Administrative Searches, generally
Category > Administrative Searches, generally
Auto search was not valid as an inventory search where the purpose was to search for criminal behavior rather than inventory the contents of the car.Police searched defendant’s car after finding he possessed marijuana. The prosecution argued the police action was justified as an inventory search. However, the search served no community caretaking function. Police asked defendant and the passengers if there was anything illegal in the car rather than whether there were valuables in the car defendant needed to inventory. The trial court reasonably found the primary purpose of the search was not to inventory the contents of the car, but rather to investigate the defendant for possible criminal behavior.id: 26433
Removal of the console exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search but the search was supported by probable cause and admissible under the automobile exception.Removal of the dashboard console exceeded the scope of an inventory search. However, the search was supported by probable cause, as the officer found packaged drugs under the driver’s seat and noticed the dashboard had been tampered with, and so the search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.id: 25426
Auto search was not a valid inventory search where there was no evidence that that is what the police intended or that they were acting pursuant to established impound procedures. While arguing the propriety of a vehicle search under the incident to arrest theory in light of Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. ___, the prosecution argued on appeal that the auto search was also valid as an inventory or impound search. However, that theory was not raised in the trial court and there was no evidence the officers intended to conduct such a search or that police followed some standardized criteria or established routine in conducting the search as the law on inventory searches requires.id: 21585
Search of car where cocaine was found in an airvent was not justified as an inventory search where the impound yard manager testified the policy was just to inventory items found in plain view. Defendant was stopped for erratic driving, tased and pepper sprayed after he refused to leave the car, and then arrested for interfering with a police investigation. The searches of his car at the scene or later at the impound yard (where cocaine was found in an air vent) were not justified as incident to arrest or under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The prosecution argued the search was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine because the drugs would inevitably have been discovered during an inventory search. However, the impound yard manager testified the policy was only to inventory items found in plain view and they don’t “search” cars. The search was not a valid inventory search.id: 22463
Cell phone search was not justified as an inventory search absent evidence of a standardized policy.Police stopped defendant’s vehicle for suspicion that he was driving under the influence. He was subsequently arrested. The search of defendant’s cell phone could not be justified as an inventory search because there was no evidence that turning on the phone or searching through it were done in accordance with any standard policy governing inventory searches.id: 22395
The inventory search was unlawful where the truck was impounded because of an investigatory motive rather than a community caretaking function.The officer testified that he decided to impound the truck to facilitate an inventory search as he was hoping to find drugs. He also said he was impounding the truck because it was driven by an unlicensed driver but he did not describe a standardized policy to impound all vehicles of unlicensed drivers. And he did not offer any community caretaking function served by impounding the truck.id: 21805
Supreme Court says school authorities’ search of girl’s underwear was unreasonable. School officials received reports that students were bringing drugs and weapons to school and that plaintiff, a 13-year-old student, had held a party at which alcohol had been served. A week later, a student gave a school official a prescription pain reliever, said that a girl named Marissa had given it to him, and stated that students were planning to take the pills at lunch. Officials confronted Marissa, who had several pills and a razor blade in her possession; Marissa told the officials that plaintiff had given her the pills, but she did not say when. In a day planner seized from Marissa, officials found knives, lighters, and a cigarette. When called to the school office, plaintiff admitted that the day planner belonged to her, but said that she had lent it to Marissa, that none of the contents belonged to her, and that she did not know anything about the pills seized from Marissa. The officials then searched plaintiff; during the search, which was conducted by two female school officials in the nurse’s office, the officials directed plaintiff to remove all of her clothes except her bra and underpants. The officials directed plaintiff to pull her bra out and shake it and to pull out the elastic on her underpants. No pills were found. The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision written by Justice Souter, held that the search of plaintiff’s underwear violated the Fourth Amendment. Although the Court found that the school officials had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a search of plaintiff’s outer clothing, it held that the officials lacked sufficient grounds to search her underwear.id: 21433
Impounding the vehicle under section 22651 was unconstitutional where there was no showing that it furthered a community caretaking function. Following defendant's arrest for an outstanding warrant, police impounded defendant's car pursuant to Vehicle code section 22651, subd.(h)(1). However, impounding the car, which was legally parked in front of defendant's house was unconstitutional, as it served no caretaking purpose. The subsequent inventory search was therefore also unconstitutional.id: 19367
Officers forced their way onto defendant's premises in violation of administrative search provisions.Code of Civil Procedure section 1822.56 sets forth the specific procedures which must be complied with in executing an inspection warrant. The provision prohibits forcible entry onto a premises. The officers' initial act of forcing appellant to leave his car and return to the gate in the face of his refusal to consent to the search permeated the entire sequence of events including appellant's giving the combination to the officers.id: 11192
Warrant is required for a nonconsensual inspection of an industrial facility storing hazardous waste materials.Health and Safety Code section 25185 permits inspection of industrial cites where hazardous waste is stored. The exception to the warrant requirement applicable to pervasively regulated industries does not apply to inspections conducted pursuant to section 25185. If consent to conduct such an inspection is refused, a warrant must be obtained.id: 11194
Supreme Court strikes down checkpoint whose purpose was to find unlawful drugs.In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose as the discovery and interdiction of illegal drugs violated the Fourth Amendment. The majority distinguished <i>Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz</i>, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and <i>U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte</i>, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), which upheld the constitutionality of brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants. The court said that stopping a vehicle constitutes a seizure but walking a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car did not transform the seizure into a search. The majority cautioned that its holding "does not impair the ability of police officers to act appropriately upon information that they properly learn during a check point stop justified by a lawful primary purpose, even where such action may result in the arrest of a motorist for an offense unrelated to the purpose." Finally, the court cautioned that "the purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an indication to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene." Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and in part by Justice Scalia.id: 15058
Asserted purpose for stopping the taxi - a cab inspection was a pretext for the officer's true motive of contacting defendant and the stop was therefore unlawfulThe stop of the taxicab was not based on any criminal law violation. Instead, it arose from the officer's asserted purpose of conducting a cab inspection. A stop for such an administrative search does not require any reasonable suspicion. However, the officer had vast experience in enforcing drug laws but little experience in cab inspections. He acknowledged that patrol officers conduct such inspections only occasionally. He failed to perform any element of a cab inspection except obtaining the driver's papers. He focused immediately on defendant, the passenger. Finally, he admitted that he stopped the cab based on his knowledge of the bar defendant exited. The stop for the cab inspection was a pretext for his true motive - to contact defendant. The trial court erred in denying the suppression motion.id: 15613
Illegal execution of administrative search required exclusion of evidence.The illegal execution of an inspection warrant required exclusion of the evidence seized at the premises.id: 10872
Police officer’s use of a key to open the compartment under the passenger’s seat of a motorcycle was a proper inventory search when transporting the motorcycle to a storage yard after the accident. Following a collision, defendant was taken to the hospital and his motorcycle that was blocking a driveway was towed to a police storage yard. The officer unlocked the compartment area under the passenger seat using a key, and discovered drugs. This was a permissible inventory search aimed at securing the motorcycle and its contents.id: 26694
A person arrested for driving under the influence may not defeat a search incident to arrest or an inventory search by locking incriminating evidence inside the car. Defendant was detained for certain Vehicle Code violations and the officer observed symptoms suggesting he may have been under the influence. Thereafter, defendant removed his coat and threw it into the car, along with his keys, and locked the car. Defendant was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance. The subsequent search of the car was valid as an inventory search aimed at securing the car and its contents, and as a search incident to arrest.id: 24986
The suspicionless search of the high school student was justified after he broke the policy of leaving school grounds and later returning. The suspicionless administrative search of the student by the high school assistant principal was justified by the fact that the student left and returned to campus during the school day. The search of the backpack and request that the student empty his pockets was conducted pursuant to an established policy, the purpose of which was to keep the school environment safe. id: 21958
Supreme Court upholds suspicionless search of California parolee.Under California Penal Code id: 20181
Searching the locker of a jail visitor was valid as an administrative search. Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence taken from his belongings in a jail locker when he was at the jail visiting another inmate. However, the search of the jail locker into which defendant, a visitor, put his belongings was a valid administrative search.id: 22407
When federal police properly detained defendant on county or city property, the subsequent inventory search was valid where it followed the federal policy. A U.S. Park Police officer properly stopped defendant on city/county property adjacent to Fort Mason, a federal property. The officer later arrested defendant and conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the prosecution was not required to prove the inventory was conducted pursuant to the local police. It was enough to show the Park Police followed the federal policy.id: 21547
Inventory search was justified by the officers authority under the community caretaking function as they sought to protect a parked car in a dangerous area from damage or theft.The magistrate properly denied defendant’s suppression motion where he argued the California Highway Patrol conducted an illegal inventory search after he had been arrested for drunk driving and the car was parked in a dangerous area. While the officers did not follow a written police procedure, they both referred to the authority under Vehicle Code section 22651, subd.(h), listed in the manual which allows the officers to provide for the safekeeping of a vehicle under the community caretaking function.id: 21522
Defendant failed to show the sobriety checkpoint did not substantially comply with the factors set forth in Ingersoll v. Palmer. The drunk driving defendant argued the sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional because it failed to comply with certain factors set forth in Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321. However, defendant did not show the checkpoint lacked supervisory decisionmaking where it was located at a different location than the media advisory provided. Moreover, the officer’s testimony that he was unaware of the mathematical selection process for stopping vehicles did not show the absence of such a process.id: 21571
Search of a stateroom on a cruise ship when the ship docked after a foreign cruise was a routine border search that did not require reasonable suspicion. The warrantless search of defendant’s stateroom on a cruise ship by customs officers, after the ship docked in Long Beach following a foreign cruise was a routine border search for which reasonable suspicion was not required. id: 20375
A warrantless administrative search under section 2805 does not require that the location be open to the public.Defendant argued the trial court erred in finding the search of an automobile repair shop was authorized by the warrantless administrative search provisions of Vehicle Code section 2805. He claimed the search was not authorized because the shop was not "open to the public" in the sense that customers were not invited onto the premises. However, there is no open to the public requirement for a warrantless administrative search under section 2805.id: 18483
Coast Guard's below-deck search during the search and rescue of a disabled boat with an injured passenger in the cabin and a broken sanitation device was a proper administrative search.The U.S. Coast Guard responded to a call that a person on a disabled boat adrift outside the San Leandro channel needed medical assistance. The boat's radio did not work and it had no power. As the Coast Guard approached it noticed the sanitation device was not working and sewage was pumping into the bay. Defendant argued the extensive below-the-deck search violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the search was part of a legitimate administrative search following an intervention of a search and rescue nature. There is a strong public interest in detecting safety violations such as in this case with an inoperable boat pumping sewage overboard. Moreover the officers had already been below deck to remove the injured passenger, so the defendant had a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy in the cabin area.id: 16614
Court properly denied suppression motion where inventory search took place after DMV records that were accurate 28 hours prior to the stop showed the car's registration had expired.Defendant argued the police were not entitled to impound and search his car based on an incorrect Department of Motor Vehicle computer record that reported his car's registration had been expired for more than eight months. The record was inaccurate because defendant had registered the car the day before the stop. However, the officer's reliance on the pertinent DMV computer information was at most 28 hours "stale" and was objectively reasonable. There was no evidence of negligence or inadequate record keeping by the DMV.id: 14921
Search did not exceed the scope of the administrative inspection law where the officer moved about the premises looking for the owner of the business and saw drugs in plain view.Appellant argued Vehicle Code section 2805 only authorized inspections of vehicles and their parts and was not a carte blanche invitation to roam the premises of his business. However, in his attempt to locate the new owner, the officer did not roam the premises. He went upstairs using a route typically used for getting to the parts room. He identified himself as an officer and proceeded further only when he received no response. His attempt to locate the new owner was limited in scope, reasonable under the circumstances and involved places where police normally would be in the course of their inspection. The officer viewed the methamphetamine from a place he had a legal right to be and the search did not exceed the scope of section 2805.id: 11193
Warrantless search of the bar did not exceed the scope of administrative searches permissible under sections 25753 and 25755.Officer of the Department of Alcohol Beverage Control was told by an anonymous informant that drugs were being sold in defendant's bar. Defendant argued Business and Professions Code section 25753 and 25755 would be constitutionally overbroad if they permitted the ABC to inspect licensed premises for narcotics or other crimes unrelated to the regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, the statute is not unconstitutional and the search in the instant case was reasonable.id: 11195
An automobile inventory search policy may allow an officer to exercise discretion.Defendant's car was impounded after he was arrested for drunk driving. An inventory search revealed a locked suitcase in the trunk of the car which contained a garbage bag containing marijuana. The U.S. Supreme Court held that since the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy with respect to opening close containers during an inventory search, the search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. However, a 5-4 majority of the court disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that in order to be constitutional, an inventory policy must mandate either that all containers will be opened or that no containers will be opened. The majority held that some discretion was permissible. Thus, a policy may allow the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers' exteriors, as long as the search is not a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. Judges Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in suppressing the evidence, but complained of the majority's activism in reaching out to make new law in this case.id: 11173
Failure to comply with the 24 hour notice requirement did not compel suppression of the evidence seized during the inspection.When officials have sought and been refused consent to inspect a premises for building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor or zoning violations, notice that an inspection warrant has been issued must be given at least 24 hours before the warrant is executed unless the judge issuing the warrant finds that immediate execution is necessary. Failure to comply with the 24 hour notice requirements did not compel suppression of the evidence seized during the inspection because the provision is a procedural requirement and did not rise to the level of an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.id: 11185
Giving an officer discretion to impound a vehicle after a valid traffic stop was not unconstitutional.Appellant was pulled over on a valid traffic stop and acknowledged he had a suspended license. The officer cited him and decided to impound the vehicle after learning the passenger also lacked a valid license. Appellant argued that standardized impoundment procedures are required and that merely leaving the decision to the officer's discretion is unconstitutional. However, the deputy's decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable. While the department lacked a written policy on impoundment, the deputies are clearly given parameters under which to exercise their discretion pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22651, subd. (p). While that section only authorizes impoundment, the court has clearly upheld the inevitable inventory search.id: 11186
Impounding defendant's vehicle after stopping him on a private road and citing him for a misdemeanor was proper.Defendant was stopped on a private road by an officer who knew defendant to be driving with a suspended license. He did not intend to arrest defendant, but only to cite him. To ensure defendant would not drive his car after the police departed, the officer decided to impound the vehicle. While conducting the subsequent inventory of the vehicle contraband was discovered. Impoundment of the vehicle was authorized by Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (a) which provides for such procedure when the vehicle is found on public or private property and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle was used to commit a public offense.id: 11187
Law relating to administrative inspections was not unconstitutional as applied to an automobile repair shop which is a closely regulated business.Vehicle Code section 2805 authorizes inspections of automobile repair shops and new or used car lots to examine the title or registration of vehicles and vehicle components for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles. Appellant argued the provision was unconstitutional as applied to his business, because warrantless administrative inspections are permitted only of closely regulated businesses and his auto repair shop was not a closely regulated business. However, section 2805 is not unconstitutional as applied. Automobile shops are closely regulated and section 2805 is a proper method of enforcing the administrative scheme. Moreover, contrary to appellants claim, his shop was open to the public as the business had a glass front opening to a showroom area where cars were displayed and employees worked on and attempted to sell cars to the public.id: 11188
Mandatory drug testing for certain U.S. Customs employees is constitutional.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court upheld mandatory urine drug tests for U.S. Customs employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions that (1) are directly involved in drug interdiction, or (2) require firearms to be carried. Such drug tests constitute searches, but are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The results may not be used in a criminal prosecution without the employee's consent. The tests are narrowly circumscribed and justified by the government's compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment. However, the court found the record inadequate to assess the reasonableness of testing a third class of employees<197>those who handle classified material<197>and remanded to determine whether the category may have been defined more broadly than necessary. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Scalia and Stevens dissented.id: 11189
No warrant or reasonable suspicion is required to conduct drug and alcohol tests on certain railroad workers.The Federal Railroad Administration promulgated regulations requiring alcohol and drug tests for railroad employees involved in certain train accidents. The agency also authorized railroads to test employees who violate certain safety rules. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality these regulations. Although the tests constitute searches, they are reasonable in order to ensure the safety of the traveling public. No warrant or reasonable suspicion is required. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented.id: 11190
Officer verifying a dance permit in a bar was properly in the back office when he discovered the narcotics in plain view.Officer entered defendant's bar to determine whether defendant had an entertainment or dance permit. Defendant went to the back office to retrieve the permit. The officer followed him, opened the office door and saw defendant give something to another man. Officer then saw narcotics paraphernalia in plain sight and discovered cocaine on defendant's person at a subsequent booking search. The suppression motion was properly denied. Given the factual determination that the officer was wearing two hats one of which was his bar check hat, the rules which allow for an administrative search made it objectively reasonable for him to be at any location in the bar, including the office/storage room.id: 11191
Supreme court upholds sobriety checkpoints against Fourth Amendment challenge.Writing for a five-person majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist upheld a Michigan sobriety checkpoint at which all motorists were stopped for brief questioning and observation in an effort to detect persons driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, even though no individualized suspicion supported the stops. The Court found the governmental interest in the checkpoints outweighed their intrusion on privacy, rejecting respondents' argument that a balancing test is inappropriate in the absence of showing of special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement. Disapproving the state court's conclusion that sobriety checkpoints are ineffective, the Court concluded that elected officials are free to choose among reasonable law-enforcement alternatives without judicial second-guessing as to whether other alternatives might work better. The Court reserved the question whether more extensive field sobriety testing requires individualized suspicion. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.id: 11097
Defendant was detained where an immigration officer approached him at an agricultural inspection stop and directed him to park on the side of the road.Defendant, a highway traveler, read road signs requiring him to stop for an agricultural inspection. Upon completion of the agricultural inspection an immigration officer approached the car and directed defendant to park at the side of the road. Defendant was detained for Fourth Amendment purposes since a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances. Moreover, the agricultural inspection station did not qualify as a fixed immigration checkpoint and therefore reasonable suspicion was required in order to stop and question any person passing the checkpoint.id: 10966
DMV is not required to prove the lawfulness of a sobriety checkpoint unless the licensee raises the issue.The trial court granted a writ of mandate directing the DMV to reinstate defendant's driving privileges following her arrest at a sobriety checkpoint. The court reasoned the DMV failed to establish the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint by proving the eight factors set forth in <i>Ingersoll v. Palmer</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321. However, the DMV is not required to prove the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint unless the licensee raises the issue.id: 10579
A single newspaper article was sufficient advance notice of the sobriety checkpoint.A detective who was the public information officer for the police department prepared a press release announcing a sobriety checkpoint to be conducted and placed it on the front counter at the police station. He then contacted the three major television networks by telephone advising them of the particulars of the checkpoint and contacted several local newspapers. He testified that to his knowledge the only publicity his efforts actually garnered was an article in the morning daily newspaper (with county wide circulation). The trial court erred in finding there was insufficient advance publicity for the check point and granting the suppression motion. Defendant had argued the police could have disseminated flyers, used billboards and placed advance signs in the general area of the roadblock. However, the advance publicity actually given in this case was adequate.id: 10551
Advance publicity is not a prerequisite to the operation of a constitutionally permissible highway sobriety checkpoint.The operation of a sobriety checkpoint conducted in the absence of advance publicity but otherwise in conformince with the guidelines established in <i>Ingersoll v. Palmer</i> (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, does not result in an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.id: 10553
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850