Probation/Parole
Category > Probation/Parole
Updated 7/22/2023Parole search of back seat passenger did not permit a search of the locked glove compartment.Police searched the locked glove box in defendant’s car during a parole search of the back seat passenger. The search was improper where the parolee was incapable of accessing the glove box and police did not observe anything suggesting the occupants of the car were trying to access the glove box.id: 27646
The probation search condition of the residence of a female probationer did not authorize police to search a drawer located in a separate living unit.A probation search condition of the residence of a female probationer, without more, did not authorize law enforcement officers to look into a purse or drawers located in a separate living unit. The trial court erred in denying the suppression motion on that basis.id: 24780
The search exceeded the scope of the probation search clause where there was no showing the probationer’s residence was subject to the search. Defendant was living in the garage attached to the home of two probationers. Police conducted a warrantless search of the home. Although the officer’s subjective belief that the two men were probationers subject to a warrantless search was supported by the record, the probation search was not objectively reasonable as there was no showing regarding the scope of the probation search - that is whether it extended just to the two probationers, or all of the property under their control, or their residence. Nor was there a showing that a search was authorized for a particular kind of contraband. id: 24335
The probation condition requiring the minor drug possessor to submit her electronic devices for a search was unreasonable. The minor admitted to drug possession. As a condition of probation the juvenile court ordered that she submit to searches of her electronic devices and turn over her passwords to the probation officer. However, this was an unreasonable probation condition as there was no evidence connecting her electronic devices or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct.id: 24330
The discovery after the fact of a probation search condition does not sanitize an unlawful detention.The unlawfulness of a suspicionless vehicle detention is not retroactively cured when one of the passengers turns out to be a probationer with a search condition.id: 23415
The parole status of a passenger cannot be relied upon to justify a search of the vehicle.A mere passenger in a vehicle, who claims neither a possessory nor property interest therein, lacks the “common authority” over the vehicle which would allow him to either consent or object to its search. Consequently, the parole status of such a passenger cannot be relied upon as the sole basis to justify such a search.id: 21764
The juvenile court cannot impose a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of informal supervision.The juvenile court does not have the authority to impose a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 654 and 654.2. id: 21310
The trial court erred in denying the suppression motion where the prosecution failed to establish that defendant was still on parole at the time of the warrantless search.The prosecution’s only justification for the warrantless search was that defendant was on parole subject to a search condition at the time. However, the prosecution failed to prove defendant was on parole at the time of the search. His four-year parole period ended on December 11, 2004 and the search took place two days later. While the parole period could have been extended if defendant was a fugitive from justice during that period, and the prosecution introduced handwritten and stamped entries to his CDC record, no witnesses testified as to the meaning of those entries. Moreover, the prosecutor did not invoke, argue or present any evidence to support the good faith exception. The error in denying the suppression motion required reversal of the conviction. id: 20909
Unlawful search of a juvenile was not justified by the officer's subsequent discovery that the juvenile was on probation.Juveniles are protected by the same rule of law protecting similarly situated adults: that an otherwise unlawful search may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the searching officers were totally unaware. The juvenile court erred in relying on In re Tryrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, in denying the minor's suppression motion.id: 18535
Probation search condition does not apply if police are unaware of the condition at the time of the warrantless search.The adult probationer's search condition exception to the warrant requirement does not apply if police are unaware of the probation search condition at the time of a warrantless search.id: 18013
Police suspicions that three cars full of black youths in a gang area, after midnight and after a shooting were about to commit a crime did not justify a stop, and the later discovery that one person was subject to a probation search did not justify the illegal stop.Several hours after a gang related shooting, officers stopped three cars driving together (at 12:30 a.m.), in East Side Crips territory, identified one of the occupants of a car as an East Side Crip, and noted the presence of several other black males in the three cars. The circumstances did not provide a particularized and objective basis to suspect someone in defendant's car had committed or was about to commit a crime. The officer's subsequent discovery that one of the occupants of the car was on probation and subject to a probation search condition did not legalize the otherwise unlawful stop.id: 17918
Search was illegal where officer did not know defendant was on probation and subject to the probation condition when searched.A police officer searched defendant without knowing he was on probation and subject to a search condition. Thus, he was not acting pursuant to the search condition, and because he did not have a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the search was unreasonable.id: 18261
An otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the police were unaware.Police searched the residence of two persons, one of whom was on parole and subject to a search condition of which the police were unaware at the time of the search. However, an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was conducted. Evidence seized from the search was suppressed as to both defendants.id: 17485
Since the court erred by finding the search was justified by defendant's adult probation search condition, the matter was remanded for a hearing on the other issues raised in the suppression motion.Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his hotel room. The issue of the search warrant was not litigated at the hearing. Instead, the motion was denied after evidence was presented that defendant was subject to a probation search condition about which the searching officer was unaware. However, in light of People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, an adult's probation search condition cannot be used to justify a search. The matter was remanded for a hearing on the remaining issues raised by the original suppression motion.id: 17996
Probation search condition did not justify the search where the officer conducting the search was unaware of the condition.Defendant's probation search condition did not justify the search of his person, because the police officer who conducted the warrantless search was unaware of the condition at the time. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether other circumstances justified the search.id: 17845
The police had no authority to conduct a patdown search of defendant, who was present during a probation search absent reason to believe he was armed and dangerous.Officers conducted a probation search at a residence. Defendant was a “known associate” of the probationer and was present during the search. The police violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a patdown search because they had no reason to believe he was armed and dangerous.id: 20373
Probation search condition of defendant's brother may not be used to validate the warrantless search of the garage where the police did not know of the condition at the time of the search.The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the warrantless search of the garage because defendant's brother, with whom he lived, had agreed to submit to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation. However, since the officers were unaware of the brother's probation condition at the time of the search, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the court erred in denying the suppression motion.id: 15656
Stop was unreasonable where police did not know of defendant's probation condition, and there was no reason for remand for further proceedings.At the suppression hearing, the prosecution conceded defendant was detained without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. It argued the search was valid because of defendant's
probation status, which was unknown to the police at the time of the detention. The trial court's denial of the suppression motion was reversed in light of recent case law on point. The
prosecution argued the matter should have been remanded for further proceedings. However, in light of the prosecutor's decision to expressly concede that the stop was unreasonable absent the probation search condition, further proceedings were unwarranted and the judgment was reversed.id: 19407
Court may not require an applicant for drug diversion to submit to reasonable, but warrantless, searches as a condition of diversion.The trial court may not require an applicant for drug diversion to submit to reasonable, but warrantless, searches as a condition of his or her drug diversion. However, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the instant search and suppression was not required as defendant told the officer she was on probation and subject to a search and seizure condition, and the officer's failure to appreciate the distinction between diversion and probation did not render his conduct unreasonable.id: 10689
The court erred at the suppression hearing by not allowing defendant to prove the stop was illegal notwithstanding his probation search condition.Defendant argued the evidence would show he committed no turn signal violation, and there was therefore no legitimate stop or search. The trial court declined to hear the evidence, holding defendant's probation search condition rendered any illegality in the stop irrelevant. However, evidence is excludable when seized during a probation condition search that is arbitrary, capricious or harassing. If he committed no traffic violation, then his stop and detention were all of those things. The court erred in not allowing him to prove the illegality of the stop. id: 17089
Good faith exception does not apply to a probation search which relied on a probation roster that, by design, omitted information on the limitations of the authority to conduct a probation search.The good faith exception rule does not apply to a probation search conducted by police officers in reliance on a probation roster that, by design, omitted information concerning judicially imposed limitations on the authority to conduct a probation search.id: 17277
Pat search of parolee was improper where he was stopped for a traffic infraction.Officer stopped defendant for riding an unlicensed bicycle and, after ascertaining he was on parole, pat searched him for weapons. The court erred in denying the motion to suppress the rock cocaine found in defendant's pocket. A frisk was not permitted simply because he was on parole. Moreover, the search cannot be justified as a lawful parole search. Where an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a parolee is in possession of evidence relating to a violation of the law or other condition of parole, the officer may conduct a parole search. However, the search was improper where the officer detained a parolee for a traffic infraction and had no reasonable suspicion that a search would produce such evidence.id: 11008
Updated 9/14/2023The law does not require testimony of an officer as to how he or she knew defendant was on parole.Defendant argued the placement of a GPS surveillance device on his vehicle without a warrant was unconstitutional because the officer did not specifically describe how he knew defendant was on parole. However, no case or statute has ever articulated such a requirement with respect to parole searches. The officer was never asked the question.id: 27929
Upon learning the passenger of a stopped car was on probation, the warrantless search of the car was proper. An officer who stopped to speak with the driver of a car, and afterward learned the front seat passenger was on probation (subject to a warrantless search condition) could lawfully search those areas in the car where the probationer could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items upon seeing the police.id: 27132
The clerk’s minutes showed defendant understood he would be subject to a warrantless search probation condition. Defendant argued the probation search condition was invalid because it had not been furnished to him in writing. However, the clerk’s minutes indicate he had been advised of the consequences of the plea, which included a warrantless search condition. This suggests he understood the consequences of the plea.id: 26930
Warrantless search of parolee’s cell phone was justified where police had specific facts showing he was involved in a residential burglary. Defendant was serving a parole term that required him to submit to warrantless searches of his cell phone. At the time of the cell phone search, police knew defendant was on parole and had specific articulable reasons to suspect he was involved in a residential burglary. He argued the search violated the Fourth Amendment because his written parole conditions gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his cell phone. However, any expectation of privacy defendant had was outweighed by the state’s interest in conducting the search because the police had specific reasons to believe he was involved in a residential burglary.id: 26677
Warrantless parole search using penile swabs for DNA after defendant’s rape arrest was not arbitrary or harassing.Without possessing a warrant, two police officers took penile swabs for DNA after arresting him for rape. The search was conducted pursuant to a condition of defendant’s parole, and the evidence shows it was not arbitrary, capricious or harassing.id: 24970
Defendant who provided police with a false name is estopped from later challenging the probation search.When a defendant gives a false name to a police officer, and a record check of that name fails to reveal that defendant is in fact subject to a probation search condition, the defendant is estopped from challenging the legality of an ensuing search or seizure that could have been authorized had the officer been aware of the condition. id: 25401
The search of defendant’s center console was justified based on his passenger’s status as a probationer. In People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, the court upheld a search of personal items in the back seat of a car based on a front seat passenger’s status as a parolee. The same policy considerations justify the search of defendant’s center console based on his passenger’s status as a probationer. Also, the discovery of the drugs there would inevitably have led to the discovery of the drugs in the bags located in the back seat.id: 25255
The warrantless search of defendant’s home one day after his postrelease community service had expired was proper because the probation department still had 30 days to discharge him. Defendant argued the warrantless search of his home was unlawful because the county probation department’s postrelease community supervision of him had terminated the day before the search as a matter of law, pursuant to Penal Code section 3456. However, that provision requires that the agency discharge a defendant from supervision within 30 days after successfully completing one year of postrelease supervision. The defendant had not been discharged on the day after his year ended, and so the probation department maintained postrelease supervision.id: 24744
Where the officer knew defendant was on probation for brandishing a firearm and probation for those offenses included a search condition, the officer’s lack of knowledge that defendant was subject to a search condition did not invalidate the search.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officer presumed, but did not know for certain at the time of the search, that defendant was subject to a search condition. The officer knew defendant was on probation for brandishing a weapon and that probation in gun-related offenses included a search condition. The officer’s lack of knowledge that there was a search condition did not invalidate the search.id: 24347
The searching officer reasonably relied on defendant’s mistaken statement that he was on probation and subject to a warrantless search. The officer conducted a warrantless search after defendant said he was on probation. The search was proper even though defendant was no longer on probation. The officer could reasonably rely on the statement, and the fact that the officer could have independently verified the fact but didn’t, did not change the result.id: 24166
Supreme Court allows warrantless search of California probationers on reasonable suspicion.As a condition of probation, California probationers consent to a search of their "person, property, place of residence [and] vehicle" by any law enforcement officer at any time. The Supreme Court unanimously held that a search of the residence of a California probationer - who had agreed to that search condition - is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as the authorities have reasonable suspicion that the probationer is engaged in criminal conduct. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that a probation search's legality turned on the officer's purpose in conducting the search, but it did not reach the question whether the probation's consent to the search condition would be sufficient to authorize a search absent reasonable suspicion.id: 20130
Defendant and her probationer boyfriend had joint access to her purse and the officer conducting a probation search could properly search the purse.Defendant was the probationer’s girlfriend and lived with him in an apartment. The girlfriend’s purse, which was on a chair in the bedroom was subject to a search because this was a repository over which the probationer had access or control. A probationer is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because of ingenuity in selecting a hiding place for drugs.id: 23185
The police properly searched the backseat of defendant’s car based on the passenger’s parole status.A police officer, aware that the front seat passenger was on parole, searched the backseat of defendant’s car and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant, the driver, sought to suppress the evidence. However, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as the Constitution permits a search of those areas of the passenger compartment where the officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity. Also, the officer may search personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them. id: 22984
Any illegality in the traffic stop was attenuated by defendant’s probation search condition even though the police did not know about the condition at the time of the stop.During a traffic stop for failing to signal a turn, police discovered that defendant was carrying a loaded firearm despite his status as a convicted felon currently on probation. He argued the probation search condition could not be used to validate the patdown because the officer was unaware of the condition when he first initiated the stop. However, any illegality in the initial stop was attenuated by defendant’s probation search condition. Although the search and discovery of the gun occurred shortly after the detention, they did not occur until after the officer had recognized defendant as a person subject to a search condition. id: 22681
Officers executing an arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search need not have probable cause to believe the suspect was present. An officer executing an arrest warrant or conducing a parole or probation search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only a “reasonable belief,” falling short of probable cause, to believe the suspect lives there and is present.id: 22358
Probation officers looking for a juvenile probationer properly detained defendant inside the house as he had gang tattoos and the officer wanted to know his relationship with the probationer.Probation officers were conducting a valid home visit to a probationer who had recently violated his probation. They had a right to enter and search for him. Once inside they saw defendant who had visible gang tattoos on his face and hand. Under the circumstances, the probation officers had the authority to briefly detain defendant to determine his relationship to defendant. The court rejected defendant’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove the scope and terms of the juvenile’s probation - specifically, that the search term covered the residence.id: 22083
Officer’s actions in pulling back the waistband and inspecting defendant’s crotch area did not constitute an improper “public strip search.” Defendant who was convicted of drug offenses, argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence unreasonably obtained during a “public strip search.” However, the officer’s search, effected by pulling back the waistband of his underwear and visually inspecting his crotch area did not constitute a public strip search, and met constitutional standards, in light of defendant’s parole status and reduce expectation of privacy. People v. Smithid: 20908
Officer’s second search of the parolee within 24 hours did not amount to police harassment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.While on parole, defendant was stopped and searched by the same police officer who had searched him during a traffic stop the night before. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the parole search conducted within 24 hours of the officer’s previous search was not a function of police harassment invalidating the search. Rather, the second search was for a legitimate law enforcement purpose as the officer was investigating drug trafficking in the area, regularly spoke to known parolees as part of his job and had no personal animus towards defendant.id: 20787
Defendant who misrepresented his identity to the officer was estopped from arguing the officer did not know he was on probation at the time of the search. Defendant argued the search of his car was not a valid probation search because the officer did not know at the time that defendant was on searchable probation. However, defendant was estopped from challenging the search on this basis because of his wrongdoing in concealing his search condition from the officer by misrepresenting his identity.id: 20786
Officers search of minor's apartment was reasonable after minor told the officer he was searchable for weapons even though he was not under a search condition.The minor was not subject to a search condition. Nevertheless, when the officer who stopped him asked the minor if he was searchable, the minor said, Yes, for weapons. The officer was reasonable in relying on the minors statement that he had a search condition. The subsequent search of the minors apartment was not improper.id: 15636
Under California law, a suspiciousless search pursuant to a probation search condition is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a suspiciousless probation search of his residence conducted solely because of defendant's probation search condition. However, under state law, a suspiciousless search condition is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The trial court erred in granting the suppression motion.id: 20050
Parole search was proper notwithstanding proof of a signed parole search agreement. Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion due to the prosecution's lack of proof of the existence of, and the searching officer's awareness of, a
signed parole search agreement. He argued the authority to search a parolee derives from the written search agreement. However, every grant of parole includes an implied search condition and an officer's knowledge of parole status is equivalent to knowledge of a parole search condition.id: 19773
Juvenile's probationary search condition, unknown by the searching officers, does not justify an otherwise illegal search.A juvenile's probationary search condition does not justify an otherwise illegal search and seizure if the officers conducting the search are then unaware that the juvenile is on probation and subject to the search condition. The court's earlier
holding in In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, is overruled.id: 19356
When the suppression motion was litigated before the court's decision in Sanders, the proper remedy was a remand to determine whether police knew of defendant's parole search condition.In 2003, the court held police must know of a defendant's
parole search condition to justify a warrantees search under that exception. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.) Defendant's suppression motion was litigated before the court decided Sanders. The parties did not present evidence as to whether the police knew of the search condition at the time of the search. The Court of Appeal thereafter erred by reversing the judgment outright. The appropriate remedy was a remand to determine whether the officers knew of the search condition.id: 19152
The parole officer retained the authority to conduct a parole search after defendant had been returned to prison for a parole violation but before his parole was formally revoked. Defendant argued the warrantless search of his storage locker was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where it occurred after he had been returned to prison for a parole violation but before his parole was formally revoked. However, the search of the
locker was permissible as a parole search because defendant was still a parolee until his parole was formally revoked.id: 19125
Police officers' knowledge that a person was a parolee was sufficient to inform them of their right to conduct a parole search.Defendant argued that the police officers' knowledge that an individual was on parole was not sufficient to inform them that he was subject to a search condition, and the facts known to the officers at the time they entered his motel room did not justify his detention. However, a search condition for every parolee is now required by statute, and the officers' awareness that the person was a parolee was sufficient to inform them of their right to conduct a parole search of his motel room.id: 18688
The officer's subjective purpose is irrelevant in determining whether the search exceeded the scope of the probationer's waiver.Defendant provided consent to search his house for guns or drugs in return for a grant of probation following an earlier offense. The trial court in the present case erred by finding the search was illegal because the officer's subjective intent was to search for stolen property. The search was lawful because defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the property was found, and the officer's subjective purpose for the search did not make it illegal.
id: 18629
Searching officers relied in good faith on search waiver even though the guilty plea to which the probation condition attached was later vacated.In 1995, defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography. As a condition of probation, he waived his Fourth Amendment rights. In 1999, police searched his home and found more child pornography. Thereafter, defendant succeeded in having the 1995 guilty plea withdrawn because the court had failed to advise him of the mandatory sex offender registration requirement. Defendant argued that the 1999 search was invalid and that the search condition was nullified when the 1995 judgment was vacated. However, the officers conducted the search in good faith reliance on the probation condition. There was nothing the officer could have reasonably done in advance of their search that would have put them on notice that the Fourth Amendment waiver was anything but valid.id: 18203
The trial court did not err in finding defendant's mother had joint control over his locked bedroom so as to place the room within the scope of her probation search waiver.Defendant argued the search waiver given by his mother as a probation condition did not justify the officers entry into his locked bedroom, especially since they did not make a good faith effort to determine whether the bedroom was an area of the residence within his exclusive control. However, since defendant's mother had waived her Fourth Amendment rights, gave consent to search her residence, and since she had a key and access to defendant's locked room, the court did not err in finding the search of the locked room within the waiver.id: 18149
Suppression of the evidence was not required where the dispatcher mistakenly told the officer that defendant was on parole and did not learn until later that defendant was subject to a probation search.Defendant argued the search of his motel room was unlawful because the police were unaware of his probation search condition. The dispatcher had told the officer defendant was subject to a parole search which is what the police believed they were conducting. Under the totality of the circumstances test set forth in People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the evidence. To punish the officer and the dispatcher would create a windfall for the defendant who was legitimately subject to the search condition.id: 17893
Protective sweep was justified prior to a valid probation search where defendant appeared to be under the influence and officers knew that drug users often have weapons in the house.In Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated the standard for determining when police are entitled to conduct a brief, cursory sweep of the premises before undertaking an arrest. In the present case, the protective sweep was conducted prior to a valid probation search. Defendant was not the subject of the search, but occupied a room where the evidence was found. The probation search was conducted pursuant to a probation condition imposed on a convicted drug user. Defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs when the police arrived. Since there appeared to be ongoing drug activity, and drug users often have weapons in the house, with transients coming and going at all hours, the protective sweep was justified.id: 17222
Police reasonably believed defendant's purse was an item which defendant's probationer boyfriend had access to or control over for purposes of the probation search.Defendant lived with a man, Kelsey, who was subject to a probation search condition. Police went to search the house and defendant informed them she and Kelsey shared the bedroom. In searching the room, officers found drugs and paraphernalia. Defendant told police there was a gun in the safe and that there was a key to the safe in her purse, which they found. Police later searched her purse again and found narcotics. She moved to suppress the drugs found in the purse arguing it was a female item and not part of the search condition to which Kelsey had submitted. However, in light of the drugs and weapons found in the room, either defendant and Kelsey shared in a criminal enterprise or Kelsey was involved with narcotics and was using defendant's purse as a repository. In either case Kelsey had access to if not control of the purse. The search of the purse did not exceed the scope of the probation search condition.id: 16671
Placement of electronic tracking device under defendant's car was not a search and would have been otherwise justified by defendant's parole search condition.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his location obtained from installation of an electronic tracking device on the undercarriage of his truck. However, defendant was on parole and subject to a standard search condition which authorized a warrentless search of defendant, his residence, and his property. Moreover, the detective who walked up the driveway and placed the tracking device under the car did not violate defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore his conduct did not amount to a search.id: 16610
A police officer need not obtain an arrest warrant before entering a parolee's house for the purpose of taking a parolee into custody.Although conceding that the officer had probable cause to arrest him and that his parole search condition would have authorized the officer's entry for purposes of a search, defendant argued the search condition could not serve as authority for the warrantless entry to effect an arrest. However, a police officer need not obtain an arrest warrant before entering a parolee's house for the purpose of taking a parolee into custody.id: 15654
A warrantless search of a probationer's house is not constitutionally invalid when it is undertaken to discover incriminating evidence against a third party residing in the house.Loza agreed, as a condition of felony probation to submit her residence to warrantless searches. During a warrantless search of the residence, police officers found evidence of criminal activity against defendant, who shared the apartment with Loza. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it had been obtained as a result of a pretextual probation search. However, the officer's subjective intent did not invalidate the challenged search since the circumstances, viewed objectively, supported the officer's actions.id: 15655
The officers acted reasonably in briefly detaining defendants to determine if they were convicted felons since they were visiting a probationer who was prohibited from associating with convicted felons.Defendants were visiting a probationer who was subject to a probation term that prohibited him from associating with convicted felons. The magistrate erred in finding that the officers acted unreasonably in detaining the defendants to determine if they were convicted felons. The detention was brief (15 minutes) and was not particularly embarrassing to the defendants because it was not viewed by the public. The intrusion on the privacy interest of the defendants was minimal and not unreasonable in light of the officer's duty to ascertain if the probationer was violating the terms of his probation.id: 15657
A parole search may be reasonable despite the absence of particularized suspicion.In <i>People v. Burgener</i> (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, the Court held the warrantless search of a parolee subject to a search condition must be justified by reasonable suspicion. In <i>In re Tyrell J</i>. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, the Court held reasonable suspicion was not required in the warrantless search of a juvenile probationer. In the present case the Court disapproved the <i>Burgener</i> holding and found a parole search may be reasonable despite the absence of particularized suspicion. However, parole searches may still become constitutionally unreasonable for various reasons including frequency or length, or if made at an unreasonable hour.id: 15653
Suppression was not required where the police officer relied on incorrect information from the probation officer regarding a probation search condition.Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a police officer, acting in reasonable reliance on information obtained from a juvenile probation officer that a search condition exists, need not be suppressed if it is determined subsequently that the information was correct.id: 15600
By consenting to the search and seizure probation condition defendant waived the right to assert the illegality of her arrest.The prosecution conceded that defendants' arrest lacked probable cause, but argued that she consented to seizures of her person, including arrests without probable cause, when she accepted probation conditioned upon a search and seizure provision. By consenting to the search and seizure condition defendant waived the right to assert the illegality of her arrest.id: 11197
Fruits of an illegal search of a minor may be admitted into evidence against the minor if the minor was subject to a probation search condition of which the officer was unaware.When a police officer conducts an otherwise illegal search of a minor, the fruits of the search may be properly admitted into evidence against the minor if the minor was subject to a probation search condition of which the officer was unaware. Because the minor was subject to a valid condition of probation that required him to submit to warrantless searches by any law enforcement officer, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy over a cache of marijuana in his pants. Consequently, the search of his person was not unconstitutional despite the officer's ignorance of the search condition.id: 11198
Parole search does not require prior authorization of parole officer.Officers who stopped defendant were aware of his parole status. The officers had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was involved in criminal activity (which is all that is necessary for a parole search) and were not required to have the approval beforehand of defendant's parole officer.id: 11199
Probationary search clause rendered the minor without standing to object to the officer's objectively unreasonable frisk.A minor who is on probation with a search condition has no standing to object to the reasonableness of a search conducted by an officer who is unaware of the minor's probationary status and its search condition.id: 11200
Search condition of trailer owner's parole justified search of defendant's handbag.Defendant's handbag was in a travel trailer occupied by defendant and Tim Mitchell, a parolee. The trailer was owned by another parolee, Allen Santos, and was parked next to his home. The search was based on search conditions applicable to both parolees. The officers had reasonable suspicion that the handbag was owned or controlled by the parolee and thus its search was within the scope of the parole search.id: 11201
Search pursuant to a consent search probation condition was not arbitrary where officers decided to search gang members homes looking for weapons and stolen property.Minor was on probation and, pursuant to a consent search term of probation, police searched his residence and discovered stolen property and weapons. The juvenile court granted the suppression motion finding that under <i>People v. Bravo</i>, (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, a search pursuant to a consent search probation term cannot be arbitrary and the instant officers' decision to go out and search gang members today was arbitrary. However, the court found the instant search was not arbitrary but was conducted for a legitimate law enforcement reason <197> to look for stolen property and weapons at the homes of gang members. Where the search is conducted for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, a consent search term, standing alone, provides a constitutional basis for a search.id: 11202
Unrestricted search condition in Nevada probation order is interpreted according to California law where probationer is supervised and the search is conducted in California.An unrestricted search condition in a Nevada probation order should be interpreted according to California law where the probationer is supervised and the search conducted in California. By applying for transfer to California under the Uniform Act of Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, defendant is deemed to know she would be supervised by California authorities under California law and therefore to have consented thereto.id: 11203
Warrantless search probation condition is reasonably related to arson.Defendant pled guilty to one count of arson. He argued that the probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches was invalid because it was not reasonably related to deterring or preventing him from committing the crime of arson in the future. However, the court found the warrantless search condition was reasonably related to the offense in that it provides a means by which the probation officer can ascertain whether defendant is complying with the terms of the probation and obeying the law.id: 11204
Probation search condition applies to detention as well as searches.Thinking defendant had been dealing drugs from his hotel room, officers detained him for a registration violation after he drove away in his car. Defendant argued that the stop was an unlawful pretext stop mandating exclusion of evidence. However, defendant was on probation and had waived his Fourth Amendment rights. That the police were unaware of his probation status was of no consequence. Moreover, defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver applies to detentions as well as searches.id: 10982
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850