Computer/Cell Phone
Category > Computer/Cell Phone
Electronics search condition did not relate to future criminality for minor convicted of indecent exposure.The minor was found to have committed indecent exposure. The probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices was unreasonable where the juvenile court made no finding that the condition was necessary to monitor the minor’s compliance with probation conditions or deter future criminal conduct. That the condition would facilitate supervision did not make it reasonably related to future criminality.id: 26768
Electronics search condition was unreasonable for defendant convicted of possessing a concealed weapon.The electronics search condition of probation the trial court imposed was unreasonable as there was no relationship between electronic devices and the offense defendant pled guilty to - possession of a concealed weapon. The condition was not reasonably related to future criminality, and it burdened defendant’s privacy interest without specific and substantial justification.id: 26681
Ameliorative statutes can apply to those on probation who can no longer appeal from the original order granting probation.A convicted defendant who is placed on probation after imposition of sentence is suspended, and who does not timely appeal from the order granting probation, may take advantage of ameliorative statutory amendments (in this case Health and Safety Code section 11370.2) that take effect during a later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing sentence.id: 26673
Electronic search condition authorizing searches of insuring the minor was complying with all probation conditions was overly broad. The minor was found to have committed felony assault. The probation condition requiring her to submit to warrantless searches was overly broad. The court could have imposed an electronic search condition to make sure the minor had no contact with the victim, but the condition as imposed went too far.id: 26668
Good faith exception did not apply to pre-Riley cell phone search conducted after a stop for an infraction where there was no arrest.Defendant was detained for failing to stop at a stop sign (an infraction). He was not under arrest when police conducted a warrantless search of his cell phone. In People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, the court found police could perform a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest. In Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473, the court held to the contrary. The present search violated the Fourth Amendment under Riley, and could not be justified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because reasonably well trained officers would have known the Diaz rule only applied to searches following an arrest. id: 25002
The probation condition allowing for warrantless search of the minor’s electronic devices was improper absent evidence that he used such devices while committing a crime. The juvenile defendant was placed on probation after admitting two counts of felony burglary. As a condition of his probation, he was required to submit to warrantless searches of all electronic devices even though there was no evidence that he used electronic devices in the commission of the burglaries. Absent evidence that he used electronic devices in the commission of any illegal activity, the probation condition was not reasonably related to future criminality, and was therefore invalid. id: 26360
The electronic search probation condition was overbroad because of its potential impact in allowing the state to search into all private matters in defendant’s life.Defendant was convicted of domestic abuse, and the court imposed a warrantless electronics device search probation condition. Even though the condition may reasonably relate to future criminality, it is overbroad for purposes of the Fourth Amendment given its essentially unprecedented intrusion into the private affairs of the defendant that will likely have nothing to do with criminality.id: 25418
Warrantless search of “electronics including passwords” probation condition was invalid for minor found to have possessed a knife on school property. The minor was found to have possessed a knife. The probation condition that he submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords” bore no relationship to the underlying offense and was not reasonably related to his possible future criminal activity. It was therefore invalid. id: 24502
Electronic search probation condition was overbroad and modified to allow searches of communication where the minor might boast of drug use. The minor admitted to public intoxication. The probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronics including passwords, was reasonably related to future criminality but it was overbroad because it was not narrowly tailored to further the minor’s rehabilitation. It was modified to allow searches of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor was boasting of drug use. id: 24634
Probation condition allowing a search of all computers and electronic devices was unconstitutionally overbroad.Defendant pled no contest to false imprisonment by deceit. The probation condition allowing for searches of all of his computers and electronic devices was overbroad as worded. The matter was remanded to allow the court to impose a more tailored condition. Assuming the court fashions a proper limited search of defendant’s computers, the additional condition that he may not delete his browsing history is valid.id: 24586
Probation condition allowing a warrantless search of all electronic devices was modified to permit searches likely to reveal whether the minor was boasting about drug use or was otherwise involved with drugs. The minor admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales. The juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring him to submit to the warrantless search of his electronic devices and his use of social media. The condition was reasonably related to future criminality. However, it was overbroad as it permitted the search of too much private information. It was modified to allow for searches of programs used for interpersonal communication.id: 24449
Probation condition allowing a full search of the minor’s cell phone and electronics was overbroad and it was modified to allow searches of texts, emails, photos and social media.The minor challenged the probation condition requiring him to submit his “electronics and passwords” to his probation officer for warrantless searches. The probation condition was not unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481. It was overbroad to the extent that it allowed searches beyond texts, emails, voice messages, photographs and social media accounts. The court rejected the claim that the condition posed a risk of illegal eavesdropping by allowing searches of communications with third parties because the minor lacked standing to raise the issue.id: 24399
The electronic search condition was overbroad because it wasn’t narrowly tailored to further the minor’s rehabilitation.The minor was found to have committed first degree burglary and was placed on probation. One of his probation conditions required him to submit his warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” The condition was overbroad because it infringes on the minor’s right to privacy and expression without being sufficiently tailored. The court struck the condition and remanded the case so that the juvenile court could tailor a condition to the minor’s circumstances.id: 24360
Electronic search probation condition in minor’s case was overbroad by including searches of social media accounts and information stored remotely. The probation condition that the minor permit searches of, and disclose passwords to, electronic devices and social media sites was overbroad in allowing access to information stored in a remote location or the content of his social media accounts. A condition allowing searches of electronic devices found in defendant’s custody and control would be proper. The condition also cannot extend to the minor’s family.id: 24337
The probation condition requiring the minor drug possessor to submit her electronic devices for a search was unreasonable. The minor admitted to drug possession. As a condition of probation the juvenile court ordered that she submit to searches of her electronic devices and turn over her passwords to the probation officer. However, this was an unreasonable probation condition as there was no evidence connecting her electronic devices or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct.id: 24330
The trial court erred by finding the search of defendant’s computer that took place after the officer arrived at the repair shop was within the scope of the shop owner’s prior search of the computer.Defendant brought his computer into a repair shop for servicing. The technician viewed images in the computer that appeared to be underage girls engaged in sexual activity. He called the police, and Officer Clark looked at the images but did not believe the posing was of a sexual nature. Clark asked to search further and found video files but could not open them. He then transferred those files to a flash drive, and Clark took the drive to the police station where officers viewed the files and found pornography. The trial court erred by denying the suppression motion because the search at the station exceeded the scope of the prior private search by the shop owner and therefore violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.id: 23830
Warrantless search of the cell phone of an arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment.Police may not, without a warrant, search the digital contents of the cell phone of an arrestee under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.id: 23878
Cell phone search was not justified as an inventory search absent evidence of a standardized policy.Police stopped defendant’s vehicle for suspicion that he was driving under the influence. He was subsequently arrested. The search of defendant’s cell phone could not be justified as an inventory search because there was no evidence that turning on the phone or searching through it were done in accordance with any standard policy governing inventory searches.id: 22395
A person who uses a false name to procure a cellular telephone has a privacy interest in his communications over that phone.Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that his conversations would be private. The expectation of privacy in the contents of the telephone conversations does not become unreasonable just because the phone was procured using an alias. However, the denial of the suppression motion was proper due to the necessity for a wiretap based upon affidavits which specifically described the conspiracy under investigation.id: 18700
Cellphone search was valid under the independent source doctrine following the initial illegal pre-warrant search to obtain the phone number.The pre-warrant search of defendant’s cellphone to identify its corresponding phone number was illegal. However, even without tainted information derived from the illegal search, the affidavit established probable cause to search the cellphone given the defendant’s proximity to the shooting, the ballistics evidence connecting him to a second shooting, and a nexus between the shootings and his cellphone. id: 27333
Warrantless search of computer files by Google before governmental search was was justified by the private search doctrine.The government’s warrantless search of four computer files that had been flagged by Google as child pornography did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless search was permissible under the private search doctrine. Google’s private search had already frustrated defendant’s expectation of privacy before the government viewed them, and the government’s search did not expand on the one conducted by Google. Moreover, the private search doctrine as used here did not amount to privacy violations as established in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, or Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S. Ct. 2206. id: 27068
Defendant did not show good cause to determine whether a cell site simulator had been used to track defendant’s location during the investigation.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue the sentencing hearing so that he could investigate whether the police used a technology called cell site simulator (Stingray) to locate him. He argued the use of the simulator would have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the trial court had determined before trial that no such surveillance had occurred and that the cell site technology fell within the scope of the warrants issued during the investigation. Therefore, defendant did not show good cause to continue the sentencing hearing. id: 25806
Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as to a video he posted on social media after a robbery. The trial court did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by admitting a video defendant posted on social media where the detective obtained the video without a warrant by portraying himself as a friend to gain access to defendant’s social media account. Defendant voluntarily shared the video of himself wearing the stolen chain with social media friends. He assumed the risk that the account for one of his “friends” could be an undercover profile for a police detective or that any other “friend” could share the information with the police. The ECPA did not apply because the state did not seek to compel access to an electronic device or information on the device.id: 26038
Probation condition authorizing a search of defendant’s electronic devices did not violate his right to privacy.Defendant argued the probation condition allowing a search of his electronic devices violated his right to privacy because it had a much greater impact on his privacy rights than a search of his person. However, the condition was necessary here to ensure compliance with his other probation conditions and to protect the public, including vulnerable children.id: 25645
Probation condition allowing warrantless search of defendant’s electronic devices was not improper.Defendant was convicted of possessing methamphetamine for sale. He argued the probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his electronic devices was unreasonable. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the condition did not allow unlimited searches of defendant’s devices and was confined to various categories such as text messages and voicemails, etc. The search condition was otherwise reasonable and not vague or overbroad.id: 25615
Evidence from an improper cell phone search was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.The warrantless search of defendant’s cell phone was improper. However, the data taken from the search, defendant’s cell phone number, would inevitably have been discovered from the lawful search of the victim’s cell phone and other sources.id: 26728
Warrantless search of parolee’s cell phone was justified where police had specific facts showing he was involved in a residential burglary. Defendant was serving a parole term that required him to submit to warrantless searches of his cell phone. At the time of the cell phone search, police knew defendant was on parole and had specific articulable reasons to suspect he was involved in a residential burglary. He argued the search violated the Fourth Amendment because his written parole conditions gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone. However, any expectation of privacy defendant had was outweighed by the state’s interest in conducting the search because the police had specific reasons to believe he was involved in a residential burglary.id: 26677
Probation condition requiring the minor to submit to warrantless searches of his electronics was not overbroad where he had used his cell phone to record sex acts with another minor.The minor used his phone to record sex acts between himself and Jane Doe who was also a minor. He later threatened to show others the video if she did not give him money. He pled guilty to possession of child pornography and extortion. The probation condition requiring him to submit all electronics devices for warrantless search and to provide passwords was not constitutionally overbroad given the direct relationship between the minor’s offenses and his use of an electronic device.id: 26628
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder associated with the peer-to-peer network. The evidence leading to defendant’s arrest was obtained when police used software that targets peer-to-peer file-sharing networks to identify IP addresses associated with known digital files of child pornography. Defendant argued the use of this software violated his Fourth Amendment rights by infringing on his reasonable expectation of privacy on his computer. However, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder associated with peer-to-peer network.id: 24951
The probation condition requiring defendant to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and social media was reasonable given that he communicated with his 15 year-old victim via social media and had sex with her while already on probation.The 22 year-old defendant was placed on probation for having unlawful sexual intercourse with a 17 year-old girl. He then met a 15 year-old, exchanged text messages and suggested he wanted to have sex with her. He later admitted having sex with her. He was placed on formal probation that included 381 days of custody. The probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and recordable media was reasonable given that he communicated with the victim via social media, and reoffended with the younger victim while already on probation.id: 24925
The juvenile court did not err by imposing the electronic device search condition for the minor who admitted a burglary.The minor was found to have committed a second degree burglary. The probation condition requiring him to submit his electronic devices to search upon the request of his probation officer was reasonably related to his future criminality and was not overbroad. Moreover, the condition did not pose a risk of unlawful eavesdropping under Penal Code section 632.id: 24824
Electronic search condition was overly broad and remanded to allow a more narrowly tailored version.The minor was found to have committed burglaries. The probation condition permitting searches of his electronic devices was overly broad. The case was remanded to permit a more narrowly tailored condition allowing a search of any medium of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor is associating with prohibited persons.id: 26411
Electronic search probation condition was reasonable for defendant who stole electronics devices to buy drugs.Defendant pled guilty to stealing cell phones and other electronic devices so that he could buy drugs. The probation condition allowing a warrantless search of his electronic deices was reasonable and not overbroad. Contrary to the prosecution's argument, defendant was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to challenge the probation condition on appeal.id: 26289
Probation condition limiting juvenile’s use of his computer, the Internet, and social media sites was not facially overbroad. The minor was found to have committed lewd acts upon a younger child. He challenged the imposition of a probation condition that imposed limits on his use of computers, the Internet and social networking websites. To the extent that the claim may be considered a facial, rather than an “as applied” challenge, it may be reviewed on appeal without an objection in the trial court. The condition while difficult, is not unconstitutional in every potential application, and therefore is not facially overbroad. id: 26275
The electronic device probation search condition did not violate the ECPA. Defendant argued the electronics device search condition attached to his probation violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) because he did not give specific consent to access his electronic storage devices. However, there is no requirement that a defendant consent to specific government entities. In any event, there is no legislative intent suggesting the ECPA would affect electronic device search conditions. id: 26270
The warrantless search of electronic devices probation condition was reasonably related to further criminality following defendant’s identity theft conviction and it was not overbroad and did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant admitted the identity theft and was placed on probation which included a condition that he submit his electronic storage devices and email/Internet accounts to warrantless searches. The electronic search condition was reasonably related to future criminality even though the current identify theft did not involve the use of electronic devices. Neither was the search condition improper under the appropriate test balancing interests to determine reasonableness (rather than the “closely tailored” test used by some courts). Finally, the condition does not violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.id: 26269
Probation condition requiring minor’s consent to search electronic devices was reasonable in attempting to limit his online access to racial hatred.The minor participated in a fist fight at school, and when his teacher tried to break it up, he used a racial slur. He admitted that he committed a disturbing the peace on school grounds. The juvenile court’s probation conditions included a requirement that he consent to a search of his electronic devices that was designed to limit his access to racial hatred on the internet. The condition was reasonable and not overbroad.id: 26133
The electronics search condition was not related to the vandalism convictions, but it was reasonably related to preventing future criminality. Defendant was convicted of felony vandalism and admitted the gang enhancement. He argued the probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his electronic devices was improper. While it is true that the probation condition had nothing to do with defendant’s conviction, the issue was reasonably related to preventing future criminality, and so it was valid.id: 25508
Probation condition authorizing a warrantless search of defendant’s “property” and “personal effects” allowed the search of her cell phone.Defendant was on probation and subject to a general search condition that allowed authorities to search her “property” and “personal effects” without a warrant. She argued the scope of that search condition did not extend to a warrantless search of her cell phone. However, a reasonable person at the time of the search would have understood that a search of the cell phone was within the scope of the search condition. The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.id: 25356
The probation condition authorizing warrantless searches of the minor’s property applies only to tangible property and not to electronic devices.The minor argued the probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his person, property or vehicle was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed searches of his electronic devices and data. However, reasonably construed, the search condition applies only to tangible physical property, and not to electronic data.id: 25237
Requiring defendant to provide the password to his cell phone as a condition of his probation was not unreasonable. Defendant was convicted of drug possession. He argued the probation condition requiring him to submit to a cell phone search and provide his password was unreasonable. The condition requiring him to provide his password was reasonable since he used his cell phone to buy the drugs in the present case. Moreover, the condition was not vague by referring to “electronic searches” as that term is commonly applied to searches of cell phones and computers.id: 25126
Probation condition restricting a minor’s use of electronics or requiring that he submit them for search was proper for the minor who admitted to molesting children. (425)(810) The minor admitted to annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18. The court did not err by imposing a condition of probation restricting his use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics for search because of the connection between child molestation and digital child pornography or online sexual material.id: 24774
Electronics search probation condition was proper for a minor with serious substance abuse and mental health issues.The juvenile court’s probation condition requiring a minor to submit her electronics including passwords to warrantless searches by the probation and law enforcement was reasonable and constitutional even though the crime adjudicated was an assault on the defendant’s mother. The minor was a substance abuser and truant with serious mental health issues and the search condition was reasonably related to future criminality. The condition was also not overbroad under the circumstances.id: 24590
The warrantless search of the minor’s cell phone was reasonable where it occurred on school grounds after officials had discovered a firearm and the minor was evasive.The warrantless search of the minor’s cell phone at the high school was reasonable under New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, where school officials found a firearm and magazine on school grounds, and the minor was evasive and resistant to school officials. The search was not invalid under Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473 (decided after the present search) because it involved a school search in a threatening situation rather than a search incident to arrest.id: 24605
Evidence that defendant was obsessed with the victim’s husband at the time of the killing over 20 years earlier was not stale and justified the search of her new home and computer. Defendant argued the search warrants that were issued more than 20 years after the killing were necessarily based on stale information. However, the information showing defendant’s obsession with the victim’s husband was not stale and it was probable that she would retain evidence of her relationship given the strong feelings. That she had moved homes did not matter as people wouldn’t normally throw out such personal items. The computer search was proper even if she didn’t own the computers earlier because she could easily have transferred the photographs and other information to her current computer.id: 24193
The use of GPS technology in determining the location of the stolen cell phone, and thus assisting in locating defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The police did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by using a Global Positioning System (GPS) to locate a stolen cell phone and detain defendant. There is no Fourth Amendment violation when the information generated by the GPS, with the owner’s consent, is only a part of the objective reasons leading up to the decision to detain. id: 23215
The cell phone was properly seized, and text messages read, even though the phone was not among the items listed in the search warrant. Defendant argued the seizure of his cell phone was unauthorized because the search warrant did not specifically include cell phones in its list of property to be seized. However, the warrant allowed the seizure as the smartphone was the likely container of many items listed in the warrant. Moreover, the police were not required to get a second warrant to read defendant’s text messages.id: 22749
The minor committed identity theft when he hacked into the victim’s facebook account and posted vulgar messages allegedly written by the victim.The juvenile court properly found the minor committed identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, subd.(a) when he accessed the victim’s facebook account, altered her profile and posted obscene comments purportedly as the victim. He “willfully” obtained the victim’s password when he chose to remember it from a text message he received and later used the password to gain access to the victim’s electronic accounts. Moreover, he used the information “for an unlawful purpose” under the statute when he committed the civil tort of libel. Criminal conduct was not necessary to establish an “unlawful purpose.” id: 22313
Search of defendant’s cell phone found in the car while he was secured in the police vehicle was justified as incident to the arrest. Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence and secured in a patrol car. The search of the vehicle incident to arrest was proper under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 129 S. Ct. 1710, where it was reasonable that evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle. While searching the vehicle, police could also search containers including defendant’s cell phone, even where the cell phone was not on defendant’s person at the time.id: 22396
A subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. A subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. Therefore, defendant could not properly challenge a warrant requiring his Internet provider to identify him through his Internet Protocol (IP) number. Moreover, that Time Warner filed a letter rather than a declaration “verifying the authenticity of its records” pursuant to Penal Code section 1524.2 did not provide defendant an exclusionary relief remedy.id: 22180
Search of a text message folder of defendant’s cell phone 90 minutes after his arrest was valid as a search incident to arrest. Approximately 90 minutes after lawfully arresting defendant and transporting him to jail, police conducted a warrantless search of the text message folder of the cell phone they took from his person after the arrest. The search was valid as being incident to a lawful custodial arrest.id: 21970
The trial court did not err by not excluding the Yahoo chat dialogue between defendant and the purported minor because it was not a confidential communication within the meaning of section 632.Defendant was convicted of attempting to send harmful matter with intent to seduce the minor in violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 288.2, subd, (a). He argued the trial court erred by not excluding the Yahoo chat dialogue between defendant and the purported minor because it was a confidential communication pursuant to section 632. However, while defendant desired that the communication be confidential, this expectation was unreasonable as it could have been shared or viewed with any computer user the young victim wanted to share. Assuming the communications were protected by section 632, any error was harmless since the jury would still have heard about defendant's sexually explicit conversations with young girls.id: 21500
The seizure of defendant’s computer which was not listed on the warrant was proper to establish dominion and control.Defendant argued that the computer, closed in the car parked outside of his house, and not specifically mentioned in the search warrant, could not be seized under the general dominion and control clause. However, the warrant authorized the seizure of “computer disks” which are materials stored by the computer. Moreover, the officers were entitled to secure items, including the computer to clearly establish dominion and control, This was so, even though the computer contained a wide range of information not related to dominion and control.id: 20293
The warrant to search the computer was supported by probable cause where the officer knew defendant had been communicating with another suspect and the officer believed the communication might be discovered in an e-mail. There was probable cause to issue a warrant to search defendant’s computer where the officer had knowledge that defendant had been corresponding with another suspect in the case, and it was reasonable to believe defendant used the computer to correspond by e-mail. While the affidavit also mentioned an anonymous uncorroborated tip linking defendant to the killing, it was a minor part of the affidavit and there was nothing to suggest defendant relied on it.id: 20292
The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence AOL instant messages seized from defendant's home computer where police knew the defendant and minor were communicating by computer.Defendant was charged with sodomy of a minor and oral copulation of a minor after meeting a 15 year-old in an Internet chat room. He argued the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence of the America Online instant messages seized from his home computer. The search warrant seeking such evidence was not overly broad. The AOL instant messages fell into the category of correspondence relating to the exploitation of children. Defendant also argued there was no information in the search warrant affidavit to support the conclusion that he possessed such evidence. However, home computers are common and the officers knew the defendant and the minor were communicating by computer. There was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found on defendant's computer.id: 17003
Police did not exceed the scope of the warrant by confiscating an open laptop computer as "dominion and control" evidence.Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property. She argued the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant when
they confiscated an open laptop computer under a warrant clause authoring seizure of "any items tending to show dominion and control" of the premises searched. However, a laptop computer
could logically serve as a container for information tending to show occupancy and control of the residence.id: 18983
The search warrant affidavit was supported by probable cause where the child reported a recent molest and defendant had taken steps to make sure no one had access to his computer which was found to contain child pornography.Following a no contest plea, defendant appealed the denial of his motion to traverse and quash a search warrant and suppress child pornography evidence found on his computer. He argued the probable cause affidavit failed to establish that child pornography would be found on his computer. However, the search warrant application was supported by more than the detective's opinion that child molesters collect and store pornography. It was supported by statements of the child that defendant recently molested her, and by his storing the computer in a hot garage and asking his mother not to let anyone "mess with it." The search warrant was supported by probable cause.id: 20071
Defendant had no expectation of privacy as to a cell phone he abandoned at the scene of a robbery.Defendant argued the detective performed an unlawful search when he removed the battery from defendant's cell phone to find identifying numbers. However, defendant left his phone unattended at a public place. He fled the scene of the robbery and made no attempt to retrieve the phone realizing that to associate himself with it would be incriminating. All objective indications were that the phone was abandoned, and the defendant therefore relinquished any expectation of privacy with respect to it.id: 18792
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850