Arrest and Detention, generally
Category > Arrest and Detention, generally
Updated 9/25/2023Detention became unduly prolonged once the officer saw the paper registration taped to the window but continued questioning defendant.The trial court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion because the detention was unlawfully prolonged. The detention became unlawful once the officer saw the documents attached to the window showing defendant had not committed a traffic violation, and continued questioning defendant about potential wrongdoing.id: 28048
Updated 9/25/2023Police unlawfully prolonged the stop by failing to address the traffic infractions while waiting for a narcotics dog to arrive.Defendant was stopped for two traffic infractions and detained for about 15 minutes until a narcotics dog arrived. Police later found drugs in the car after the dog alerted. The initial stop was actually part of a preexisting drug investigation, which was a pretext for the stop. The police failure to address the traffic infractions during the stop shows they unlawfully prolonged the stop, and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s suppression motion.id: 28036
Updated 9/14/2023A lawful traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged by a dog sniff search around the vehicle requiring suppression of the contraband found in the vehicle.A police officer stopped defendant following an unsafe lane change. The officer then inquired into unrelated matters and eventually brought in a dog to sniff around the exterior of the truck. The search produced drugs and guns found inside the vehicle. However, the search was illegal as it occurred during an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop.id: 27924
Updated 7/25/2023The officer’s decision to conduct a parole search did not sufficiently alleviate the connection between the unlawful detention and the discovery of contraband.Responding to a report of suspicious activity, a police officer detained a bystander who had no apparent connection to the report. The officer thereafter learned the bystander was on parole and subject to warrantless searches. The subsequent search produced contraband. The Court of Appeal held the officer’s discovery of the parole search condition attenuated the connection between the unlawful detention and the subsequent discovery of contraband. However, the officer’s discretionary decision to conduct a parole search did not sufficiently attenuate the connection between the officer’s initial unlawful decision to detain the defendant and the discovery of contraband.id: 27681
Defendant’s arrest and detention were lawful where he told police he thought there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest and police took 84 minutes to confirm the fact.Defendant was known to be on probation and told detectives at the house that he believed there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. It was reasonable for the officers to detain him until they could confirm that fact. The process was not unduly prolonged where the police took 84 minutes to confirm that defendant was a wanted juvenile. id: 25882
Defendant was subjected to a prolonged and unreasonable detention as police guarded him on the porch for 30 minutes while conducting a probation search of Beltran.Defendant was ordered out of the house while police preformed a probation search on Beltran’s residence. He was pat searched and ordered to remain on the front porch for the duration of the search - about 30 minutes. An officer stood on the porch guarding defendant and Beltran. The officer had obtained defendant’s identifying information and asked dispatch to see if defendant was subject to a probation search even though there was no indication that he had done anything wrong. The extended detention of defendant under these circumstances was unreasonable, and the fruits of the detention were suppressed.id: 25602
Defendant was detained when the officer pulled in behind him, and the detention was unreasonable since he was parked and was not required to have his headlights illuminated.Defendant was detained when the officer made a u-turn to pull in behind him and trained spotlights on his car. It did not matter that the officer did not block him in or activate the colored emergency lights. Moreover, the detention was not justified as the officer noticed that defendant’s fog lights, but not his normal headlights were illuminated. It is unlawful to drive at night using only fog lights but defendant was not driving when the officer approached - he was parked.id: 26227
Defendant could challenge the gun evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention even if he lacked an expectation of privacy in the searched car.The magistrate denied defendant’s request to suppress evidence of a gun found during the search of a car because defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. However, the defendant could properly challenge the gun evidence as the fruit of an unlawful detention, even if he lacked an expectation of privacy in the searched car.id: 25420
The officer detained the woman for Fourth Amendment purposes as he approached her standing next to her car, asked for her driver’s license, retained it for a records check and ordered her to put out her cigarette and put down her soda can. The officer approached a woman standing outside of her stopped vehicle, told her he had seen her passenger flicking cigarette ashes out of the passenger window, and asked for her driver’s license. He then commanded her to put out her cigarette, put down her soda can and he kept the driver’s license to run an unexplained records check. This was a detention for Fourth Amendment purposes, rather than a consensual encounter as no objectively reasonable person would have felt free to end the encounter regardless of the officer’s polite demeanor and relatively low-key approach.id: 24351
Defendant was detained when the officer stopped behind his parked car and activated the emergency lights. An officer investigating an emergency call of a fight in progress pulled his patrol car behind defendant’s parked vehicle and activated the emergency lights. He approached the car and saw defendant sitting behind the wheel, apparently intoxicated. A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and defendant submitted to a show of authority by remaining in his car. Nevertheless, the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion given a reliable citizen’s report of a violent fight (potentially involving a firearm), the deputy’s quick response time and defendant’s presence near the scene of the fight in the otherwise unoccupied alley. id: 24223
The discovery after the fact of a probation search condition does not sanitize an unlawful detention.The unlawfulness of a suspicionless vehicle detention is not retroactively cured when one of the passengers turns out to be a probationer with a search condition.id: 23415
Police improperly stopped defendant for failing to signal a turn where there were no other vehicles present that could have been affected by the turn. Police improperly detained defendant for failing to signal a right turn within 100 feet of the turn in violation of Vehicle Code sections 22107 and 22108, because those provisions only require that a driver signal a turn where another vehicle might be affected by the turn and there was no other vehicle present that could have been affected by defendant’s turn. id: 22203
Protective sweep was not justified where the officers entered the home after lawfully detaining the suspect outside.Police stopped a suspected drug dealer behind his house, handcuffed him, and had him sit on the ground. The officers then entered the home to determine whether there was anyone inside who might be in danger. They found no one but did see a package which proved to contain cocaine. The officer's initial act of drawing his gun on defendant did not convert the detention into an arrest, nor did the use of handcuffs or making defendant sit on the ground for a few minutes. However, the officer's entry into and inspection of defendant's house was not permissible as a protective sweep under Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325.id: 18006
Suppression was required if the search incident to a lawful arrest based on an outstanding warrant was obtained through an unlawful traffic stop.Evidence seized in a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest based upon an outstanding warrant must be suppressed if the police invented the ground for the traffic stop which led to the
discovery of the warrant. The trial court erred by finding it did not need to decide whether the police made up the claim regarding the faulty brake light since any taint arising from such an unlawful stop was dissipated by the discovery of the arrest warrant prior to the search.id: 19309
Supreme Court requires warrant or exigent circumstances to enter home for arrest.Police officers observed activity consistent with drug dealing occurring at an apartment. They stopped a person leaving the apartment and found drugs. Because the stop occurred near the apartment, the officers feared that evidence in the apartment would be destroyed. The officers therefore entered the apartment, arrested defendant, and conducted a search. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the arrest and search because the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, reiterating the rule announced in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), that "police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home."id: 20142
Supreme Court says rule requiring judicial finding or probable cause within 48 hours of arrest is retroactive.In <i>Gerstein v. Pugh</i>, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the 4th Amendment's shield against unreasonable seizures requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following an arrest without a warrant. In <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i>, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court held that prompt generally means within 48 hours of the warrantless arrest; absent extraordinary circumstances. A longer delay violates the 4th Amendment. In <i>Griffith v. Kentucky</i>, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) the Court held that rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions are to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal . . . not yet final when the rule is announced. Accordingly, in the present case, in a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that <i>McLaughlin</i> applied retroactively to the defendant, whose case was not final when McLaughlin was announced. Nevertheless, the Court left it up to the Nevada Supreme Court to determine the appropriate remedy for the 4-day delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate. Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.id: 10987
Detaining individuals believed to be in a gang and taking field identification information for later use violated Fourth Amendment.Officers approached defendant and his companions and ordered them to stay there while they were patted down for weapons. They were then told to sit down while the officers interviewed them one at a time. This action constituted a detention rather than a consensual encounter. The detention was improper where officers testified defendant and his companions were doing nothing suspicious when they approached and that it was departmental policy to stop individuals who may be involved in a gang and take field identification information for later use. This policy is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment . The illegal detention required suppression of the gang book photograph. However, identification from the booking photographs and the in-court identifications were admissible because they were based on the witness' independent recollections of the crime.id: 10969
An arrest warrant may not issue for a non-detained minor who fails to appear at the initial hearing after mail notice.Appellant argued her arrest and detention were illegal because as a non-detained minor, she should have been personally served with notice to appear at the initial hearing as prescribed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 660, subdivision (c). The prosecution maintained the arrest warrant was proper to bring appellant before the court as authorized under section 663. However, based on the express language of section 660, subdivision (c), an arrest warrant may not issue for a non-detained minor who fails to appear at the initial hearing after mail notice.id: 10962
Asserted purpose for stopping the taxi - a cab inspection was a pretext for the officer's true motive of contacting defendant and the stop was therefore unlawfulThe stop of the taxicab was not based on any criminal law violation. Instead, it arose from the officer's asserted purpose of conducting a cab inspection. A stop for such an administrative search does not require any reasonable suspicion. However, the officer had vast experience in enforcing drug laws but little experience in cab inspections. He acknowledged that patrol officers conduct such inspections only occasionally. He failed to perform any element of a cab inspection except obtaining the driver's papers. He focused immediately on defendant, the passenger. Finally, he admitted that he stopped the cab based on his knowledge of the bar defendant exited. The stop for the cab inspection was a pretext for his true motive - to contact defendant. The trial court erred in denying the suppression motion.id: 15613
Use of a police ruse led to an unlawful detention and the subsequent consent to search defendant's person was ineffective.An undercover officer approached a house and announced through a screen door that he had collided with the white truck parked in the alley. Defendant exited the house to investigate and was met by uniformed officers with masks and vests. The officers asked if they could search his person for drugs and he agreed. The use of the ruse led to an unlawful detention and any consent to the warrantless search of his person was a product of that illegality.id: 15621
Inculpatory statement was the result of a flagrant police misconduct during questioning.Officers arrived at defendant's house and told him they wanted to take him downtown for a voluntary interview. However, the manner in which they arrived, accosted him, and secured his consent to accompany him suggested they did not intend to take no for an answer. Once at the station defendant was brought to a small interrogation room, read his Miranda rights and led to believe that he was the sole suspect in the double murder case and that they would arrest him if he tried to leave. He was under an illegal arrest during this period and his subsequent confession was not sufficiently attenuated where there were no significant intervening events to break the chain of causation between the flagrant illegality of his custodial interrogation and his subsequent statement.id: 10972
Suppression was required under Harvey-Madden where the prosecutor failed to establish the existence of the warrants on which defendant was arrested.The trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence where the prosecutor, after proper <i>Havey-Madden</i> objection, failed to adequately establish the existence of the warrants on which defendant was arrested. The court rejected the prosecution's claim that such proof was unnecessary where the person arrested falsely identified himself to police. The court also rejected the claim that suppression is not required because it would have no effect on the behavior of the officer who transmitted information regarding outstanding warrants.id: 15610
Officer lacked probable cause to search a woman's compact case for drugs after properly detaining her for drunk driving.Officer properly stopped appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol and a sobriety test was lawfully initiated. However, he acted improperly in subsequently opening what appeared to him to be a snuff case (a woman's compact) because it clearly was not a container for alcohol and the officer did not believe that it contained alcohol. That such containers may be used to store narcotics did not justify the search. Moreover, the doctrine of inevitable discovery did not justify the search where the officer's testimony made it abundantly clear that he called for a back up female officer only after he had found the narcotics in the snuff case/compact and arrested defendant.id: 10604
Updated 10/18/2023Seven minute detention was not unduly prolonged after officer found a firearm during a pat search.Defendant argued his detention was unduly prolonged. However, it lasted a mere seven minutes during which the officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable concerns for officer safety, and the officers’ concerns were reasonable after the pat search produced a loaded weapon on one defendant.id: 28086
The outstanding misdemeanor warrant was a sufficient basis for defendant’s arrestDefendant argued there was no probable cause to arrest him other than a misdemeanor warrant. However, the outstanding misdemeanor warrant was a sufficient basis for defendant’s arrest.id: 26977
The dog sniff did not unduly prolong the detention where the dog alerted before the officer issued the citation.The officer stopped defendant’s car due to a tinted window infraction. Defendant argued the subsequent dog sniff unduly prolonged the detention for the traffic stop requiring suppression of the evidence under Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 135 S. Ct. 1609. However, the dog alerted before the citation was issued, indicating the use of the dog did not extend the detention, and the record did not show the officer took longer than normal to write the citation.id: 25944
Interaction where officers drove up next to defendant and asked what he was doing was not under a show of authority, and was a consensual encounter.Officers saw defendant change directions as he was walking, and place something into his pocket. They then drove up next to him, got out of the car and asked what he was doing. He responded that he was carrying a pipe. Police then searched defendant and found a pipe and some methamphetamine. Contrary to defendant’s claim, this was a consensual encounter rather than a detention and defendant freely offered the information regarding his possession of the pipe that led to the search.id: 26129
The consensual encounter did not become a detention until the officers used force to grab defendant’s arm and told him to place his hands behind his back. When the officer contacted defendant to inquire about defendant’s disabled car and offer assistance, the incident was a consensual encounter. It did not become a detention after the officer directed defendant to sit on the curb and keep his hands out of pockets. These were done for safety and were not a display of authority. The encounter did not become a detention until the officers used physical force to grab defendant’s arm and told him to place his hands behind his back. The detention was supported by reasonable suspicion after police learned defendant’s license had been suspended, and they had seen his car roll backwards into the intersection and defendant exit from the driver’s seat.id: 25196
Once defendant was properly stopped for a traffic infraction, police could properly detain him further to investigate his possible involvement in a recent murder committed by someone who fit his description.Defendant argued that although police had reasonable suspicion to detain him following an illegal lane change, they did not have sufficient cause to detain him further to investigate his possible involvement in the murder. He matched a description of the killer - black with dreadlocks. However, where the initial detention was proper, the defendant and passengers were properly ordered out of the car for further investigation. The detention was not a product of racial profiling.id: 21658
Detaining the driver of the second car by activating emergency lights was justified by the concern for the safety of the officers who were investigating the first car. Sheriff’s deputies pulled their patrol car behind two vehicles parked at night on a driveway out of sight from a nearby highway. The two vehicles included a lead vehicle and a second one driven by defendant. The deputies activated their emergency lights to investigate a felony arrest warrant for the registered owner of the lead vehicle. The action amounted to a detention of defendant, but it was justified to assure that defendant did not present a danger to the deputies while they approached and investigated the lead vehicle.id: 24670
Defendant’s consent to accompany police to the station for an interview was voluntary and his statements were admissible.Defendant was not detained by officers where he was not under arrest when he accompanied the police to the station, was reminded he could end the questioning at any time and told he would then be driven home. The officers were dressed casually, did not display guns and made no commands. Contrary to defendant’s claim, his consent to accompany the police to the station was voluntary and his statements were admissible. id: 24817
The detention was lawful where the officer’s knowledge gave him an objectively reasonable belief that defendant was on PRCS. If a police officer knows an individual is on postrelease community supervision, he may lawfully detain that person for the purpose of searching him or her as long as the detention and search are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing. An officer “knows” a subject is on PRCS if his belief is objectively reasonable. Substantial evidence supported the court’s implied finding that detective knew defendant was on PRCS, and his failure to consult the ARIES database did not negate that knowledge. The detective’s belief in defendant’s PRCS status and his actual detention of defendant were objectively reasonable.id: 24333
Police did not detain defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes when they asked for and retained his identification card. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated when a police officer asks to see a person’s identification card. Contrary to defendant’s claim, he was not seized during the time that the officer possessed his driver’s license as a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to ask the officer to return his license. There was a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant anyway, where the police had been informed of a robbery by two young black men driving a dark SUV who identified themselves as members of a certain gang, and defendant who fit the description was driving a dark SUV in the gang neighborhood with the back door open suggesting someone else might have hastily fled.id: 23224
Investigative detention did not become a de facto arrest where police handcuffed the defendant at gunpoint.Defendant, a parent of high school football player, threatened to shoot the coach after a game. Police thereafter approached defendant with guns drawn, ordered him to the ground and handcuffed him while looking for a weapon. The encounter was brief and was a proper investigative detention under the circumstances. By handcuffing defendant at gunpoint the officer’s did not elevate the encounter to a de facto arrest.id: 23319
When a car is already stopped without police action, merely activating emergency lights on the police car does not, without more, constitute a seizure. The officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant who was parked on the side of the road with his brake lights on after receiving information of a 911 call from an identified citizen who reported potentially violent conduct outside of his home. Moreover, when a vehicle is stopped, without police action, merely activating emergency lights on a police vehicle, without more, does not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. id: 23589
The officer could ask defendant about unrelated incidents while writing a citation as long as the questioning did not prolong the stop.Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation. He argued that once the citation process was completed, the officer could no longer detain him for questioning and any consent to search was invalid. However, one officer was in his car working on the citation when the other approached defendant and asked him about the vandalism incident and for his consent to search. Thus he was not detained during the citation process. Moreover, the officer was allowed to ask defendant about matters unrelated to the traffic stop as long as it did not prolong the stop.id: 22843
Officers executing an arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search need not have probable cause to believe the suspect was present. An officer executing an arrest warrant or conducing a parole or probation search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only a “reasonable belief,” falling short of probable cause, to believe the suspect lives there and is present.id: 22358
Police had probable cause to arrest defendant for weapon possession with intent to assault where he was holding a brick and someone in a group said “He’s over there”, even though there may have been an innocent explanation. The police had reasonable cause to arrest defendant after observing him with an object (a brick) which could have been used as a deadly weapon, and after he heard someone shout “He’s over there” suggesting the group intended to use the brick to hurt someone. The investigator’s knowledge that defendant was a gang member supported the conclusion. At that point, the police had probable cause to arrest and it did not matter that there may have been an innocent explanation including the possibility that defendant and his group were chasing a rabbit or playing a game. id: 21819
The police dispatcher "witnessed" defendant's harassing 911 calls and did not have to personally confront defendant to effect a citizen's arrest. After making more than 40 harassing calls to 911 in a single evening, the police dispatcher requested that defendant be taken into custody on a citizen's arrest. He argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because he was unlawfully taken into custody pursuant to an invalid citizen's arrest. He claimed the citizen making the arrest (the 911 dispatcher) did not sufficiently participate in the arrest to make it a valid arrest. However, under the circumstances, the dispatcher was present during the crime, and did not have to physically deliver defendant to the police.id: 21647
A federal park officer had authority to detain defendant on property adjacent to federal property.Defendant argued the federal officer (a U.S. Park Police officer) lacked authority to detain him on property owned by the City and County of San Francisco. However, the detention was lawful under Penal Code section 830.8, subd.(b). The parking lot in which defendant was arrested was adjacent to federal property even though separated by a yacht harbor. And contrary to defendant’s claim, the term “adjacent to” in section 830.8 was not vague.id: 21546
Defendant failed to show the sobriety checkpoint did not substantially comply with the factors set forth in Ingersoll v. Palmer. The drunk driving defendant argued the sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional because it failed to comply with certain factors set forth in Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321. However, defendant did not show the checkpoint lacked supervisory decisionmaking where it was located at a different location than the media advisory provided. Moreover, the officer’s testimony that he was unaware of the mathematical selection process for stopping vehicles did not show the absence of such a process.id: 21571
The prolonged detention of defendant for a “records check” while defendant was detained for Vehicle Code violations did not violate the U.S. Constitution.Defendant argued the evidence resulting from the search should have been suppressed because the detention became unduly prolonged based on an investigation unrelated to the Vehicle Code violations. However, the limit on time an officer may detain a Vehicle Code violator (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577) is no longer the law in California for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis.id: 21321
Supreme Court says that traffic stop allows detention of all occupants of vehicle. Police officers stopped a car because its vehicle registration had been suspended. The
car contained a driver and two passengers. An officer asked defendant, the passenger in the back seat, to step out of the car. During a frisk of defendant, the officer discovered a gun. The
Supreme Court unanimously held, in a decision written by Justice Ginsburg, that when officers
make a lawful traffic stop of a vehicle, the officers may lawfully detain the vehicle and its
occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The Court held that the temporary detention of the vehicle and its occupants remains reasonable for the duration of the stop.id: 21352
The police validly ran a check on defendant’s driver’s license because they had probable cause for a custodial arrest.Defendant who was detained for lighting malfunctions on his Jeep argued his detention was unduly prolonged. However, because the officers had probable cause to believe defendant had committed traffic infractions, then detaining him longer than necessary to cite him did not violate the Fourth Amendment.id: 20906
Citizen's valid arrest of drunk driver for vandalism and malicious mischief constituted an implied arrest for drunk driving and supported the license revocation.The officer did not see defendant's car move and, therefore, she could not arrest defendant for drunk driving. However, a citizen witnessed defendant's drunk driving and subsequently signed a citizen's arrest for malicious mischief and vandalism. While the witness did not expressly arrest defendant for drunk driving, his conduct constituted an implicit arrest which supported the driver's license revocation by the DMV.id: 10561
Supreme Court reaffirms power to arrest for a fine-only traffic violation despite "pretext" claim.The officer stopped defendant for speeding and having an improperly tinted windshield. When he saw defendant's license, he realized that he was aware of "intelligence" about defendant "regarding narcotics." The officer arrested defendant for speeding, driving without his registration and insurance documents, carrying a weapon (a rusted roofing hatchet), and improper window tinting. The Arkansas Supreme Court suppressed the evidence finding the arrest was merely a "pretext" for an inventory search that turned up methamphetamine. In a per curiam opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its decision in <i>Atwater v. Lago Vista</i>, 532 U.S. ____, 2001 (which upheld an arrest for a fine-only traffic violation), and reaffirming its decision in <i>Whren</i> v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (which held that an officer's "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis"). The court said the fact the <i>Whren</i> involved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, "is of no particular moment." Justice Ginsburg concurred specially, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Breyer to suggest that the court may want to reconsider its holdings if experience demonstrates "anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests."id: 15126
Supreme Court says brief detention of couple surprised in bed in search under warrant was reasonable. Police officers identified four suspects in an investigation, all of whom were African-Americans and one of whom had registered a firearm. The officers obtained a warrant to search a house where they believed the suspects lived. The affidavit in support of the warrant stated that the officers had verified that the suspects lived in the house through driver's license records, mailing address lists, an outstanding warrant, and an Internet telephone directory. In fact, the suspects had sold the house to a Caucasian man and moved out three months earlier. When the officers executed the warrant, they found the owner and his girlfriend in bed naked. The couple was briefly held at gunpoint before the officers allowed them to obtain clothes. After about five minutes, the officers realized their mistake, apologized, and left. The couple brought a civil rights lawsuit alleging that the officers unreasonably detained them. The Ninth Circuit held that the search and detention were unlawful but the Supreme Court summarily reversed. The Court held that the officers had acted reasonably in detaining the house's occupants during the execution of a valid warrant for the brief time necessary to determine that no immediate threat was present.id: 20193
Supreme Court says that officer's reason for arrest need not be "closely related" to offense for which there is probable cause.Police officers stopped plaintiff because they suspected he was impersonating a police officer. During the stop, the officers saw that plaintiff was recording their conversation, and they arrested him on the ground that the recording violated state law. In fact, plaintiff's recording of the officers did not violate state law, and that charge was later dismissed. Plaintiff then sued the officers for unlawful arrest and imprisonment. The officers defended on the ground that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff of impersonating an officer and obstructing a law enforcement officer. The Ninth Circuit held that the officers could not rely on that argument because impersonating an officer and obstructing a law enforcement officer are not "closely related" to the offense stated by the arresting office at the time of arrest. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that an officer's subjective reason for making aan arrest need not be the criminal offences as to which the known facts establish probable cause. id: 20110
The detention was not unduly prolonged where defendant sat handcuffed in the patrol car as other officers drove to the remote area looking for evidence to link defendant to the marijuana cultivation.The detention was not unduly prolonged where defendant sat handcuffed in the patrol car while another officer drove an hour to the remote location of the "marijuana grow." Once there, it took additional time to search the area and gather evidence linking defendant to the grow. Moreover, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant after searching his backpack. Even absent probable cause, defendant was not formally detained as the officers told him he would be released if they did not find evidence linking him to the marijuana grow.id: 19939
Brief detention outside the car for officer safety during the search of the car was reasonable.Defendant was seized for the time between the officer's ordering him out of the car, and other officer's discovery of the gun magazine during the inventory search of the car before it was to be impounded. However, the detention was lawful as a brief continuation of detention for officer safety. The detention lasted less than two minutes, police needed the occupants out of the car during the search, and the second officer watched the codefendant to ensure the safety of the officer performing the search.id: 19766
Police could stop a passenger walking away from a lawfully stopped vehicle and ask him for identification. Officers may, pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, reasonably
order a passenger to stay in or step out of the car for officer safety reasons, and thereafter ask the passenger for identification. The detention of the passenger (who attempted to walk away from the lawfully stopped vehicle) and the request for identification were proper.id: 19630
Admission of first statements made after an illegal detention was harmless because the second statements made voluntarily several days later were sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention.The first statements defendant made to police on April 30, while voluntary, nonetheless were the product of an illegal detention which was prolonged to enable the police to question him about the shootings without having probable cause to arrest him. The statements should have been suppressed because of the Fourth Amendment violation. The connection, however, between the illegal detention and defendant's second statements made voluntarily after being out of custody for three days, was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal detention. Defendant's confession was not obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention but as the result of the intervention of the person defendant initially implicated, who insisted that defendant tell the truth, and defendant's exercise of his own free will. Because defendant's second statements, in which he confessed to the crimes were admissible, the error regarding the admission of the first statements was not prejudicial.id: 18125
An officer may knock on someone's door seeking an interview, and there was no Fourth Amendment violation where the officer concealed himself for safety reasons after knocking.A police officer may seek an interview with a suspect at his home as long as such inquiry is courteously made and not accompanied by any assertion of a right to enter or secure answers. Federal jurisprudence describes this police tactic as "knock and talk." In this situation, the encounter between the police and the person is consensual and no Fourth Amendment protections are implicated. The officer in the present case could knock on defendant's motel room door to seek an interview, and did not lose that right by momentarily concealing himself to determine if defendant would peacefully answer the knock on the door.id: 17896
A school peace officer had the authority to stop defendant who drove recklessly in the officer's presence.Defendant argued the city schools police officer had limited powers to arrest citizens and exceeded his authority by stopping defendant for speeding. However, the officer had the authority to arrest someone who committed a dangerous offense in his presence. He had the authority to stop defendant for his reckless driving, and thereafter was permitted to display his weapon for the time necessary to obtain defendant's car keys.id: 17911
"Knock and talk" procedure employed by the police does not violate the Fourth Amendment.Officers knocked on the defendant's motel room door, asked for identification and whether she was on parole. The trial court erred in later granting defendant's suppression motion because there was no requirement that police officers have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before they can knock on someone's door during daylight hours to ask questions or even to ask for consent to search. The proper inquiry is whether the encounter was consensual under the totality of the circumstances.id: 17917
Prolonged detention caused by the delay in requesting the K-9 unit did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the officers had probable cause not only to detain but also to arrest defendant.The initial detention of defendant's vehicle for a seatbelt violation was unduly prolonged where he was detained for well over an hour before the K-9 unit was requested and there was no evidence to explain the reason for the delay. However, because both the traffic stop and collective knowledge of the investigating officers supplied probable cause not only to detain but also to arrest defendant, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the prolonged detention caused by the delay in requesting the K-9 unit.id: 17815
Officers who stop a driver for a broken taillight may not detain and frisk the person solely on the basis that the stop occurred in a high crime area at night.Officers may not, as a matter of standard procedure and in the name of "officer safety," detain and frisk a driver stopped for an equipment infraction solely on the basis that the stop occurred in a high crime area at night. The Fourth Amendment does not permit such an intrusion and any evidence flowing from the illegal contact is inadmissible.id: 17439
Defendant was lawfully stopped for the inoperable supplemental stoplamp mounted inside the rear window of his car.The stoplamp in the rear window of defendant's car was not working and the police stopped him for that reason. While California law does not require supplemental stoplamps, federal law does. Because the stoplamp was a required piece of lighting equipment in defendant's car he was required to maintain it in good working order. His failure to do so constituted a violation of Vehicle Code section 24252. The officer was justified in stopping defendant on that basis.id: 16803
Custodial arrests for fine-only offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment.In accordance with Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, custodial arrests for fine-only offenses do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, compliance with state arrest procedures, such as Vehicle Code section 40302, subd.(a), is not a component of the federal constitutional inquiry. In any event, the arrest complied with section 40302, subd.(a) where the defendant who was stopped for a bicycle infraction did not present a driver's license or other documentary evidence of his identity. Contrary to defendant's claim, oral evidence of identification is insufficient under the statute.id: 16720
School officials may detain a student on school grounds absent suspicion of criminal activity or violation of a school rule.The broad authority of school administrators over student behavior, school safety, and the learning environment requires that the school officials have the power to stop a minor student n order to ask questions or conduct an investigation even in the absence of reasonable suspicion so long as such authority is not exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or harassing manner.id: 16446
There was no basis to suppress the confession which was the product of a consensual encounter rather than arrest where defendant initiated contact with police and was fully cooperative all day.Defendant was not seized prior to his confession and therefore, the confession was not the product of an illegal arrest. He called 911 in the afternoon to report the murder. When police arrived he followed an officer into the house to point out missing items. He agreed to accompany the police to the station. He consented to the search of his home. He waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights prior to the interrogation. He agreed to provide a blood sample. At all times he was cooperative and seemed anxious to prove his innocence. Under the circumstances, the entire contact was a consensual encounter rather than a seizure. As such, there was no basis to suppress the confession.id: 16371
Detention was not unduly prolonged where officer ordered defendant out of the car following a traffic stop, and the officer properly seized the baggie found in plain view.Defendant argued he was subjected to an illegal or unreasonably prolonged detention. However, defendant was detained for expired registration tags and told the officer his driver's license was suspended. He thereafter consented to a search of the car. Once defendant was ordered out of the car, the officer standing in a lawful position saw the baggie containing drugs in plain view, and was justified in seizing it.id: 15614
Detention was not unreasonable where routine traffic stop resulted in defendant's failure to follow orders and the officer's fear for his safety caused him to order defendant to remain seated in the car.Police stopped defendant for expired registration tags. Defendant argued the stop was improper because the officer used a routine traffic stop to investigate other matters. However, at the point that defendant failed to follow the officer's order to remain in the car and the officer became concerned for his safety, the stop ceased to be a routine traffic stop. Moreover, in light of the concern for his own safety (the officer was alone and the defendant was a known gang member) the act of ordering defendant to remain seated in the car was justified.id: 15615
Federal immigration inspector at the border was authorized to make a citizen's arrest for suspected drunk driving.Defendant was stopped by an immigration inspector at the United States-Mexico border, and subsequently arrested by the CHP for suspected drunk driving. Defendant sought to suppress statements taken after the arrest. He argued the federal immigration inspector had only limited authority to question persons crossing the border about their right to enter or remain in the United States. This authority, he claimed, did not extend to making arrests for suspected drunk driving at a federal facility, without express authorization by state authorities. However, defendant failed to dispel the presumption that state jurisdiction applied and provided no support for his claim that the federal inspector was not authorized to make a citizen's arrest based on factors such as his appearance and behavior.id: 15616
Passengers are not detained for Fourth Amendment purposes simply because they are present inside a car stopped for a traffic violation.The typical traffic stop, by itself, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure of the passenger. Rather, a passenger is seized only if the officer physically restrains him or initiates a show of authority to which a reasonably innocent person in the passenger's position would feel compelled to submit, and to which the passenger actually does submit. No seizure of either sort happened in the present case until after the passenger volunteered she was in possession of methamphetamine.id: 15617
Police may run warrant check during traffic stop and question detainee regarding his probation status.During a routine traffic stop, an officer may run a warrant check and then question the detainee regarding the detainee's probation status and ask permission to search while waiting for results of the warrant check.id: 15618
School officials may properly detain an outsider for the limited purpose of determining such person's identity and purpose regardless of "school hours."Unlike the rules applicable to public places in general, school officials need not articulate a specific crime which appears to be violated in order to detain an outsider for the limited purpose of justifying the outsider's presence on the campus. Therefore, the school officer properly detained defendant at 3:00 p.m. to determine whether he was permissibly present on the campus. There was sufficient evidence to conclude the officer was acting lawfully in the performance of his duties, an element of the offenses of battery on and resisting a police officer.id: 15619
Stop of defendant driving a 1989 car was proper where the officer observed defendant was not wearing a shoulder harness.Defendant argued there was no reasonable cause to stop his vehicle based on the arresting officer's observation that he was not wearing his seat belt (Vehicle Code section 27315, subdivision (d).) He claimed the stop was improper because the officer could not have seen a lap belt, and there was no evidence the officer observed a should harness installed on the vehicle but not being used. The absence from sight of a shoulder harness does not imply a violation of the law and cannot support a lawful stop. However, such was not the case with defendant's 1989 Honda. Even in cases of older cars, where it is reasonably uncertain whether a shoulder harness was installed, the officer is entitled to resolve the uncertainty by stopping the vehicle.id: 15620
An officer with probable cause may arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his or her presence where evidence may be destroyed by passage of time if the person is not immediately arrested.A police officer with probable cause may arrest a person for misdemeanor drunk driving not committed in the officer's presence where evidence may be destroyed unless the person is immediately arrested. However, a police officer may not enter a person's home to effect such an arrest.id: 14912
Detaining defendant, an outsider, on school grounds to determine his purpose on campus was reasonable and the evidence supported the convictions for battery on a police officer and resisting arrest.Defendant was convicted of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. He argued the officer who detained him on school grounds was not acting lawfully because the detention was not reasonable. However, unlike the rules applicable to public places in general, school officials and police need not articulate a specific crime which appears to be violated in order to detain an outsider to determine his purpose for being on campus regardless of "school hours." The officer in the present case acted lawfully in detaining defendant and there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.id: 14913
Detention and search of a curfew violator was proper even where he was to be released from temporary custody without being booked.Police detained the minor for violating the city's age-based curfew and transported him to a "curfew-center" facility to await notification of his parents and their arrival at the facility where he would be released to them. The search of the minor was proper even though the police had plans to release him without a formal booking.id: 14914
No detention occurred where officers approached a group wearing gang colors and defendant threw down a bag of cocaine.Several officers of the gang task force approached a large group wearing gang colors in a public park to monitor possible gang activity. At no point did the officers single out defendant or any other member of the group, or physically restrain any member of the group, until defendant threw down the bag of cocaine. No coercive display of weapons, use of language, gestures, or intention to detain members of the group occurred. At no point did the officers actively pursue any member of the group, even though all testimony confirmed the group began to walk away as the officers approached. Under the circumstances defendant could not reasonably have felt compelled to discard the cocaine in his possession due to the police activity.id: 10976
Officer acted within his discretion in taking defendant into custody for failure to produce satisfactory evidence of his identity following a minor Vehicle Code violation.Vehicle Code section 40302, subd. (a) makes custodial arrest of a traffic violator mandatory if the violator cannot produce either a driver's license or other satisfactory his discretion in evidence of his or her identity. After his arrest for violation of the open container statute, defendant was asked if he had any identification; he responded he did not. At that point the officer had discretion to either continue to question defendant to elicit other evidence of his identity or, to determine that defendant should be taken before a magistrate. The officer's decision to take the latter course was authorized by section 40302. This provision is not unconstitutionally vague.id: 10977
Officer need not establish reasonable suspicion focusing on the passenger to justify a request for identification in connection with a valid traffic stop.Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was lawfully stopped after attempting to evade the officer. After finishing with the driver, the officer asked defendant to produce identification. The officer's contact with the passenger was not a separate detention requiring justification beyond that warranting the traffic stop. The detention was merely an incident to his being a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle.id: 10978
Officer's backing up the patrol car to view the plates of the Chrysler was not an improper detention and the stop after the Chrysler sped away was proper.Defendant argued the evidence discovered in the Chrysler was the product of an unlawful detention. Officers, while next to the Chrysler, looked up to read the Chrysler's license plates. At that moment the Chrysler sped rapidly away from the patrol car. Backing up the patrol car to view the license plate did not constitute a detention and the suppression motion was properly denied.id: 10979
Officer's chase did not amount to a detention where he never told defendant to stop.As defendant made eye contact with the officer he took off running. The officer chased defendant on foot while a second patrol car followed the two. While running defendant discarded a packet containing cocaine. Defendant argued the detention was unlawful and therefore evidence of the contraband had to be suppressed. However, the court held there was no detention before defendant discarded the cocaine. Much like the situation in <i>Michigan v. Chesternut</i>, (1988) 486 U.S. ____, 108 S. Ct. 1975, the defendant's flight was voluntary and not the product of any action on behalf of the police. When defendant broke into a run, there were no objective facts by which he could have believed he was not free to leave.id: 10980
Officers may briefly detain for identification and safety, a person who enters a premises about to be searched pursuant to a warrant.Police officers searching a private home pursuant to a search warrant did not err in briefly detaining defendant who entered the premises at the time the officers began the search. The initial brief detention was justified by the need to determine what connection defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site of a search for narcotics.id: 10981
Probation search condition applies to detention as well as searches.Thinking defendant had been dealing drugs from his hotel room, officers detained him for a registration violation after he drove away in his car. Defendant argued that the stop was an unlawful pretext stop mandating exclusion of evidence. However, defendant was on probation and had waived his Fourth Amendment rights. That the police were unaware of his probation status was of no consequence. Moreover, defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver applies to detentions as well as searches.id: 10982
Request of defendant to remove her hands from her pockets did not transform the consensual encounter into a detention.As an officer approached a group of individuals the group dispersed with the exception of defendant. The officer's asking her name and where she lived was a consensual encounter. His request for identification to verify the information given did not transform the encounter into a detention. Thereafter, while waiting for her to produce identification, the officer asked her to remove her hands from her pockets. Such request did not constitute a show of authority sufficient to transform the encounter into a detention. However, even if the request was a detention, the officer's concern for his personal safety justified the request. Defendant's act of removing the contraband from her pocket and discarding it in plain view was purely a voluntary action unrelated to the officer's conduct.id: 10983
Shining spotlight and high beams into defendant's car did not constitute a detention.Defendant argued he was illegally detained when a police patrol car shined its high beams and spotlights at his vehicle. However, the officer parked his vehicle in front of defendant's vehicle and left room for defendant's car to leave. Moreover, the officer turned on the high beams and spotlight but did not activate the emergency lights. Mere use of the lights did not constitute a detention.id: 10984
Supreme Court allows police to order passengers out of lawfully-stopped car.In <i>Pennsylvania v. Mimms</i>, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a police officer may, as a matter of course, order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle. Here, in a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court extended that rule to apply to passengers as well. The majority reasoned that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car. The court recognized that although there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. Justices Stevens and Kennedy dissented, arguing that this case takes the unprecedented step of authorizing seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion whatsoever.id: 10985
Supreme Court says defendant need not be told he is free to go before asking for consent to search.After a routine traffic stop the officer asked defendant to step out of his car, issued a verbal warning and returned defendants drivers license to him. At this point, the officer asked whether the defendant was carrying any drugs or weapons. When defendant answered No, the officer asked if he could search the car. Defendant consented and the officer found a small amount of marijuana and one pill of MDMA. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, establishing a bright line rule requiring that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed that they are free to go before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The court noted that it had consistently eschewed bright line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. In particular in <i>Schneckloth v. Bustamonte</i>, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the court rejected a per se rule, stating the [w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the <i>sine qua non</i> of an effective consent. <i>Id</i>., at 227.id: 10986
Supreme Court upholds traffic stop even though officer's motive was to look for drugs.Plain clothes policemen patrolling a high drug area in an unmarked vehicle saw defendant commit a minor traffic violation. They stopped the vehicle and saw drugs in plain view. The petitioners moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the stop was pretextual because the officers would not have made the stop but for the suspicions that the petitioners were engaged in drug activities. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the stop and temporary detention of a motorist where there is probable cause to believe he has committed a traffic violation is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the officer would not have made the stop without some additional law enforcement objective. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis.id: 10988
The subjective motivation of an arresting officer is irrelevant in determining the propriety of a traffic stop.Defendant, a passenger in an automobile, conceded that the driver's failure to signal a left turn provided a nominal basis for a traffic stop. He claimed, however, that the officer used the stop as a pretext to investigate his suspicion of criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation. However, if the officer does no more than he or she is legally permitted to do, regardless of the subjective intent with which it was done, the arrest and search are objectively reasonable and constitutionally proper.id: 10989
There was no evidence the detention was a pretext stop notwithstanding that defendant was detained for traffic infractions by a gang surveillance unit.Officers stopped defendant after observing that he committed two traffic infractions. He argued the court erred in denying this suppression motion because the traffic stop was a pretext to search for evidence of other crimes. He based his claim on the fact that the officers were not on traffic detail but were part of a gang surveillance unit. There was no evidence that the officers had a hidden agenda. Perhaps the officers believed in stopping defendant they might get lucky and uncover evidence of a crime. However, a valid traffic stop is not made unreasonable by the officer's hope the stop might yield evidence of other crimes.id: 10990
When there is an actual traffic violation there is no improper pretextual stop even though in reality it was motivated by the desire to search for evidence of other crimes.Officers believed defendant possessed narcotics. They followed and stopped him after observing an illegal U-turn and an unsafe lane change on the highway. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, claiming it was an improper pretextual stop motivated by a desire to search for evidence of crimes unrelated to the traffic violations. However, the subjective motivations of the officers were irrelevant and the stop valid so long as it was objectively justified by the observed traffic violations.id: 10991
Where probable cause to arrest existed illegal entry of motel room and knock-notice violation did not invalidate the arrest or require suppression of subsequent statements.Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. The fact that police may have illegally entered the motel room to make the warrantless arrest neither invalidated the arrest itself nor required suppression of the post arrest statements defendant made at the police station. Likewise, the officers' failure to comply with knock-notice requirement before entering the motel room did not vitiate the officers' right to arrest defendant and defendant's subsequent statements to the police were admissible.id: 10992
Accompanying defendant to retrieve her driver's license did not transform the consensual encounter into a detention.The deputy's action in accompanying defendant a short distance over her objection, as she walked to a public place to retrieve her driver's license, did not transform the consensual encounter into a detention, since defendant was at all times free to leave.id: 10961
Consensual encounter did not become a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when officer commenced the warrant check over the radio.Defendant argued that his consensual encounter with the officer ripened into a seizure when the officer commenced a warrant check over the radio. He claimed no reasonable person would feel free to leave under those circumstances. However, neither the officer's questioning nor the warrant check related to specific and identifiable criminal activity. Moreover, the officer did not order defendant to do anything nor did he draw his weapon or make threatening gestures. Because defendant was free to terminate the encounter at any time up to his arrest the encounter did not become a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment.id: 10963
Contact between defendant and the officer was a consensual encounter despite his statement but, in fact he had some questions for her.A narcotics's officer identified himself to defendant at the airport and advised her she was not under arrest, she was free to go at any time and did not have to talk with him. This contact was a consensual encounter which did not require any objective justification. Defendant argued she was detained because the officer at the end of his initial warning stated but, in fact he had some questions for her if she didn't mind. However, these words did not convert the consensual encounter into a detention.id: 10964
Court erred in granting corporate president's motion to seal his arrest record where he failed to show he was factually innocent of certain industry-related crimes.Defendant, and his electronics company, were each charged with illegal disposal of hazardous waste. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the charges against defendant personally were dropped. The trial court erroneously granted his motion to seal and destroy his booking and arrest records pursuant to Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (b). Defendant failed to satisfy his initial burden under that provision of showing there was no reasonable cause to believe he committed the offense for which he was arrested. Rather, the evidence showed he had the power to prevent and remedy the unlawful conditions, but failed to do so.id: 10965
Defendant was detained where an immigration officer approached him at an agricultural inspection stop and directed him to park on the side of the road.Defendant, a highway traveler, read road signs requiring him to stop for an agricultural inspection. Upon completion of the agricultural inspection an immigration officer approached the car and directed defendant to park at the side of the road. Defendant was detained for Fourth Amendment purposes since a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances. Moreover, the agricultural inspection station did not qualify as a fixed immigration checkpoint and therefore reasonable suspicion was required in order to stop and question any person passing the checkpoint.id: 10966
Defendant was not detained where the officer advised her he was a narcotics detective who only interviews possible suspects.A narcotics's officer at the airport identified himself and informed defendant he and his partner only interview people they suspect of transporting narcotics. This statement did not transform the encounter into a formal detention since the officer did not directly accuse defendant of transporting narcotics, did not retain her airline ticket or bag, and did not change the tone of the conversation. Even if defendant was detained the officer had reasonable suspicion where defendant was dropped off by people who did not say good-bye, the identification tags on her bags did not match the information she gave the skycap, she had no identification on her person, she was travelling to Detroit, a city known to be supplied drugs from Los Angeles, and she refused consent to search her checked bags after allowing a search of her carry on.id: 10967
Detaining defendant who entered the residence during the execution of a search warrant was proper.Officers were searching a residence pursuant to a warrant. When defendant entered the residence without knocking or announcing his presence, the officers executing the warrant had reason to believe defendant was directly connected to the premises in some way. Moreover, there was no evidence that the officers at the premises had completed their search for contraband before defendant consented to a search of his truck and his residence. Finally, defendant provided false information regarding his identity and therefore, the officers had reason to extend the detention in an effort to determine his true identity. The consent to search his truck and residence was not the product of an unlawful detention.id: 10968
Evidence of appellant's rage supported the trial court's finding that the officers did not use excessive force in spraying appellant with mace.Before the encounter, officers were aware that appellant was described as an insane person and they knew that he had torn up a house. When the officers approached appellant he assumed a fighting stance and acted as if he were about to strike the officer. It was only at this point that the officer sprayed appellant with mace. Evidence supported the trial court's implied finding that the police properly detained appellant and did not use excessive force.id: 10970
Fish and Game checkpoint in a hunting area on the first day of hunting season was not an unreasonable detention.The Fish and Game checkpoint was set up to regulate hunting near a hunting area on the first day of the season. It was reasonable in light of the public interest in regulating hunting since the intrusion was minimal. Defendant argued the procedure was unconstitutional because only suspected hunters were detained. However, given the highly regulated nature of hunting and the corresponding reduced expectation of privacy of hunters in their gear and their take from hunting, it was reasonable to detain hunters briefly near hunting areas during hunting season to inspect their licenses, tags, equipment and any wildlife taken.id: 10971
Initial detention of defendant who was present in a residence when officers were executing an arrest warrant was proper.Defendant was present at a residence when officers arrived to execute an arrest warrant regarding another individual. One officer requested that defendant remain seated where he was located, no threats were made and the request was not visible to the public. The brief intrusion was minimal. However, there was a legitimate governmental interest in detaining defendant to determine who he was and if he had any information on the juvenile named in the arrest warrant. Moreover, the detention was necessary to ensure defendant did not warn the juvenile or assist him in evading arrest. Finally, officer safety while not a major factor, was still a factor.id: 10973
Local ordinance that was partially defective at the time of the detention was properly used as a basis for initiating the detention.Officer detained defendant in front of a liquor store for drinking in public in violation of a local ordinance. Portions of the ordinance had previously been determined to be defective and unconstitutional. However, there was no reason to believe that the objectionable portions of the ordinance were so crucial that enactment would not have occurred in their absence. As thus reconstructed, the ordinance constituted a valid and effective statute at the time the officer detained defendant. The officer was therefore entitled to use it as a basis for initiating the detention.id: 10974
Minor misdemeanants may be arrested on probable cause without a warrant or committing a crime in the officer's presence.Welfare and Institutions Code section 625(a) does not violate federal constitutional equal protection rights of a juvenile by allowing a peace officer to arrest juvenile misdemeanants solely on probable cause without a warrant or any requirement the offence be committed in the officer's presence.id: 10975
Police questioning of driver after traffic stop regarding unrelated matters (small talk) did not exceed the scope of the detention as to the driver or the passenger.A typical traffic stop results in the detention of a passenger as well as the driver of a vehicle. The passenger's detention may be based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by the driver or another passenger. Moreover, if a driver's detention is unlawfully prolonged, the passenger's detention is likewise unlawfully prolonged. The officer's conversation with the driver about unrelated matters took place while he was writing the ticket and did not prolong the stop. It therefore did not exceed the scope of the detention. Even if police questioning about unrelated matters could taint an otherwise permissible stop, the instant questioning was unintrusive and nonaccusatory.id: 10909
Harvey-Madden rule applies only to arrest and is not extended to detentions.According to the <i>Harvey-Madden</i> rule when an officer makes an arrest based on information received through official channels the prosecution is required to show that the officer who originally furnished the information had probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a felony. This rule does not require that the officer who made the broadcast which caused the stop of the automobile be produced in court.id: 10942
Supreme Court refuses to exclude evidence where arrest was caused by court employee's computer error.During a routine traffic stop, police entered defendant's name into a computer data terminal in the patrol car. The computer erroneously indicated defendant had an outstanding misdemeanor arrest warrant. In fact, the warrant had been quashed, but the court clerk's office failed to notify the Sheriff's office. As a result, defendant was taken into custody, and marijuana was discovered in his car. In a 7-2 decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the marijuana to be suppressed. Applying the exclusionary rule for court employees would not deter them from making occasional errors, nor could it be expected to alter the arresting officer's behavior, since there was no indication he did not act reasonably in relying on the computer record. Justice Stevens dissented, and Justice Ginsberg would have dismissed the writ.id: 10880
Advance publicity is not a prerequisite to the operation of a constitutionally permissible highway sobriety checkpoint.The operation of a sobriety checkpoint conducted in the absence of advance publicity but otherwise in conformince with the guidelines established in <i>Ingersoll v. Palmer</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, does not result in an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.id: 10553
Court may admit evidence obtained in a misdemeanor arrest outside the officer's presence unless the exclusion is mandated by the federal exclusionary rule.The arrest for drunk driving was violative of Penal Code section 836, subdivision (a)(1) which requires that a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The judicially created exclusionary rule mandating that evidence obtained incident to such arrest be excluded was abrogated by the adoption of Article 1, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. The Legislature did not intend to revive the judicially created exclusionary rule as a remedy for an illegal arrest when it amended section 836 in 1992 and 1993 by a two-thirds vote.id: 10567
Supreme Court says remedy for unfounded prosecution is Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process.A civil plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that a police officer deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing an arrest warrant for a charge that did not state an offense under state law. In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the court held that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which the claims must be judged. The court declined to recognize a Due Process right to be free from unfounded criminal prosecution. The court expressed no view as to whether the claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment because the plaintiff had not presented that question in the petition for certiorari.id: 9525
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850