Consent Searches
Category > Consent Searches
Consent to search was invalid once the police learned defendant’s arrest was based on a mistake of fact.Defendant was under de facto arrest when the police applied the handcuffs, seated him on the sidewalk curb and asked for consent to search his car. However, probable cause for the arrest ceased to exist when police determined the object found in his pocket was a diamond, not drugs. Absent probable cause to arrest, defendant’s consent to search was invalid.id: 24711
The defendant’s consent to the search of his backpack was not voluntary where he was detained when he gave it. Defendant was detained before he consented to the search of his backpack. The officer asked the minor defendant (and his brother) whether they had anything illegal, conducted a records check and searched them while physically restraining them. A reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not feel free to leave after being told to sit on the curb. The consent given to search the backpack was therefore involuntary.id: 23682
Handcuffing defendant after the police saw his friend smoking pot constituted an arrest without probable cause.Two teenagers were walking down the street in the afternoon and one was smoking a marijuana cigarette. That teenager was arrested. Defendant, the companion was handcuffed and then asked for permission to search him. He consented and the police found drugs. However, the conduct of the officers exceeded a reasonable detention and defendant was under arrest when the officer asked for permission to search him. Because there was no probable cause to arrest him, the consent to search was not voluntary, and the evidence discovered must be suppressed.id: 20571
The evidence did not show that handcuffing the driver was necessary for the detention, and therefore did not establish his consent to search was necessary.The officers who had been informed that defendant’s vehicle had been involved in a narcotics transaction, stopped the truck for a possible Vehicle Code infraction. The police ordered defendant (the driver) out of the truck. Defendant was cooperative but was handcuffed because he was several inches taller than the officer, and then consented to a search of his person. However, the evidence did not show the handcuffing was necessary and defendant’s height did not make him a threat to the officer’s safety. The consent to search was not lawfully obtained and the trial court erred in failing to grant the suppression motion.id: 20629
A university safety officer did not have the authority to give police consent to enter a dorm room but suppression was not required as the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. A university security officer did not have the actual authority to consent to the search of a student's dorm room. The subsequent entry of the room by the police was therefore unreasonable. The security guard may have had the apparent authority to consent, but that issue was not addressed since it was determined the evidence would have been inevitably
discovered by police. The school's safety officer had contacted police after gathering the evidence and it was likely the police would have been further involved in the investigation.id: 19310
The search of a container found inside defendant's car exceeded the scope of the consent to search.Following a traffic stop, the officer said he smelled marijuana and asked defendant's consent for a "real quick" "check" of the car. Defendant consented. The officer spent the next 15 minutes searching the passenger compartment, the trunk and under the hood. Defendant's consent to search reasonably ended there. The officer's subsequent search of a record cleaning machine by unscrewing the back panel exceeded the scope of the consent to search. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence.id: 19558
Consent was invalid where it was the product of an unlawful detention and given only while the officer unreasonably withheld defendant's green card.Following an agricultural inspection defendant was detained by an immigration officer who inquired as to defendant's immigration status and took defendant's green card. Defendant's subsequent consent to search the trunk was the product of inherently coercive circumstances in which he consented to the search only after the officer unreasonably withheld his green card. The consent was therefore invalid and the search unlawful.id: 11144
The trial court erred in admitting testimony that defendant refused the officer's request to enter his property without a warrant.Defendant was charged with animal abuse. The trial court erred when it allowed an animal control officer to testify, over defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment objection, that defendant refused the officer's request to enter the property without a warrant. However, the error was harmless because the testimony would have been admissible to impeach defendant's testimony that he lacked ownership and control of the property and the animal located thereon.id: 17059
Visitor who walked away from the officer without closing the door did not consent to his entry.An officer informed an apparent visitor to an apartment that he was investigating reported drug sales. The visitor did not invite the officer in, but merely walked away as if to retrieve defendant. Under these circumstances, it was unreasonable as a matter of law for the officer to have assumed or inferred the visitor had consented to his entry and observation of the bedroom, if it was even reasonable to assume he was invited to cross the threshold of the apartment. The visitor's awareness of his entry and lack of protest did not validate the unconstitutional entry.id: 11151
Consent to search defendant after he had been forced into a house at gunpoint and patted down for weapons was not independent from the illegal detention.Defendant was visiting a house that was being searched by officers. He was ordered into the house at gunpoint, patted down for weapons and interrogated regarding his identity. He was asked for consent to a search of his person and vehicle, and personally searched a second time, all within less than three minutes. Under the circumstances, the consent cannot be segregated from the illegal assertion of authority.id: 11143
Condo owner's consent to install video equipment did not authorize surveillance when he was not present.The government informant who owned the condominium in which defendant was staying was authorized to consent to a search of the premises. However, the informant also consented to the installation of video cameras. The search pursuant to the monitoring equipment was only valid while the informant was in the condo. Once he left the condo, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by continued video surveillance.id: 11141
Supreme Court holds testing pregnant mothers for cocaine was unreasonable search without consent.In an effort to deter pregnant women from using cocaine, a South Carolina hospital offered to cooperate with the city in prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. A task force made up of hospital representatives, police, and local officials developed a policy for identifying and testing pregnant patients suspected of drug use. The policy contained police procedures and criteria for arresting patients who tested positive and prescribed prosecutions for drug offenses or child neglect, depending on the stage of the pregnancy. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes was an unreasonable search where the patients did not consent for the test to be used for this purpose. The majority held that the state's interest in deterring pregnant women from using cocaine could not justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. Justice Scalia dissented, joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas..id: 15131
Use of a police ruse led to an unlawful detention and the subsequent consent to search defendant's person was ineffective.An undercover officer approached a house and announced through a screen door that he had collided with the white truck parked in the alley. Defendant exited the house to investigate and was met by uniformed officers with masks and vests. The officers asked if they could search his person for drugs and he agreed. The use of the ruse led to an unlawful detention and any consent to the warrantless search of his person was a product of that illegality.id: 15621
Defendant’s consent to search the truck was valid where he was not detained at the time he gave it. Defendant was detained for a traffic stop and the officer spent a reasonable period of time examining his documents. The officer then returned the documents and told defendant he was free to leave. As defendant walked back towards his tractor-trailer, the officer asked for consent to search his truck. The consent defendant gave was not invalid as a reasonable person would have felt free to leave and the officer’s request was not coercive or accompanied by a show of authority.id: 25862
Consent to a blood draw was valid after Birchfield where defendant was given the other less intrusive alternatives.Defendant was arrested for drunk driving and admonished that he was required to submit to a blood, urine or breath test, or face civil/criminal penalties. His consent to a blood test was not invalid in that it was given under threat of prosecution. Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 136 S.Ct. 2160, didn’t support his claim since he was given the other less intrusive alternative. id: 26406
Defendant could not challenge the forced blood draw given his earlier probation condition that required he submit to such a procedure.Defendant charged with drunk driving moved to suppress the results of a blood draw taken without his consent. However, defendant was on probation at the time, and as a condition of that probation, acknowledged that he had no right to refuse to a chemical test if arrested for drunk driving.id: 26162
The 15 year-old suspected of killing her newborn baby voluntarily consented to the search of her cell phone from her hospital bed.The minor was found to have committed murder of her infant son after a home birth. She argued the police violated her reasonable expectation of privacy by entering the hospital room and obtaining consent to search her cell phone. However, evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that consent to search the phone was freely and voluntarily given, impliedly considering her youth and medical condition.id: 26105
Consent to search the house given by a cotenant was valid even though the other cotenant objected while not present after his arrest.Police may search a jointly occupied premises if one occupant consents but that consent is insufficient where another occupant is present and objects. However, the denial of consent is only valid where the objecting party is present and did not apply to a defendant who objected after he had been removed from the premises by police following his arrest.id: 23886
The evidence did not show that defendant’s consent to enter the house and surrender his computer was coerced.The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s suppression motion based on the claim that the consent to search his home and computer was obtained by improper police coercion. The court was entitled to reject the claim that the officer prevented defendant’s mother from initially closing the door when he asked to enter, and there was no other evidence showing the consent to search was involuntary.id: 23867
Defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw at the police station even though the officer partially misled him regarding the consequences of a refusal.Defendant argued the forced blood draw following his drunk driving arrest was unlawful under Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1552. However, defendant consented to the blood draw and his consent was voluntary even though he gave it in response to a partially misleading claim about the consequences of his refusal. And the blood was drawn in a reasonable manner even though done at the police station rather than a medical facility. Finally, even if defendant’s consent was invalid, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the police reasonably relied on binding precedent to support the warrantless blood draw.id: 24008
Defendant consented to a search for weapons and drugs even though the officer may only have mentioned weapons. Defendant argued the search of his person exceeded the scope of his consent as he consented to a search for weapons, not drugs and searching the coin pocket of his pants for a knife that could not fit in the pocket was a mere pretext. However, the officer knew defendant was an armed drug user and communicated this to defendant before asking to search him. It was reasonable to conclude that defendant understood the officer was asking to search for drugs and weapons even though he expressly mentioned only the weapons.id: 22844
The cotenant’s consent to search the apartment after defendant had been taken away was valid.Defendant refused to consent to a search of her apartment, was arrested and a cotenant consented to a search after defendant had been taken away. The cotenant’s consent to a search of the apartment she shared with defendant was valid, and the trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion.id: 22818
A second search of the car at the police station did not exceed the scope of consent to search given when defendant was originally stopped.Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and gave the officer consent to search his truck. The search produced no incriminating evidence but a second officer determined defendant might have outstanding arrest warrants. Police took defendant and his truck to a local police station where another officer searched the truck for a second time, this time finding cocaine. Under these circumstances, the second search of the vehicle did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s initial consent.id: 22518
Officers did not exceed the scope of the consent to search the house for Jones by opening the dryer door to stop the noise.Two police officers and a probation officer visited defendant’s house looking to perform a probation compliance search on Jones, who had given this address to his probation officer. Defendant said Jones was not there but the officers could check. She also said her children and her brother were upstairs sleeping. Police did not exceed the scope of the consent when they opened the door to the noisy clothes dryer which contained a metal object that was making noise. The officers reasonably opened the door to stop the loud noise which inhibited the officers from clearly ordering the people who were upstairs, to walk downstairs in a manner consistent with the safety of all involved in the otherwise lawful encounter. id: 21887
The minor’s parent had the authority to consent to a search of his bedroom and to override any objection he raised to the search.Police officers went to the minor’s apartment suspecting the minor’s brother may have been involved in a crime. His mother authorized the officers to search the entire apartment. The minor objected and blocked entry into his room but relented when his mother ordered him to move. Because he was a minor, his mother had the authority to consent to a search of his bedroom and his objection to the entry did not preclude a consensual search.id: 21808
Defendant was not detained when he gave the officer his shoe to examine and the consent was therefore voluntary.Defendant, his daughter and nephews accompanied police to the police station for witness statements. They rode in the back seat of the police car with no handcuffs and sat in a public area of the station when not being questioned. They were specifically told they were not suspects and were not given Miranda advisements. When defendant gave consent for the officer to examine his shoe he was not detained. id: 20295
Supreme Court holds that scope of consent to search a vehicle extended to a closed container therein.After stopping the defendant for a traffic infraction, the officer told him he had reason to believe he was carrying narcotics in the car and asked permission to search the car, after explaining that defendant did not have to consent. Defendant gave permission to search the automobile. The officer searched the car, found a brown paper bag, opened it and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. In a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within the automobile. Since the officer told defendant he believed he was carrying narcotics, it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. The court rejected the argument that if the police wished to search containers within a car, they must separately request permission to search each container. Justices Marshall and Stevens dissented.id: 11149
Supreme Court holds that bus passengers need not be told they can refuse consent to search.In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the Supreme Court held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching bus passengers, asking them questions, and requesting consent to search, as long as a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request and terminate the interview. In Bostick, the officers told the passengers that they had the right to refuse consent. On this basis the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Bostick to require officers to inform a bus passenger that he had the right to refuse consent before asking to search the passenger or his effects. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent. id: 20144
The Fourth Amendment does not require police to corroborate an anonymous tip before contacting the occupant of the residence and seeking consent to enter and search. The Fourth Amendment does not require police to corroborate an anonymous tip before contacting the occupant of the residence and seeking consent to enter and search a residence. Even if acting on an anonymous, uncorroborated tip, police may knock on the door of a residence, speak with the occupant, and request permission to enter and search.id: 19677
Defendant's girlfriend's consent to search the house was voluntary even though there were several officers present and the event was stressful, where she had time to reflect and contact defendant and counsel before giving consent. Defendant argued his girlfriend's consent to search the house they shared was coerced by police threats and intimidation. However, while the girlfriend was upset and emotional when police returned to the house and sought permission to search, these events are inherently stressful. It was several hours
between the time police left the house, and returned looking to search the area. She had an opportunity to reflect, and in fact, burned the jacket defendant wore on the night of the murder. Moreover, she acknowledged she was permitted to consult with both defendant and an attorney before giving permission. While several officers appeared at their house, the consent she
provided was not coerced.id: 19060
Person who laundered defendant's clothes and placed them inside his bags at her residence had authority to consent to the search of his bags.Defendant argued police wrongfully searched the belongings he stored in a private home. Defendant left these belongings in bags at a residence occupied by two other people, knowing that one of them routinely placed defendant's laundered clothing inside the bags, and he never instructed her not to do so. Therefore, that person had access to defendant's personal effects sufficient to endow her with the authority to consent to the search.id: 18761
Reasonable suspicion is not required to request consent to search.Following a traffic stop for a broken taillight, the officer requested consent to search the car. Defendant argued the evidence found in the search needed to be suppressed. According to defendant, the police need an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing before requesting consent to search. However, this is not so as long as the detention is not unreasonably prolonged as a result of the request to search. The request did not unreasonably prolong the stop where only two minutes elapsed from the time of the stop to the request for consent.
id: 18602
Defendant's consent to search was voluntary even though it was given while he was under arrest and handcuffed in the patrol car.While sitting handcuffed in the back of a police car, defendant consented to a search of the room he shared with Brock's 16 year-old son, after Brock came out to the car and told defendant she had no objection to the search. The fact that defendant was under arrest and handcuffed at the time he gave consent to search the room, did not render the consent involuntary. Moreover, that the police asked Brock for consent to search the apartment and informed defendant of that fact, did not constitute a false inducement for consent or render the defendant's consent involuntary.id: 18250
Entry into the backyard in order to knock on the rear door did not invalidate the subsequent oral and written consents to search the house in light of the exigent circumstances.Defendant argued that when the detective walked into the backyard and knocked on the back door, the Fourth Amendment violation invalidated the subsequently obtained written and oral consents. However, the case involved exigent circumstances including the need to apprehend an absconding parolee who was considered armed and hiding in a residential neighborhood. This exigency strongly outweighed the marginal relevant impact of the trespass into defendant's backyard.id: 16927
16 year-old's consent justified the officers' entry where she appeared to have the authority, and therefore an announcement under Penal Code section 844 was not required.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the police improperly relied on the consent of his 16 year-old daughter when they entered his home. He claimed the subsequent search of his bedroom, though performed with his permission, was tainted fruit of the unlawful entry. However, after knocking, officers entered the house legally, in response to the daughter's consent. While not all 16 year-olds may have the authority to consent, the court accepted the officer's version of the facts suggesting the girl engaged in conduct demonstrating some degree of control over the premises. Moreover, the defendant thereafter made no attempt to revoke the consent.id: 15641
Authorized scope of consent to search the truck was not exceeded by search of suitcases in the back or use of a drug dog.Defendant consented to a search of his truck. The subsequent search of the seedbags and suitcases in the back of the truck did not exceed the scope of the search. Moreover, the authorized scope of the search was not exceeded by use of a drug-sniffing dog, or transportation of the truck to an off-highway location.id: 15642
Neither the lack of Miranda warnings nor the failure to inform defendant of his right to refuse will invalidate an otherwise facially voluntary consent to search.The consent to search the vehicle was voluntary where the officer asked permission to search, defendant answered yes in Spanish and handed his car keys to the officer. When the officer first asked for permission to search the car defendant was not in custody but was merely being detained. Neither the lack of <i>Miranda</i> warnings nor the failure of police officers to inform defendant of his right to refuse can invalidate an otherwise facially voluntary consent to search.id: 15643
Officers reasonably believed defendant's sister could provide consent to search his briefcase which was located at her house.Defendant argued the court erred in denying the motion to suppress items found in his briefcase which was seized from his sister's house. The sister testified at the suppression hearing that her consent to the search was involuntary whereas the officer testified to the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court deferred to the implied factual determination of the trial court. Moreover, the consent to search the apartment - in which defendant had no possessory interest - extended to the search of his briefcase. The officers explained the purpose of the search as it related to the investigation of the murder of a police officer. It was reasonable to conclude the consent included the briefcase which was capable of storing incriminating evidence such as weapons. Finally, it was reasonable for the officers to believe the sister had authority to consent to search the briefcase since it appeared she had joint if not exclusive access to it.id: 15644
Unlawful detention of defendant did not terminate the consent to search.Defendant argued his original consent to search terminated as a matter of law when he was unlawfully detained immediately after the consent was given. However, the unlawful detention did not terminate the consent to search the truck.id: 15645
12 year-old full time babysitter, who was the victim of corporal injury, had authority to consent to a search of the residence.Defendant was convicted of corporal injury to a child - her 12 year-old full time babysitter. She argued the search was unlawful because it was unreasonable for the police to believe the 12 year-old victim had authority to consent to a search of the residence. However, the victim was not an occasional babysitter, but rather, was in charge of the household, as a servant, for forty hours a week. Moreover, she initiated the events which led to the investigation and there was no suggestion she submitted to police authority. Finally, defendant herself invited the officers into the living room, and the victim simply led the officers into the other rooms and handed various items to the officers. The consent to search under these circumstances was valid.id: 11139
Co-tenant had the authority to consent to the search of the house.While at the police station defendant telephoned his co-tenant and told her that the decision to allow the police to search their house was hers. Nothing in the conversation implied to her that his cooperation had been coerced. Co-tenant's subsequent consent to search the house was valid.id: 11140
Consent of an absent co-occupant validated the police entry despite the lack of express consent from defendant co-occupants.Police entry onto the premises of which the defendants were co-occupants was validated by the consent of an absent co-occupant, notwithstanding the lack of express consent from the defendants themselves.id: 11142
Defendant's refusal to consent to search his bedroom, among other things, determined his consent to search the rest of the apartment was not coerced.Defendant argued consent to search the home was coerced based upon the lateness of the hour, the display of the weapon, the fact that he was handcuffed, the number of officers present and the failure to advise him of the right to refuse consent. However, he was not awakened by the police entry and was not told a warrant would be sought if he refused consent. Moreover, he was aware of his right to refuse consent to search his bedroom.id: 11145
Defendant's wife had authority to consent to a search of their house even though she had moved out and defendant had changed the locks.Defendant's wife moved out of their house out of fear for her safety. She moved to a temporary residence at a battered woman's shelter. She accompanied police to search the house for evidence of defendant's involvement in a robbery/murder. Defendant had changed the locks and the wife had to crawl through a window to gain entrance and let the police in the house. The trial court properly found the wife had authority to consent to a search of the residence. At that point the couple was still married and defendant had no legal right to exclude her. As defendant's wife she remained liable for the rent and accidents on the property despite her absence. She had also left a substantial amount of property behind. That he changed the locks was indicative of the level of antagonism but was not determinative of her continuing authority to consent to a search.id: 11146
Reasonable appearance of authority over premises supports reliance on third-party consent to search.In <i>U.S. v. Matlock</i>, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), the Court explicitly reserved the question whether a third-party consent to search eliminates arguments that a warrantless search is unreasonable when the third-party lacks actual authority over the searched premises, but reasonably appears to possess such authority. Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the reasonable appearance of authority over the premises suffices to validate a warrantless entry and search. The court relied on other cases in which the validity of searches under the Fourth Amendment turned on the facts as they reasonably appeared rather than the facts as they actually were. The Court cautioned, however, that even an explicit representation that a person lives in a certain place will not justify police entry in reliance on that person's consent if a reasonable person would doubt the consenting party's representations. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens dissented.id: 11147
Removal of a vent from a door fell within the scope of a suspect's consent to search his car for drugs.A suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when, after the suspect gives the officer consent to search the interior, glove compartment and trunk of his vehicle for drugs, the officer removes a screw from the plastic door vent and disengaged the vent.id: 11148
The canine sniff did not exceed the scope of defendant's consent to search his baggage and while the dog was outside the car, the sniff revealed probable cause to search the car's interior.Defendant was a passenger in a lawfully stopped car. The officer asked defendant if he had cocaine and whether the officer could search the car. Defendant replied, Just my stuff. The officer in a K-9" unit then brought out the dog and opened the trunk which contained defendant's luggage. The dog then bypassed the trunk and went to the open passenger door and he alerted to the area under the passenger seat where a package of cocaine was found. Defendant argued the consent was limited to his baggage and did not extend to a search of the trunk. However, the baggage was in the trunk and the consent was meaningless unless it included consent to open the trunk. Once the trunk was open the officer did not search beyond what was in plain view. Moreover, defendant's consent to search his bags, and implicitly the trunk, extended to the use of a drug sniffing dog.id: 11150
Battered victim/wife standing out on the porch properly gave consent to enter the premises to arrest defendant.Officers were investigating a domestic dispute and found the wife outside of the house crying uncontrollably. She stated that defendant (her husband) had hit her several times. Officers entered the home without a warrant and with only the wife's consent. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence derived form the detention, arrest and search. However, the entry was justified both by exigent circumstances and consent. The risk of imminent violence resulting in further physical harm to the victim was an exigent circumstance requiring immediate action. Moreover, the victim had the authority to consent to police entry into the premises to arrest defendant and his authority was not vitiated nor the victim's joint occupant status negated by defendant's refusal to give consent.id: 11117
Supreme Court holds that asking bus passengers for permission to search their luggage is not a seizure per se.Without articulable suspicion, two uniformed officers boarded a bus and asked the defendant for consent to search his luggage after advising him that he had the right to refuse. The trial court found that the defendant consented, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, adopting a per se rule that every encounter on a bus is a seizure. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. The case was remanded to the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether, on the facts of this case, a seizure occurred. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 11015
Supreme Court says defendant need not be told he is free to go before asking for consent to search.After a routine traffic stop the officer asked defendant to step out of his car, issued a verbal warning and returned defendants drivers license to him. At this point, the officer asked whether the defendant was carrying any drugs or weapons. When defendant answered No, the officer asked if he could search the car. Defendant consented and the officer found a small amount of marijuana and one pill of MDMA. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, establishing a bright line rule requiring that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed that they are free to go before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The court noted that it had consistently eschewed bright line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. In particular in <i>Schneckloth v. Bustamonte</i>, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the court rejected a per se rule, stating the [w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the <i>sine qua non</i> of an effective consent. <i>Id</i>., at 227.id: 10986
Detaining defendant who entered the residence during the execution of a search warrant was proper.Officers were searching a residence pursuant to a warrant. When defendant entered the residence without knocking or announcing his presence, the officers executing the warrant had reason to believe defendant was directly connected to the premises in some way. Moreover, there was no evidence that the officers at the premises had completed their search for contraband before defendant consented to a search of his truck and his residence. Finally, defendant provided false information regarding his identity and therefore, the officers had reason to extend the detention in an effort to determine his true identity. The consent to search his truck and residence was not the product of an unlawful detention.id: 10968
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850