrant affidavit information that was favorable to the probable cause finding.The trial court granted defendant's suppression motion after finding the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause. However, the officer had omitted facts which were favorable to the issuance of the warrant. The trial court erred in ruling that the officer conducting the search could not rely on the warrant in good faith under <i>United States v. Leon</i> (1984) 468 U.S. 897, because the officer had omitted from his affidavit in support of the application the favorable information which supported the probable cause finding.id: 14911
Supreme Court refuses to exclude evidence where arrest was caused by court employee's computer error.During a routine traffic stop, police entered defendant's name into a computer data terminal in the patrol car. The computer erroneously indicated defendant had an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant. In fact, the warrant had been quashed, but the court clerk's office failed to notify the Sheriff's office. As a result, defendant was taken into custody, and marijuana was discovered in his car. In a 7-2 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the marijuana to be suppressed. Applying the exclusionary rule for court employees would not deter them from making occasional errors, nor could it be expected to alter the arresting officer's behavior, since there was no indication he did not act reasonably in relying on the computer record. Justice Stevens dissented, and Justice Ginsberg would have dismissed the writ.id: 10880
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be used to impeach a witness.It was permissible for the prosecutor to impeach a witness with evidence that he had possessed a pipe containing cocaine residue, despite the court's recognition of the fact that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search.id: 10859
Good-faith exception applied where affiant included description of items to be seized but such information was omitted from the warrant.The officer who prepared the search warrant affidavit included a particular description of the items to be seized. However, the search warrant wholly omitted that information. The officer reasonably relied on the magistrate's having signed the search warrant. It was the district attorney's office and the magistrate, not the police officer who made the critical mistake and suppression of the evidence was not required.id: 10860
Good faith exception applies where the officer relies on erroneous computer-generated data furnished by the judicial system.The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the invalid warrantless search conducted in this case based on the investigating officer's objectively reasonable good faith reliance upon erroneous computer-generated information developed solely within the judicial branch of the government. The trial court therefore erred in granting the suppression motion.id: 10861
Good faith exception applies to violation of the rule dealing with out-of-county search warrants.When police officers sought an out-of-county search warrant, they failed to advise the magistrate that they were investigating crimes which had occurred in the issuing county. The affidavit was therefore facially deficient within the meaning of <i>People v. Fleming</i> (1981) 29 Cal.3d 698. However, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to search warrants issued in violation of <i>Fleming</i>.id: 10862
House search pursuant to a warrant was proper under the good-faith exception despite the inadvertent omission from the warrant of the list of items to be seized.The items to be seized page was inadvertently omitted from the search warrant package submitted to the magistrate. The magistrate reviewed the application and approved it without commenting that there were any omissions. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was properly applied. The searching officers believed in good faith that a valid warrant had been issued. Moreover, the searching officers, all of whom participated in the surveillance, knew exactly what they were looking for and there was no evidence that the search conducted was overbroad. Finally, there was no merit to appellant's contention that the warrant itself must be present at the premises to be searched.id: 10871
In determining the officer's objective reasonableness in relying on a search warrant for purposes of the good faith exception the fact that the warrant had been issued is of no significance.Pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as set forth in <i>United States v. Leon</i> (1984) 468 U.S. 897, the government has the burden of establishing that the officer's reliance on the search warrant issued by the magistrate was objectively reasonable. In making this determination, the fact that the warrant had been issued is of no significance. The appropriate test is as follows: If a well-trained officer should reasonably have <U>known</U> that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause (and hence he should not have sought a warrant), exclusion is required under <i>Leon</i>. Exclusion was not required in the instant case where the officer obtained substantial corroborating information that, although stale, was sufficient to make the probable cause question a close call. Moreover, the officer submitted the affidavit to a deputy district attorney who approved it. It could not be said that an objective and reasonable officer would have known the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.id: 10873
Officer prepared the affidavit believing in good faith that it was proper to rely on the cassette provided by the informant.Appellant argued that the search warrant affidavit prepared by the officer failed to explicitly indicate appellant's telephone conversations had been surreptitiously and illegally recorded. However, the officer's testimony supported the conclusion that he prepared the affidavit believing in good faith that it was proper to rely on the cassette provided by the informant. Although his legal conclusion was wrong, he could not be faulted for failing to correctly anticipate the court's ruling on the question.id: 10874
Omission in the search warrant affidavit of the link between defendant's activities and the described premises did not render reliance on the subsequent warrant unreasonable.While the search warrant affidavit provided a detailed description of the residence to be searched and gave a detailed description of defendant's rent skimming activities it did not provide facts linking defendant to the described premises. The affidavit was complete in all other respects. Given the nature of the mission the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. The officers therefore reasonably relied on the subsequent warrant.id: 10875
Physical evidence seized as a result of Miranda violation is not excludable under the Wong Sun doctrine.Defendant argued the seizure of cocaine base and marijuana occurred as a result of a custodial interrogation that was not preceded by Miranda warnings and therefore the court erred in denying her suppression motion. However, even though evidence was seized as a result of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda principles, exclusion of such evidence is not required by federal law and therefore such evidence may not be excluded under California law.id: 10876
Police objectively relied on the warrant to search defendant's residence where surveillance showed twice that after a dealer agreed to sell drugs he drove immediately to defendant's residence and then consummated the sale.Defendant pleaded guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance. He argued the suppression motion was improperly denied as the trial court found the officers relied on the warrant in good faith under <i>Leon</i>. Defendant claimed the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was unreasonable for an officer to believe such cause existed. However, on January 11, a drug dealer's emissaries visited defendant's home shortly after the dealer said he would check his sources to see if drugs could be delivered. On January 30, within minutes of agreeing to sell drugs, the dealer stopped briefly at defendant's residence and then drove without interruption to consummate the drug sale. The facts permit a reasonable inference that defendant's residence was a source of supply for the drug dealer.id: 10877
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850