Interrogation and Confessions, generally
Category > Interrogation and Confessions, generally
Updated 9/25/2023The trial court erred by prohibiting expert testimony on defendant’s susceptibility to give a false confession.The trial court allowed the defense to present a psychologist as an expert on false confessions and suggestibility generally. However, the court erred by not permitting the expert to testify about the results of an assessment designed to address defendant’s susceptibility to give a false confession or testify about the results of the psych test he administered to defendant.id: 28031
The trial court erred by precluding testimony from the defendant regarding the interactions with police in a Thai refugee camp to explain why he may have falsely confessed.The trial court erred in precluding defendant’s testimony regarding his understanding about what happened to people who denied allegations made by police in Thai refugee camps where he was born and stayed as a boy. His cultural experience was relevant to his state of mind in interacting with the detectives who interrogated him and tended to prove why he would give a false confession.id: 27028
Conviction for sex with a child 10 years old or younger was reversed absent independent evidence of the corpus delicti.There was evidence independent of defendant’s confession that he committed three acts of sexual abuse against his daughter. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of a sex act with a child 10 years old or younger under Penal Code section 288.7, subd. (b). There was no evidence other than defendant’s statement indicating that he engaged in a sex act with the minor before her 11th birthday. The prosecution did not present evidence sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti rule as to that count, and the conviction was reversed. id: 26906
Police violated defendant’s Miranda rights by asking questions allegedly regarding another matter that they should have known could incriminate him on the charged offense.Defendant invoked his Miranda rights as to the murder for which he was in custody, but agreed to speak with police about another incident. However, the officers continued to ask questions they should have known could incriminate him on the charged murder count. This was improper custodial interrogation, and the record does not show a valid waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights. However, the error was harmless in light of the other evidence supporting the convictions.id: 26112
Defendant’s arrest and detention were lawful where he told police he thought there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest and police took 84 minutes to confirm the fact.Defendant was known to be on probation and told detectives at the house that he believed there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. It was reasonable for the officers to detain him until they could confirm that fact. The process was not unduly prolonged where the police took 84 minutes to confirm that defendant was a wanted juvenile. id: 25882
Police committed a prejudicial violation of the Edwards rule by questioning defendant after a three hour break in custody following his request for counsel.Defendant was interviewed while in custody and requested an attorney. He was released but contacted a few hours later and told police had more questions. Under Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, police can’t ask more questions once the suspect requests counsel. The rule doesn’t apply if there has been a substantial break in custody and the suspect has a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. In Maryland v. Shatzner (2010) 559 U.S. 98, the court found police must wait 14 days before resuming questioning. Here, the break in custody was only a few hours and police questioning violated Edwards. id: 24361
Questioning arrestees about gang membership exceeded the scope of the booking exception to the Miranda requirement.Routine questions about gang affiliation, posed to the defendant while processing him into the jail on murder charges exceeded the booking exception to the Miranda requirement. The officers should have known the questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response because of the pending charges and gang allegations. While the officers were permitted to asked the questions for institutional security purposes, defendant’s un-Mirandized responses were inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief. However, the error in allowing the statements was harmless where defendant’s gang membership was otherwise convincingly established.id: 24151
Trial court erred in admitting an involuntary statement defendant made to police officers to impeach his testimony.Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights during interrogation. He stated that he would not say another word without his attorney. Officers continued to question defendant who then made incriminating statements that did not constitute a confession. The officer testified at trial that he had continued to question defendant after the invocation of Miranda so that if defendant testified at trial, the statements could be used for impeachment. The officer testified that this tactic was taught at a seminar. Defendant's statements were coerced and involuntary and should not have been introduced to impeach his trial testimony. However, the erroneous admission of the involuntary statement was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.id: 11248
The trial court erred by admitting defendant’s unMirandized statement made during the booking process in response to the question of his gang affiliation. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements taken from his classification interview when he was booked into the jail. The interview was a custodial interrogation to the extent that it asked him to admit gang membership, and therefore the police were required to read his Miranda rights before taking his statement. This is especially true where the defendant had been charged with a gang offense and the gang enhancement. While there may have been a legitimate administrative reason to seek that information, the deputies should have known it was likely to result in an incriminating response. And the sheriff could still use the information, just not as evidence in defendant’s trial.id: 23433
The prosecutor violated defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination by introducing evidence of his post arrest, pre-Miranda silence as proof of guilt.Defendant was convicted of vehicle manslaughter with gross negligence. He was under de facto arrest when he was driven from the scene of the accident in a patrol car and was not given Miranda warnings. The prosecutor erred at trial by eliciting testimony from the officers in the patrol car that defendant never asked about the welfare of the occupants of the other vehicle. The prosecution offered this evidence of defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt in violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The error required reversal of the conviction. The court also found the issue was not forfeited on appeal despite the lack of an objection on this ground where counsel did object to the related issue of the lack of Miranda warnings.id: 22634
The corpus delicti rule’s limitation on the use of a defendant’s extrajudicial statements still applies at preliminary hearings. Although the defendant’s statements might have been introduced to determine whether they would be held to answer, such statements remained irrelevant until the corpus delicti rule was otherwise satisfied. id: 21835
Supreme Court says delay of more than six hours in bringing defendant to magistrate may result in suppression of a confession.Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), an officer arresting a defendant must take the defendant before a magistrate judge without unnecessary delay. Under the McNabb-Mallory rule established by the Supreme Court, confessions obtained during periods of unnecessary delay are inadmissible in federal court. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §3501, provides, however, that a confession shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing a person before a magistrate judge if the confession was made voluntarily and within six hours of arrest. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that under §3501, a voluntary confession made within six hours of arrest and before the defendant is presented to a magistrate judge is admissible, subject to other rules of evidence; when a confession is obtained during a delay of more than six hours, a court should suppress the confession if the delay was unnecessary or unreasonable. The Court rejected the government’s argument that any voluntary confession was admissible regardless of the length of the delay in presenting the defendant to a magistrate judge. Justice Alito wrote the dissent.id: 21411
The corpus delicti rule applies to preliminary hearings. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge under Penal Code section 995 due to the lack of evidence of conspiracy other than his own admissions. Contrary to the prosecution's claim on appeal, the corpus delicti rule applies to preliminary hearings.id: 18931
"Interlocking confessions" concept did not apply where the statements admitted were defendants' own admissions, rather than separate statements of defendants taken during separate interviews.Three defendants were questioned during a joint interview, a tape recording of which was admitted at trial. Defendant argued the joint statement was actually a "rotating three-way interview" resulting in three separate statements that were interlocked on certain points as in Cruz v. New York (1987) 481 U.S. 186, where the court refused to create an "interlocking confession" exception to Bruton. However, defendant's statements were properly admitted since they were his own admissions unlike the interlocking confessions in Cruz which were given during separate interviews. Defendant emphasized some statements that were not adopted by the others. These admissions of the non-adoptive statements ran afoul of Crawford and Aranda-Bruton but the error was harmless in light of the defendants' critical admissions.id: 18567
Nothing in Proposition 8 suggests the corpus delicti rule was abrogated in the preliminary hearing context.The trial court erred in finding that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies to preliminary hearings following Proposition 8. Nothing in Proposition 8 or the case law supports that ruling.id: 18788
Defendant's confession to an escape made during pretrial plea negotiations was improperly admitted at trial.The trial court abused its discretion when it introduced evidence that, at a pretrial hearing, defendant confessed to an escape. Statements made during plea negotiations should not be introduced at trial. However, based on defendant's
testimony that he left the work furlough program, the error in admitting the pretrial statements was harmless.id: 19180
The court erroneously permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of, and comment on, the silence of the accused after his arrest in England.The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue that appellant's silence at an extradition hearing, a proceeding criminal in nature, could be used against him and interpreted as an adoptive admission of the false testimony presented by others at the extradition hearing. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available outside of criminal court proceedings and applied to the instant extradition proceedings even though they were conducted in England. Appellant's failure to object on Fifth Amendment grounds did not constitute a waiver of the claim. Moreover, cross-examination of appellant as to these statements by other witnesses at the extradition hearing was improper under any theory.id: 11216
Statement taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment itself, rather than a prophylactic rule designed to ensure voluntariness may not be used for impeachment.Officer, as head of the jail's classification unit went to talk with appellant and confronted him regarding threats made by appellant to a witness. Appellant admitted making the threats. The statement, taken after appellant was indicted, and without any waiver of his right to counsel, simply and unequivocally violated the Sixth Amendment. The trial court erred in permitting use of the statement for impeachment purposes. Although a statement taken in violation of a prophylactic rule may be used for impeachment, a statement taken in violation of the Constitution may not. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 11239
Court erred in admitting defendant's extrajudicial statements without first conducting an Evidence Code section 402 hearing.Defendant requested an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine the admissibility of his statements to a police officer. The trial court erred in failing to provide one. Three extrajudicial statements were in question but defendant objected to only one statement when the officer testified. He may not claim error as to the other two. Assuming that receipt of the third statement was error, it was harmless. The only purpose of the evidence was to show consciousness of guilt. That purpose was far more effectively served by evidence of flight and attempted fabrication of a defense.id: 11224
Persistent, accusatory questioning of defendant at the police station constituted custodial interrogation and triggered the duty to give Miranda advisements.Defendant agreed to an interview at the police station and the officer told him he was not in custody. The officers never told him he was free to leave and explained they would bring him home after he told them the truth, which he eventually realized meant after he admitted their information was correct. They told him he would not be allowed to leave if they had to go and interview an alleged alibi witness. The officers made clear defendant was a suspect and told him they had evidence to prove his involvement. He repeatedly denied involvement but ultimately changed his story. The persistent, accusatory questioning was akin to a full blown interrogation of an arrestee. The failure to provide Miranda warnings required reversal given the importance of the statements in relation to the other evidence.id: 11235
After voluntary incriminating statement during booking process, officers' questions amounted to custodial interrogation.During the booking process an unidentified detective told defendant in a casual tone that defendant looked like a traffic ticket. Defendant responded Murder. Two minutes later defendant began describing the murder to two station officers who made no remarks to him. However, they subsequently questioned him. The initial detective's casual statement that defendant looked like a traffic ticket was not interrogation as there was no intent to elicit an incriminating response. The subsequent voluntary statements to the two officers were also admissible. However, once the officers did begin to question defendant the process of custodial interrogation began and <i>Miranda</i> warnings were required. The prosecution failed to show defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Introduction of the improper portion of the statement was harmless since the information duplicated an independent admissible statement.id: 11217
Prosecutor prejudicially erred in agreeing not to use defendant's statements in court and then later using the inconsistent statements to impeach defendant's testimony.Before trial, defendant waived his constitutional right to remain silent and gave a statement to the prosecutor after the prosecutor agreed not to use the statement in court. However, at trial, the prosecutor breached the agreement and used the many contradictions between defendant's statement and his testimony to impeach defendant's credibility. The prosecutor's use of the statement in breach of the agreement with defendant was fundamentally unfair and a violation of defendant's federal constitutional right to due process of law. Defendant's conviction and death sentence were reversed.id: 11237
Statements from custodial interrogation based on a curfew violation were the product of unlawful search and seizure.Where the minor's only offense is a curfew violation, a peace officer abridges the minor's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when that officer transports the minor to the police station and subjects the minor to questioning designed to illicit incriminating responses.id: 15660
Third party's statement identifying defendant as the killer was the product of police coercion and it was prejudicial error to admit it.Police coerced a statement from a witness by an improper threat to try the witness for the murder unless he named defendant as the killer. The Court of Appeal found that a defendant seeking to exclude third party evidence of guilt on the ground the evidence was produced by coercion need not separately show the coerced evidence was "unreliable." The rule is different, however, where the defendant claims the evidence at trial was the end product or a "fruit" of unlawful coercion of a third party.id: 16658
Defendant was not entitled to the retroactive application of the provision requiring the recording of all statements in murder investigations.Penal Code section 859.5 was amended in 2017, to require (with limited exceptions) custodial interrogations of all persons suspected of murder be recorded in their entirety. Defendant who challenged the voluntariness of his 2016 confession, argued that the amendment to section 859.5 should be applied retroactively to render his confession inadmissible. However, the amendment to section 859.5 applies prospectively only.id: 27045
Defendant suffered no prejudice from the violation of the Vienna Convention caused by the officer’s failure to notify the Mexican consulate before questioning him.Defendant argued the police violated his rights under the Vienna Convention by questioning him without notifying him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate, and by failing to notify the consulate until after his death verdict. However, defendant suffered no prejudice by the violation, and reversal was not required.id: 26929
The admission of the officer’s accusatory statements from the pre-Miranda portion of the interrogation did not violate the confrontation clause. Defendant argued the admission of the officer’s statements from the pre-Miranda portion of the interrogation violated his confrontation clause rights. He claimed that because the full interrogation was admitted only after the officer was excused and the jury had its deliberations, he was deprived of the right to confront the officer about the pre-Miranda comments, none of which were repeated later. However, in order to implicate the confrontation clause, a statement must be testimonial, meaning that it must be made with sufficient formality and with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony. Accusatory statements made by police in an interrogation will, absent unusual circumstances, satisfy neither requirement.id: 26616
Exclusion of statement was not required where police violated the provision requiring a consultation with counsel, as there was no violation of the minor’s federal constitutional rights.Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.6 (a) provides that before interrogating a 15 year-old in custody, police must arrange for the youth to consult with counsel. The minor argued the violation of this provision required that his statement to police be excluded. However, exclusion was not required where his rights under the United States Constitution were not violated.id: 26586
The failure to honor defendant’s request to remain silent on April 21st was not causally related to the confession the next day, and so there was no error in admitting the confession.The officer erred by failing to honor defendant’s request to remain silent on April 21st. However, since defendant made no inculpatory statements that day, the officer did not overcome his will then or later, the failure to honor defendant’s request was not causally related to defendant’s confession the next day, there was no error in admitting the confession.id: 26524
The officer did not engage in an improper “question first, warn later” plan, where his failure to Mirandize defendant initially was based on his incorrect belief that defendant was not in custody.Defendant argued the post-Miranda advisement statements had to be suppressed because they followed the earlier unwarned statements, and this amounted to the “question first, warn later” technique prohibited in Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600. However, the officer here did not engage in a calculated plan to undermine Miranda. He failed to initially give the Miranda advice because he wrongly thought defendant was not in custody at the time.id: 26523
Corpus delicti rule was satisfied despite the contradictory statements made by the defendant who was an addict.Defendant argued the corpus delicti requirement was not established where his statements to law enforcement about his involvement in the crimes were so inconsistent and contradictory that they could not corroborate one another. He argued that his drug and alcohol addictions rendered his recollections fatally suspect. However, the prosecution’s showing of a criminal act through physical evidence, independent of defendant’s statements satisfied the corpus delicti rule.id: 26349
Defendant’s invocation of Miranda did not require suppression of his statements to a person acting as a police agent in a “Perkins” operation.Defendant was convicted of murder and assault on a child causing the death of his six month-old daughter. He gave the police an innocent explanation, but thereafter confessed the killing to the victim’s mother in a police interview room during a meeting that was arranged by the police. The fact that he had invoked his Miranda rights when questioned by police did not require suppression of the statement to a person who was acting as a police agent. Next, his statement to Martinez was not the tainted fruit of the original Miranda violation where police continued to question defendant after he invoked but defendant made no statements. Finally, the officer’s deliberate circumvention of Miranda’s protections did not amount to a due process violation.id: 26089
Statements made to informants posing as inmates were not inadmissible under section 4001.Defendant’s jailhouse statements made to informants were not admissible under Penal Code section 4001.1, because the informants were merely posing as inmates, and therefore did not qualify as “in-custody informants acting as an agent for the agency.”id: 25446
The trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with defendant’s suppressed statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with his statements that were made after he invoked his right to counsel. However, the use of the suppressed statements promoted the truth-seeking function of the trial without diminishing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police misconduct.id: 25252
Defendant’s consent to accompany police to the station for an interview was voluntary and his statements were admissible.Defendant was not detained by officers where he was not under arrest when he accompanied the police to the station, was reminded he could end the questioning at any time and told he would then be driven home. The officers were dressed casually, did not display guns and made no commands. Contrary to defendant’s claim, his consent to accompany the police to the station was voluntary and his statements were admissible. id: 24817
Evidence Code section 356 only allowed defendant to add portions of his police interview that explained his admissions of gang membership.Part of the basis for the gang expert’s opinion that defendant committed a crime to benefit his gang was that he had told police in a post-arrest interview that he had been a member of the gang. Defendant argued that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 356, he was entitled to introduce another statement made during the interview denying the carjacking. However, section 356 allows additional parts of the conversation only if needed to explain the statement in evidence. The statements defendant sought to introduce had nothing to do with his admission of gang membership.id: 21965
The trial court did not err by allowing the interrogating detective to impeach defendant’s testimony with Miranda-violative statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the interrogating detective to impeach his testimony with statements he obtained after the arrest. The detective purposely interrogated defendant without providing the Miranda warnings knowing that the statements would be admissible for impeachment. The law is unsettled on the question of whether Miranda-violative statements can be used for impeachment if there is evidence of widespread, systematic police misconduct. Contrary to defendant’s claim, there was no showing of such widespread misconduct even though the detective employed the tactic he learned from another member of the Westminster Police Department. The statements were not involuntary as the detective did not mislead defendant into thinking the statements could not be used in court.id: 24246
Police officer-defendant was under no compulsion because of her job to answer the detective’s questions.Defendant, a veteran police officer was convicted of killing her former lover’s wife 23 years earlier. She challenged the statements she made to police after her arrest. While she was not in custody for Miranda purposes at the time of the statements, she argued the statements were compelled because her job may have been in jeopardy if she refused to cooperate. However, the record showed defendant was under no compulsion to answer the questions because of her status as a police officer.id: 24194
The minor's request to speak with his father during the interrogation was not an invocation of his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances.The 16 year-old suspect's request to speak with his father did not constitute an invocation of his Miranda rights. The minor was not inexperienced in this respect and continued answering questions after indicating he wanted to notify his father about the arrest. The detectives' violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 627, subd.(b) by not providing the minor a phone call was only one factor to consider in the analysis.id: 20274
Deputy’s question during the booking process about the last time defendant was booked did not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes. During the booking process the deputy asked defendant the last time he was booked, and defendant made an incriminating response. The deputy’s question did not amount to interrogation but rather was innocuous and common to the booking process. Admitting the incriminating response at trial did not violate Miranda.id: 24060
CALCRIM No. 359 properly states the corpus delicti rule.CALCRIM No. 359 currently states the law regarding the corpus delicti requirement. It is well established that some evidence independent of a defendant’s out-of-court admission or confession must be introduced to show that someone committed a crime. The language in the instruction stating the identity of the person who committed the crime may be proved by defendant’s statement alone is a correct statement also and there is no real danger the jury would confuse the two issues.id: 23460
There was no interrogation where defendant invoked his right to counsel after saying he had been set up and the detective responded that he was not being set up. After being Mirandized, defendant invoked his right to counsel by saying “I’m being set up. I want to see my lawyer.” The detective then said “We’re not setting you up,” and the defendant agreed. The detective’s response did not constitute interrogation. Later, when defendant was being photographed he asked to speak to the detective. The detective reminded defendant that he didn’t have to speak without his attorney, but defendant responded that he didn’t care. Because defendant reinitiated the conversations there was no Edwards violation.id: 23705
Brief questioning during a temporary detention did not constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes.Defendant was detained for two minutes, handcuffed by the lone officer investigating the motorcycle theft, and asked if the motorcycle he was pushing belonged to him. Under the circumstances, the questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation, and his response was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings.id: 23396
The trial court did not err by presenting defendant’s redacted confession that did not distort his role.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting a redacted version of his confession that deleted any reference to his codefendant. But there was no error as changing the confession in this way did not distort its meaning, did not distort defendant’s role and did not render an exculpatory statement inculpatory. id: 23198
The trial court did not err by precluding defendant from calling the prosecutor as a witness to the circumstances surrounding the police interview at defendant’s house.The trial court acted within its discretion by precluding defendant from calling the trial prosecutor (who was present when police questioned defendant at his house on the night of the murder) to describe defendant’s demeanor and other circumstances surrounding the interview. Any evidence the prosecutor could have given would have been cumulative and would not have impeached the police officers’ testimony. Any questions the prosecutor might have suggested the police ask defendant were irrelevant to the claim that the statements were coerced.id: 23276
The officer’s question “What guy?” in response to defendant’s volunteered remark did not constitute custodial interrogation. Defendant was arrested for selling drugs. An officer was assigned to transport her to the jail. She was already in handcuffs when he arrived. When they arrived at the jail her phone rang. She commented “It’s probably the guy looking for his money.” The officer asked”What guy?” She replied it was the guy who gave her friend the drugs to sell. The statement was not taken in violation of the Miranda rules because the officer’s question “What guy?” following her volunteered remark did not constitute custodial interrogation.id: 22955
Defendant’s confession was not linked to the consular convention violation.efendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his confession due to the detectives’ failure to advise him of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the consular convention between the United States and the Philippines. However, the evidence supported the finding that defendant’s confession was not linked to the consular convention violation.id: 22586
Detective’s suggestion that defendant reflect on his crimes after defendant invoked his Miranda rights was not an improper attempt to continue the interrogation. Defendant argued that his confession should have been suppressed because one he invoked his Miranda rights, the detective continued to interrogate him. After defendant invoked the detective suggested he use the next two days to reflect on his crimes. This was no an improper attempt to continue or renew the interrogation.id: 22585
The failure to tape record all statements did not violate due process or constitute the destruction of evidence.The police department’s failure to tape record all discussions with defendant, including his Miranda waivers did not violate due process or constitute the destruction of evidence under Trombetta v. California. (1984) 467 U.S. 479.id: 22804
Police did not commit Edwards error by asking questions about the Young killing after defendant initiated contact to discuss another case. After defendant invoked his right to counsel, he later asked to speak to the police about the Flennaugh crimes. He later argued the police committed Edwards v. Arizona error by then questioning him about the Young killing since he had invoked his right to counsel regarding that offense. However, there was no police badgering and defendant wanted to speak to the police without his counsel being present. There was no Edwards violation where defendant, after again being given Miranda advisements, spoke to the police about the Young case.id: 22803
Detective did not commit Edwards v. Arizona error by telling defendant police had spoken to his wife about another murder.Defendant invoked his right to counsel. He argued police committed Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, error by interrogating him later without his counsel present. However, the detective’s statement telling defendant he had interviewed defendant’s wife about another murder, and the question of whether he knew Tom Rutledge, was not interrogation as the officer should not have known the comment was likely to induce an emotional response.id: 22496
Failure to record the entire interview did not result in a due process violation. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting statements he made during an interrogation because the police failed to tape-record the entire interview. However, there was no due process violation, and while the court was skeptical about the interrogating detective’s motives, defendant failed to show the officer acted in bad faith.id: 22553
Evidence supported the trial court’s finding, based largely on the officer’s demeanor at the hearing, that police did not engage in an improper two-step process to circumvent Miranda.The trial court found the police did not use an improper two-step method to circumvent Miranda (question-warn-question). This was a factual finding supported by substantial evidence. While the police should have terminated questioning after realizing defendant was a suspect, defendant was not a classic suspect and was eventually tried under the provocative act murder doctrine. There was no evidence to dispute the finding that the questioning officer was credible - a finding made in part by the trial court’s observation of his demeanor at the hearing. Moreover, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to urge the court to read the transcript of the second interview before ruling on its admissibility. id: 21816
An investigator who participated in defendant’s compelled statement could testify to matters independent of the statement.Defendant was a police officer charged with assault and filing a false report. He gave a compelled statement to the department investigators after being advised it would not be used against him in a criminal trial. At trial, the prosecutor called the person who took the statement to opine as to whether defendant had control of the arrestee during the arrest. That testimony did not violate Kastigar v. U.S. (1972) 406 U.S. 441, regarding the treatment of witnesses exposed to compelled statements, as the record showed the investigator relied on sources independent of defendant’s compelled statement.id: 21437
Defendant’s statements to his girlfriend at the police station were admissible since she was not a police agent, but informed police she could get him to speak. Lisa was interrogated about the murder and after giving a statement, spoke with defendant in an adjacent interrogating room. She told police she could get him to tell the truth. They spoke and he made incriminating statements. Defendant argued the statements made to Lisa were inadmissible absent a third reading of Miranda advisements because she was a police agent. However, Lisa was not a police agent as she initiated the idea with police, and the police did not err by allowing the two to talk during breaks in the interrogations.id: 21676
There was no interrogation for Miranda purposes where defendant made an incriminating comment during the booking process.While booking and fingerprinting defendant, a deputy made small talk about defendant’s military service. Defendant responded with statements of his regret about failing to kill someone. The voluntary admission was not the product of interrogation and did not violate Miranda principles.id: 21468
Supreme Court finds post-charge statement obtained by jailhouse informant admissible to impeach defendant.After defendant had been charged with murder, police officers put a confidential informant in his cell. The informant elicited from defendant an admission that he had committed the murder. At trial, defendant testified that his accomplice committed the murder. Although the State conceded that the defendant’s statement had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to use the statement to impeach defendant’s testimony. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that a statement obtained by a confidential informant in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies at trial. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.id: 21416
The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant’s special instruction based on the Toledo doctrine.Defendant argued the trial court erred in refusing to give a special instruction based on the “Toledo doctrine” suggesting the prosecution was bound by the defendant’s entire statement to the police. However, the doctrine has been partially superseded by subsequent cases. Moreover, the prosecutor presented well-established circumstances that were inconsistent with the exculpatory content of defendant’s statement.id: 21167
Second interview preceded by advisements and a week after the first partially involuntary statement was sufficiently attenuated. Defendant’s second taped statement (including his recantation) was attenuated from the portion of his initial statement that was found involuntary. There was more than a week between interviews, he was Mirandized before the second and that interview was conducted by a different officer who had no prior contacts with defendant and had not reviewed the tape of the first interview.id: 21166
The admission of statements made while defendants were detained together after not being timely presented to the federal magistrate did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Defendant argued the trial court violated the Fourth Amendment by admitting post-arrest, custodial statements by the defendants while detained together because they were not timely presented to the federal magistrate pursuant to their federal arrest warrants. However, the federal procedural requirements on which defendants based their claim did not apply to the underlying state prosecution. Moreover, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee of a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention. Finally, the record showed there was no improper collusion by state and federal officers.id: 21165
Statements to police four days after an invocation of Miranda were admissible under the “rescue doctrine” where the kidnap victim had been missing for 64 days.Four days after defendant had invoked his Miranda rights and 64 days after the victim (Polly Klaus) was reported missing, police reinitiated contact with defendant and asked where the victim was. The police actions did not violate Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, and the statements were admissible under the “rescue doctrine”. This is different from the “public safety exception” to Miranda and the length of time the victim was missing was not dispositive of whether a rescue was still possible. id: 21007
Failure to object on Fourth Amendment grounds precluded review of issue of whether the delayed arraignment resulted in an Edwards violation.Defendant argued his statement to police should have been suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, because an attorney is provided at the arraignment and the four day delay between his warrantless arrest and arraignment violated the Fourth Amendment. However, defendant forfeited the Fourth Amendment issue by not raising it at trial.id: 20376
Corpus delicti rule does not require proof of facts necessary for the enhancement of the penalty for an offense.The corpus of an offense subject to the corpus delicti rule includes every element of the underlying offense necessary to show the fact of injury, loss, or harm and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause, but does not include an element of an offense that does no more than aggravate the penalty for the underlying offense.id: 20230
Trial court did not deprive defendant of his right to present a complete defense by restricting the expert's testimony regarding factors establishing the unreliability of a confession.Defendant sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors that would establish the unreliability of the taped confession. The court allowed the expert to testify to the general psychological factors which might lead to an unreliable confession along with descriptions of the supporting experiments. The expert was not permitted to testify as to the "particular evidence" in defendant's taped statement that showed unreliability or to the reliability of defendant's confession. The court's restrictions did not deprive defendant of the chance to present a complete defense under the Sixth Amendment because the expert testimony that was permitted along with argument from counsel painted a detailed picture of the physical and psychological circumstances of the interrogation.id: 11247
The prosecutor did not err at the sanity phase in using defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent as evidence of his lucidity.Defendant argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting from defense witnesses on cross-examination testimony indicating that defendant had stated to jail personnel that he would not speak to them on advice of his attorney. However, evidence that defendant consciously chose to remain silent to attempt to rebut defendant's assertion that his mental illness rendered him incapable of communicating was proper. Because he had introduced evidence of his uncommunicativeness as alleged proof that he suffered from a mental illness, the prosecution was entitled to rebut such an inference by presenting evidence that established a different explanation for his lack of communication.id: 11246
Deputy had no duty to interrupt a volunteered statement that started out with the phrase "Off the record . . . ."While defendant was in county jail, he became depressed and asked to be temporarily let out of his cell. He then told a deputy, Off the record, I'm guilty. I don't know why I shot those two little girls. He argued the deputy had an obligation to terminate the conversation when defendant said Off the record . . . . However, the deputy asked no questions; he merely listened. He was under no obligation to try and prevent the defendant from volunteering the statement.id: 11228
Prop 8 did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that convictions must be supported by some proof of the crime other than the defendant's statements.California has long held that the corpus delicti (the body of the crime) cannot be proved by exclusive reliance on the defendant's extrajudicial statements. The truth-in-evidence section of Proposition 8 (Cal. Constitution; Article 1, section 28 (d)) abrogated any corpus delicti basis for excluding the defendant's extrajudicial statements from evidence. However, section 28 (d) did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that every conviction must be supported by some proof of corpus delicti aside from or in addition to such statements, and that the jury must be so instructed. The instructional error was harmless in the present case because the independent evidence of defendant's lewd intent was present.id: 16804
The trial court erred by introducing evidence that defendant confessed at a pretrial hearing during plea negotiations.The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted at trial a confession defendant made during plea negotiations at a pretrial proceeding. However, the error was harmless where defendant made a similar admission while testifying at trial.id: 19868
Supreme Court holds suppression is not a remedy for violations of Vienna Convention.The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provided that when a national of one country is detained by authorities in another, the authorities must notify the consulate of his country without delay if the detainee so requests. A foreign national arrested by State authorities was not informed of his right to have his consulate informed of his detention. Defendant claimed that his subsequent statement should be suppressed because of a violation of the Vienna Convention. Without determining whether the Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, the Supreme Court held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Convention.id: 20172
Tape recorded statements of the defendants' conversation in a bugged cell did not violate Miranda because there was no interrogation, or Crawford because the statements were not testimonial.Police placed the two defendants in a bugged cell hoping they would discuss the case, which they did. The jury heard the recording of the discussion as well as another tape of defendant talking with his aunt. There was no Miranda violation in admitting the tape recording because there was no interrogation. Moreover, there was no Sixth Amendment Crawford error because there were no formal statements given to police and therefore, no "testimonial evidence." Finally, while there may have been Aranda/Burton error in allowing the admission of the recording with defendant's aunt which referred to someone who may have been the codefendant, any error was harmless where the codefendant's other recorded statements constituted overwhelming proof of his guilt.id: 20033
Police did not violate defendant's right to counsel where, after his invocation of the Sixth Amendment right on the Missouri offense, he was questioned regarding the California murder. Defendant was jailed in Missouri and charged with a crime. His
California attorney advised him by telephone that he should not discuss the case with anyone. There was no Sixth Amendment violation in later questioning regarding the capital crime in
California since that right is offense-specific and applies only as to offenses for which criminal proceedings have formally begun.id: 19790
Defendant's conversation with his father in the interrogation room at the police station after his arrest did not constitute "interrogation" for Miranda purposes.Defendant argued the trial court should have suppressed his videotaped conversation with his father in the interrogation room at the police station after his arrest because the conversation was not preceded by Miranda warnings. However, defendant's conversation with his father did not constitute an interrogation for Miranda purposes.id: 19616
Defendant's telephone confession to his family was admissible even though it followed a coerced confession to police.Defendant made a confession to police which was later determined to be involuntary as the product of improper coercion during the
interrogation. Immediately after the confession to police, defendant confessed to his mother and relatives over the telephone. The admission into evidence of the emotional telephone confession to his family was admissible and not tainted because the police did not obtain it by any deliberate
exploitation of the first confession.id: 19184
The police did not improperly coerce the testimony of a witness by offering immunity in exchange for her testimony. Defendant argued the police coerced the testimony of a witness by threatening to take away her children, and tossing her infant daughter off a bed. However, the trial court credited the officer's denial of these incidents. Instead, the primary reason for the witness's cooperation was the prosecution's offer of immunity from prosecution as an accessory. There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime and offering immunity in exchange for truthful testimony.id: 19059
The court did not err by excluding a statement defendant made to police where the statement was ambiguous and the weakness of the inference favorable to defendant diminished its relevance.The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a statement
defendant made to an interviewing officer where he said "if I hit him 20 or 30 times I would have killed him." Defendant's inference that the statement showed a lack of intent to kill, was weak. Assuming the court erred in excluding the evidence, defendant suffered no prejudice as the evidence of intent to kill was overwhelming.id: 18986
Defendant's statements to cellmates after a Miranda-violative statement to an officer were not similarly Miranda-violative.The trial court did not err in denying Miranda-based mistrial motion which had not been raised pretrial. After defendant invoked Miranda, an officer suggested to him in the jail that his fingerprints were found on the Uzi. Defendant's response suggesting knowledge of the gun was Miranda-violative because the officer's statement was likely to elicit an incriminating response. However, that error was harmless in light of the other evidence. Moreover, defendant's damaging statements made to cellmates after the officer walked out were not Miranda-violative since they were not made in a coercive, police-dominated atmosphere.id: 18670
Miranda does not require suppression of police comments made after defendant invoked his right to remain silent.Defendant argued the trial court erred in permitting the detective to recount statements he made to the defendant during questioning after defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights. However, Miranda does not require suppression of police comments made to a defendant after defendant invoked the right to remain silent.id: 18671
Incriminating statements made to a deputy while defendant was on the food line responding to routine chatter were not Miranda-violative as there was no interrogation.Defendant's statements made to a deputy sheriff were not in response to interrogation and Miranda-violative where the officer asked if he was staying out of trouble while defendant was on the food line and defendant made an incriminating response.id: 18514
A brief statement informing an in-custody defendant about the evidence against him was not the functional equivalent of interrogation.Defendant argued the officer's statement to him in the patrol car just after his arrest, that the detectives "knew" he committed the murder because they found his fingerprints at the scene of the crime, constituted an interrogation because it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 297.) However, the detective did not phrase the statement as a question and it did not call for an incriminating response.id: 18068
The defense failed to demonstrate the need for expert testimony on police interrogation techniques to show the confession was false.The trial court did not err in denying the defense motion to present expert testimony on police interrogation tactics to show defendant's confession was false. The trial court allowed evidence on the circumstances of the confession as defense counsel cross-examined the interrogating officer on his techniques in this case and others. The defense failed to demonstrate the need for the expert testimony.id: 18073
An officer may knock on someone's door seeking an interview, and there was no Fourth Amendment violation where the officer concealed himself for safety reasons after knocking.A police officer may seek an interview with a suspect at his home as long as such inquiry is courteously made and not accompanied by any assertion of a right to enter or secure answers. Federal jurisprudence describes this police tactic as "knock and talk." In this situation, the encounter between the police and the person is consensual and no Fourth Amendment protections are implicated. The officer in the present case could knock on defendant's motel room door to seek an interview, and did not lose that right by momentarily concealing himself to determine if defendant would peacefully answer the knock on the door.id: 17896
The commencement of extradition proceedings is not enough, by itself, for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach.Defendant moved to suppress a statement he made at the Utah jail where he was held pending extradition to California. He argued that, because he was represented by Utah counsel for purposes of the extradition proceedings, the prosecutor's questioning in the absence of an attorney constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah. However, the commencement of extradition proceedings is not enough, by itself, for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach.id: 17812
Evidence that defendant did not confess until he was arrested for two later rapes was probative on the credibility of his confession.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about two rapes that postdated the charged crimes. However, evidence that defendant did not confess until he had been arrested for two more assaults and was a suspect in this case was probative on why and under what circumstances he confessed, and thus to the credibility of the confession.id: 17336
Interview with CDC psychologist at defendant's request was not privileged where the purpose was to obtain information as opposed to psychiatric treatment.Defendant offered to talk with a Department of Corrections psychologist hoping the doctor would then tell police defendant was incapable of committing the charged crimes. He later argued the statements made in the interview were privileged under Evidence Code section 1012. However, the evidence was uncontradicted that the doctor's and police's purposes for conducting the interview was to obtain information and evidence from defendant, not to conduct treatment or a psychiatric evaluation. id: 17305
Failure to inform minors of their statutory right to make phone calls did not require suppression of their subsequent statements. 17 year-old defendants argued their statements to police were inadmissible because the police failed to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code section 627 which requires parental notification and information regarding the right to place phone calls. However, while other remedies may exist for a violation of section 627, exclusion of the defendant's statements is not among them.id: 17322
Defendant's credibility was at issue in the suppression hearing and he could be impeached with lies he told police during the interrogations.Defendant testified at the suppression hearing where he challenged the voluntariness of his statements to the police. He argued the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him as to certain lies he told police in his statements. He claimed the questions went beyond the scope of direct examination, elicited irrelevant information by delving into the content of the statements (rather than their voluntariness) and violated his privilege against self-incrimination. However, defendant's credibility was at issue in the suppression hearing and he could properly be impeached with information that he had lied in his earlier statements. The court also determined the issued was preserved for appeal since defense counsel's objections were cut off by the trial court before counsel could fully articulate the grounds. , ____ Cal.4th ____, ____ Cal.Rptr.2d ____, (2002) id: 17078
There was no Edwards violation where defendant was released from custody following an earlier Edwards violation (and confession) and reinterviewed, though not rearrested, at his home two days later.Police violated Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, by reinitiating conversation with a defendant who had first waived and then invoked his right to counsel at a police station interrogation. Defendant confessed to the murder of his wife. Thereafter, they released defendant but visited his home two days later. They assured him he would not be arrested and did not re-Mirandized him. He then provided a more detailed version of the assisted suicide story. The police then left as promised. He was later charged with murder. Edwards was not violated by the interrogation at defendant's home where he was recontacted by the police after a break in custody which gave him reasonable time, while free from coercive custodial pressures, to consult counsel. Moreover, since defendant was not rearrested before requestioning at home, but was reinterviewed in a noncustodial setting, new Miranda advisements were not required. Further, by releasing and then reapproaching defendant the police were not involved in an improper ruse or pretext. Finally, the home interview was not the tainted product of the earlier Edwards violation since the earlier statement was not coerced, and the two day interval between interviews further attenuated any taint.id: 16976
Corpus delicti must only be established as to the underlying offense rather than the theory of aiding and abetting.Defendant was charged with aiding and abetting his son in a rape. He argued the only evidence of aiding and abetting came from his testimony on behalf of his son at the latter's juvenile hearing, and that the corpus delicti of the crime was not independently established. He claimed that even though the corpus delicti of the rape was established, he was only charged as an aider and abettor, and no evidence independent of his admission established his role as such. However, in a case tried on an aiding and abetting theory, the requisite knowledge and intent required for aiding and abetting are not elements of the corpus delicti that must be proven independently of extrajudicial admissions for purposes of establishing the corpus delicti.id: 16982
Miranda-violative statement may be used to impeach a defendant if it is voluntary even though the statement is untrue. Defendant made a statement at the hospital after invoking his Miranda rights. Although he was taking pain medication he was coherent. The statement was ruled Miranda-violative but admissible for impeachment since it was voluntary. Defendant argued it was not admissible to impeach his testimony since the statement was untrue, not inculpatory and inconsistent with the prosecution's and defense theories of the case. However, Miranda-violative statements need not be truthful to be admissible for impeachment. Moreover, the statement was not involuntary even though the officer said it would not be used for any purpose at trial.id: 16983
Boykin-Tahl protections do not extend to extrajudicial confessions.Defendant argued that because his statements to the police constituted a full confession of guilt, those statements should be deemed inadmissible because police failed to obtain specific waivers for each constitutional right he was forfeiting by confessing. However, no authority exists for extending Boykin/Tahl protections to extrajudicial confessions.id: 16447
Once criminal agency has been established by prima facie evidence that a murder was committed the corpus delicti rule does not prevent the use of defendant's statements to help establish the degree of the crime.The prosecution proceeded on dual theories of premeditated murder and felony murder. Defendant argued the corpus delicti rule should prohibit permitting the jury to rely on a felony-murder theory to elevate the homicide to first degree when the only evidence of the sole qualifying felony (in this case rape) came from the defendant's own statements. However, once criminal agency has been established by prima facie evidence that a murder has been committed, permitting a defendant's statements to help establish the degree of the crime does not violate due process.id: 16448
Admission of codefendant's redacted confession did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights where the confession did not say he committed the robbery with any other person.The trial court admitted into evidence codefendant's custodial confession to police concerning his commission of the robbery, with instructions that it was not admissible against defendant. The confession was carefully edited to omit any mention of defendant or his participation. The editing was sufficient to prevent codefendant's confession from incriminating defendant. Therefore, its admission into evidence with a limiting instruction did not violate defendant's federal constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.id: 15658
Spontaneous statements made to police during a ride to the jail, after the invocation of the right to counsel, did not violate Miranda.Defendant was <i>Mirandized</i> and he invoked his right to counsel. An hour later he was transported to the jail by the officer who gave the <i>Miranda</i> advisements and her partner, Officer Rico. During the ride, Officer Rico engaged defendant in casual conversation. At one point, defendant stated that he liked boys and had a sexual disorder. The statements were not taken in violation of <i>Miranda</i> requirements. Rico's attempt at casual conversation during the transport was neither direct interrogation nor its functional equivalent that was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling that the spontaneous statements were admissible.id: 15659
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defense expert on topic of false confessions where there was no evidence police used improper tactics.The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert witness who was prepared to testify on the topic of false confessions and tactics used by police to elicit such confessions. There was no evidence that police engaged in improper tactics by wearing down the defendant until he confessed. Moreover, the testimony was unnecessary since defendant testified he falsely confessed because of the officer's promise that he would serve no more than one year in custody.id: 15661
Trial court did not err in admitting fruits of third party's coerced statements on the theory that exclusion would deter police misconduct.Defendant argued the trial court violated his due process rights by presenting evidence which was a product of statements taken from an accomplice that the court determined were involuntary. While a third party's coerced statements may be excluded if unreliable, the court properly refused to exclude evidence discovered as a product of the coercion on the theory that such exclusion would deter police misconduct.id: 15662
Where an officer deliberately fails to honor a suspect's request for counsel, subsequent statements may be used for impeachment.Where a police officer conducting a custodial interrogation deliberately fails to honor a suspect's request for counsel, with the objective of securing evidence for impeachment purposes, the statement is in fact admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness so long as the statement is otherwise voluntary.id: 15663
The confession to a crime other than the one for which defendant was illegally arrested, to officers from another agency who were unaware of the illegality was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to dissipate its taint.Defendant was arrested without probable cause. Following his confession (for which trial counsel was determined incompetent for failing to seek suppression), and while still in custody, police officers from another jurisdiction obtained his confession to other crimes. The confession to crimes other than the one for which defendant was illegally arrested, to officers from a different police agency who were unaware of the circumstances of the arrest, was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest to dissipate its taint.id: 15607
Supreme Court says for Miranda purposes, right to counsel is "offense specific."Defendant confessed to a home burglary but denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. Counsel was appointed to represent him on the burglary offense, and he was released on bail. He then confessed to his father that he killed the woman and child, and the father reported this to the police, who arrested defendant and obtained a <i>Miranda</i> waiver. Defendant then confessed to the murders. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that questioning the defendant did not violate his right to counsel because that right is "offense specific" and does not necessarily extend to "factually related" offenses. The majority adopted the test in <i>Blockburger v. U.S.</i>, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): offenses are not the same if either requires proof of a fact that the other does not. The majority thus overruled the Ninth Circuit's contrary opinion in <i>U.S. v. Covarrubias</i>, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in the opinion but questioned the continued validity of <i>Michigan v. Jackson</i>, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) which held that a defendant's purported waiver of the right to counsel is invalid if the defendant has requested counsel and the police initiate interrogation in counsel's absence. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.id: 15130
Failure to notify a foreign national of her rights under the Vienna Convention did not require the suppression of her subsequent statements to police.Defendant moved to suppress statements made to investigating officers since the officers failed to advise her of her rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention which applies to the arrest of foreign nationals. However, suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for violations of Article 36.id: 14927
Defendant who seemingly consented to talk to the police was not under arrest notwithstanding that he was patted down before entering the car and subsequently Mirandized.Officers approached defendant at work and told him they wanted to talk with him about something very important. Defendant stated that he would go with them since the station was on his way home and he could thumb a ride the rest of the way. The fact that he was taken in an unmarked car and routinely patted down before entering the car did not compel the conclusion that defendant had been placed under arrest. The fact that the officers read defendant his <i>Miranda</i> rights while in the car established only an excess of caution in the event he said something that would incriminate himself, rather than indicating a police perception that he was a prime suspect or was in custody.id: 11225
Defendant's statement when asked about the murder - If I could only cry I would - was properly admitted as an admission and an inability to feel remorse.After being Mirandized defendant stated What do you want me to say? The officer stated he wanted the truth about the murder and defendant replied - If I could only cry I would, but I can't cry. I couldn't even cry when my mother died. The trial court ruled the statement was admissible because it could be interpreted as an admission and was inconsistent with a statement of innocence. The statement was ambiguous and only marginally relevant. However, the jury could have concluded the statement reflected defendant's acknowledgment of guilt and an inability to feel remorse. Thus, the court was justified in admitting the statement and leaving it to the jury to decide if it was an admission and what weight to attribute to it.id: 11226
Delay before arraignment did not require suppression of jailhouse statements.Defendant argued that tape recordings of his jailhouse conversations with family members and friends the day before he was arraigned should have been suppressed because they were obtained only as a result of the delay of his arraignment and at a time he was allegedly without counsel. However, he failed to show any connection between the delays and his statements that would warrant suppression of the statements.id: 11227
Deputy's advisement you are under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale did not constitute interrogation.Officers detained appellant while executing a search warrant at his home. Having found cocaine the officer told appellant and his girlfriend they were under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale. Appellant and his girlfriend immediately stated they did not sell rock cocaine but rather, it was for their personal use. Appellant argued the deputy's advisement that he was under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale was the functional equivalent of questioning rendering his response inadmissible under Miranda. However, the deputy's advisement constituted words normally attendant to arrest and was expressly outside the definition of interrogation.id: 11229
Failure to tape record the entire interrogation did not violate appellant's due process rights.Appellant argued the police failure to tape record his entire interrogation violated his due process rights. However, the police's deliberate and unilateral decision to discontinue the tape recording of the session during the period they were confronting the suspect was not the legal equivalent of a post-interrogation erasure of a recording already made.id: 11230
Failure to tape record the interrogation did not violate due process.Defendant moved pretrial to exclude his statement to interrogating officers, asserting the failure to tape record the statement rendered it inadmissible on due process grounds. However, neither the state nor the federal constitution requires the tape recording of statements.id: 11231
Girlfriend's attempt to elicit incriminating statements from defendant over the telephone while he was in jail on unrelated charges did not constitute custodial interrogation.Defendant argued that the prosecution witness' efforts to elicit incriminating statements about the capital crimes while he was incarcerated on unrelated charges violated <i>Miranda</i> principles. However, the statements defendant made to her over the jail telephone were not the product of custodial interrogation. The tape recorded statements were completely voluntary and compulsion free. Moreover, since defendant had not been arrested on the capital charges until the day after the last phone call, his Sixth Amendment rights had not yet attached and could not have been violated by his girlfriend's undercover work.id: 11232
Miranda rules do not apply to questioning by physician at the request of defense counsel.The People called the defense expert to testify as a rebuttal witness at the penalty phase. The doctor testified as to an admission the defendant made. Defendant augued the statement as inadmissible because he was never advised of his Miranda rights prior to the interview. However, Miranda rules do not apply to questioning by a physician at the request of defense counsel.id: 11233
Officer's inquiry was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda where it was designed to elicit information about someone other than defendant.Defendant argued his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the officer's failure to advise him of his Miranda rights before asking about the whereabouts of Frank Hillhouse. However, the officer's inquiry regarding Hillhouse was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda as it was designed to elicit information about Hillhouse, not defendant. There was no indication that the inquiry was at all relevant to any charge for which defendant was then in custody or any crime of which he was then suspected.id: 11234
Phone call between defendant at the jail and a potential child molest victim whose phone was tapped by police with her knowledge did not constitute custodial interrogation.While defendant was in jail on child molest charges the police contacted another potential victim (Tina), placed a recording device on her phone and had deputies at the jail tell defendant Tina had called the jail looking for him. Defendant called Tina on consecutive days and the conversations were recorded. Defendant argued the tape recordings were a product of official intimidation through the custodial interrogation by Tina as an agent of the police. However, the conversations were not police custodial interrogation as defined in Miranda. Even if he had been forced to place the call, he did not know Tina was working with the police. Absent such knowledge there was no reason to assume he might feel coerced and no Fifth Amendment violation occurred.id: 11236
Rule regarding privacy rights of pretrial detainees is not retroactive.Defendant argued the tape recordings of his jailhouse conversations with family and friends should have been suppressed because the recordings violated his statutory right of privacy as a pretrial detainee. He argued that retroactive application of <i>DeLancie v. Superior Court</i> (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 was mandated by the rule in <i>Griffith v. Kentucky</i> (1987)479 U.S. 314. However, nothing in <i>Griffith</i> purports to establish a new rule of retroactivity for rules of criminal procedure founded on state constitutional or statutory law.id: 11238
Statements made by the defendant pursuant to the plea bargain agreement were properly admitted during the hearing on the DA's revocation motion.The juvenile defendant entered into a plea agreement that resulted in a CYA term. The trial court later conducted a hearing following the prosecutor's motion to revoke the plea agreement and conforming sentence. Defendant objected to the use of all post-conviction statements made by him regarding the crime on the grounds they were taken in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, neither defendant's Fifth nor Sixth Amendment rights were implicated and the statements were admissible to determine whether he breached the plea agreement. Moreover, the trial court did not violate the terms of the plea agreement by admitting defendant's statements into evidence at the revocation hearing.id: 11240
Statements made to the officers on the airplane were not the product of interrogation and therefore Miranda did not apply.Officers arrested defendant in Japan. Following Miranda advisements he said he wished to talk to a friend, who was apparently a military attorney, before deciding whether to talk to the officers. This statement was an invocation of his right to counsel. Later, on the return flight, defendant initiated a conversation regarding the murders. He told the detective upon landing that he wished to continue the conversation later. He was subsequently re-Mirandized and following a waiver made incriminating statements. The statements on the plane, while made in custody were not the product of interrogation, and therefore, the Miranda rule was not implicated. Finally, the statements made after the flight were also voluntary as defendant initiated the discussion and was subsequently readvised of, and waived, his Miranda rights.id: 11241
Supreme Court holds defendant's statements during sobriety testing were not prompted by interrogation.<i>Miranda</i> warnings are required only if a suspect is subject to interrogation. During a series of sobriety tests, defendant made several incriminating statements. Writing for eight members of the Court, Justice Brennan concluded that these incriminating statements were not the result of interrogation and were thus admissible under <i>Miranda</i>. Defendant made several statements while attempting to comprehend a police officer's instructions on how to perform the tests and later while performing the tests. Most of the officer's statements were simply instructions on how to perform the tests and did not qualify as interrogation. While a few of the officer's statements sought to determine whether the defendant understood the directions, the Court noted that these inquiries were necessarily 'attendant to' administration of the legitimate police procedures. Nor was the officer's effort to ascertain whether defendant would take a breath test likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response. And other statements made by defendant, though in response to interrogation, did not raise <i>Miranda</i> problems because they were not both incriminating and testimonial. Justice Marshall dissented.id: 11242
Supreme Court plurality recognizes routine booking question exception to Miranda.After his arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence, defendant was asked his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. No <i>Miranda</i> warnings were given prior to these questions, in response to which defendant made slurred statements. Writing for a four-judge plurality, Justice Brennan concluded that these questions were routine booking question[s] that were exempt from the requirements of <i>Miranda</i>. Justice Brennan noted that the state court found that the questions were requested for record-keeping purposes only and therefore were reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns. In an opinion for four members of the Court, Justice Rehnquist agreed that the responses should not be suppressed, but did not reach the question of a routine booking question exception because he found the responses to be nontestimonial, a position apparently inconsistent with that of a majority of the Court on other issues in the case. Justice Marshall dissented.id: 11243
Supreme Court rules inmate had no right to Miranda warnings before cellblock questioning by undercover agent.Incarcerated pending trial on one offense, defendant was questioned by an undercover agent who suspected defendant of committing an unrelated murder. In response to the question whether defendant had ever killed anyone, defendant described at length his participation in the murder. At trial, defendant objected that the agent's questioning was inappropriate in the absence of Miranda warnings. Writing for seven members of the Court, Justice Kennedy concluded that Miranda warnings are no required when a suspect is unaware that a law enforcement officer is conducting questioning. The danger of coercion resulting from the interaction of custody and official interrogation is absent when the suspect believes he is speaking with another inmate. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment. Justice Marshall dissented.id: 11244
Supreme Court says federal statute on confessions does not apply while defendant is held on state charges.18 U.S.C. 3501(c) provides that a custodial confession made by a person within six hours following his arrest shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a federal magistrate. Here, the respondent was arrested on state narcotics charges. While still in the custody of state officers, he confessed to the federal offense of possessing counterfeit currency. The district court refused to suppress the confession and respondent was convicted. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that section 3501(c) applied because respondent was in custody and had not been presented to a magistrate at the time he confessed. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that section 3501(c) does not apply to statements made by a person who is held solely on state charges. The six hour time period in 3501(c) did not come in to play until respondent was arrested on a federal charge. Here, respondent was arrested on the federal charge after he made the statement. No Justice dissented.id: 11245
Where the court had ruled the Miranda violative statements were inadmissible for impeachment, the court did not later err in allowing cross-examination on the topic where defendant denied making a confession.Because the charged crimes were committed in 1980 before <i>Miranda</i> violative statements were admissible to impeach a defendant's testimony, the court ruled the statements were inadmissible. During trial, a witness referred to defendant's confession. Defendant who was representing himself later testified he made no confession but rather told the police what had happened. Because defendant denied making the confession the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding the confession.id: 11249
Allowing an accomplice's testimony following an earlier coerced confession in Mexico was not improper.Defendant argued an accomplice's trial testimony was improperly admitted since it was based on an involuntary confession following an interrogation in Mexico. However, the accomplice's trial testimony was subject to cross-examination and impeachment and defendant possessed the tools with which to challenge the reliability of the testimony, being fully apprised of all circumstances regarding the interrogation in Mexico. Moreover, the evidence established the testimony was not a direct product of the coerced Mexican confession and that subsequent events in the United States sufficiently purged any taint remaining after the Mexican confession.id: 11218
Connection to phone line constitutes wiretapping and the evidence was not inadmissible where the wiretap was authorized by federal law.Federal agents tapped the conspirator's telephone by connecting a telephone line to the coconspirator's telephone terminals in the telephone company's telephone box. Such conduct constituted wiretapping as described in Penal Code section 631 and did not constitute eavesdropping pursuant to section 632. Exclusion of the evidence was not required under the federal constitution because the evidence was obtained pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S. Code section 2510 et seq.id: 11219
Conversation between officer and defendant in the back seat of the patrol car did not amount to interrogation.While defendant was in the back seat of a police car, he asked an officer standing outside what they were going to do with his car. During the subsequent conversation the officer told defendant that he must have a good job since the car was expensive and asked if defendant could produce the pink slip. The officer's questions did not amount to interrogation for Miranda purposes.id: 11220
Corpus delicti instruction did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving premeditation and deliberation.Trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove each element of the offense by evidence independent of any confession or admission by defendant. Defendant argued the instruction which advises the jury the degree of a crime is not an element of the crime, improperly suggests that premeditation and deliberation are not elements of first degree murder, thus shifting to the defendant the burden of proof on the issue of first degree murder. However, the instruction does not relieve the prosection of its burden to prove premeditation and deliberation. It merely permits the prosecution to use extrajudicial statements to establish the degree of the crime so long as the corpus delicti has been established.id: 11221
Corpus delicti rule was satisfied where evidence presented a reasonable inference that defendant had knowledge the property was stolen.Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property - a valuable coin collection. He argued the court violated the corpus delicti rule by admitting his extrajudicial statements. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the record established a reasonable inference of defendant's knowledge the coin collection was stolen. Knowledge was proved by the following evidence: 1) the unique coin collection was worth $500,000; 2) defendant had no purchase documents; 3) defendant told a prospective buyer he had a world class coin collection but did not give the buyer his name, business address or phone number; 4) one coin had a card with the victim's name on it; 5) defendant possessed the victims inventory of gold coins (but did not show it to the prospective buyer) and the victim's name and business address had been torn off.id: 11222
Court did not err in admitting evidence of pre-Miranda silence to rebut a defense claimed for the first time at trial.Appellant argued the court erred in admitting evidence and allowing comment on the fact that appellant never claimed, prior to testifying at trial, that the container in which the amphetamine was found was not hers. After Proposition 8, evidence of appellant's pre-Miranda silence may be excluded only if application of the exclusionary rule is compelled by federal law. Since the admission of evidence of pre-Miranda silence to rebut a defense claimed for the first time at trial is permitted by federal law, appellant's pre-Miranda silence was admissible on cross-examination and rebuttal.id: 11223
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
The case of the day summarizes a current case and is viewed by lawyers and judges around the state every day.
Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850