Miranda Advice, Invocation, Waiver
Category > Miranda Advice, Invocation, Waiver
Updated 6/19/2023Defendant’s Miranda waiver was involuntary where it followed the detective’s claim that she cared about him and wanted to make sure he got his story out the right way.Defendant was young (18) and inexperienced with the criminal justice system. Wearing a hospital gown without socks, and invoked his right to counsel after five hours of interrogation, the defendant then said he would talk to her because she cared about getting his story “the right way out.” Defendant’s subsequent statements were involuntary and inadmissible.id: 27604
The trial court erred in admitting a confession produced by a two-part interrogation where police first elicited a confession without Miranda warnings. The detective who questioned defendant withheld Miranda warnings, elicited a confession, and then re-interrogated him about the same facts after warning him under Miranda. The trial court erred by denying the motion to exclude the confession under Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600. id: 27518
Police violated defendant’s Miranda rights by asking the handcuffed defendant why he ran. Defendant was detained at gunpoint and handcuffed before the officer asked why he ran. This was custodial interrogation, and inadmissible absent Miranda warnings.id: 27397
Defendant unequivocally invoked Miranda by saying wanted “to speak to an attorney” because he would take responsibility for himself.When asked by the interrogating detective whether he went into the trailer park on the night of the killing, defendant said “I want to, speak to an attorney first, because I, take responsibility for me, but there’s other people that ...” This was a clear invocation of defendant’s right to counsel. Although not required to, he explained why he wanted counsel. This did not create an ambiguity and the detective erred by failing to honor defendant’s unambiguous request for counsel. Because defendant’s subsequent admissions were an important part of the prosecution’s case, his capital murder conviction was reversed.id: 26942
Police violated defendant’s Miranda rights by asking questions allegedly regarding another matter that they should have known could incriminate him on the charged offense.Defendant invoked his Miranda rights as to the murder for which he was in custody, but agreed to speak with police about another incident. However, the officers continued to ask questions they should have known could incriminate him on the charged murder count. This was improper custodial interrogation, and the record does not show a valid waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights. However, the error was harmless in light of the other evidence supporting the convictions.id: 26112
Defendant invoked Miranda when he said he did not want to discuss the felony-murder.Police arrested defendant for robbery-murder. They read his Miranda rights, and asked whether he wanted to talk to them. He responded “No, not about a felony-murder.” Police believed the answer to be ambiguous, or a partial invocation of his Miranda rights, and they believed they could question him about other matters. The detective later asked whether he was at the scene of the murders. The questioning violated Miranda since it involved the murders and defendant had at least invoked his Miranda rights as to those offenses. The error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the fact that the officers continued questioning after the invocation did not render the statements coerced.id: 25692
Minor’s Miranda waiver was not voluntary where it followed intense questioning at school, the detective confused the minor, and suggested that waiving was a formality.A minor was found to have committed lewd acts on a child when he was 13. He was questioned by police at school and then the police station when he was 15. However, the minor did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights at the police station. He was Mirandized at the station after an hour of questioning by detectives in a small room at the school. The detective said they would continue to talk after the warnings. The detective then confused the minor by talking about an unrelated warrant, before resuming questioning about the offense in question. The young minor lacked experience in the system and was frightened that he would be locked up forever. His Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent.id: 25385
Gang allegation reversed where the expert used defendant’s statements to jail booking officers in prior cases to conclude defendant was a gang member. In People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, the court found that use of a defendant’s response to routine questions about gang affiliation during jailhouse intake interviews violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant’s responses to the jailers’ booking questions in prior cases (several years earlier) could not be used as a basis for the gang expert’s opinion when attempting to satisfy the elements of the Penal Code section 186.22, subd.(b) gang enhancement.id: 25305
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the murder confession that was taken after defendant invoked his Miranda rights.Defendant initially waived his right to remain silent under Miranda, but invoked the right prior to confessing to the murder, unambiguously telling the detectives, “I refuse to talk to you guys.” Defense counsel forfeited defendant’s challenge to the admission of his confession on this ground by failing to specifically and timely object at trial. However, counsel’s inaction resulted in a prejudicial denial of the effective assistance of counsel as to the murder conviction where the confession was a significant part of the prosecution’s case. The error did not affect the kidnapping conviction where there was strong independent evidence as to that offense. id: 25090
Defendant invoked his Miranda rights by repeatedly telling the interrogating detective to take him home or call his parents to pick him up. Defendant clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during his interrogation by telling the detective 13 times in 14 minutes to take him home, and further telling the officer to call his parents so they could pick him up. The detective should have understood this to be a demand to end the interrogation. However, the Miranda violation was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 24387
Defendant's Miranda waiver was not knowing where the Mandarin interpreter's translation of the rights was inaccurate.After defendant's arrest, he was interviewed by a detective with the help of a Mandarin interpreter. However, the interpreter's translation did not adequately inform defendant of his Miranda rights. The translation said he had a right to an attorney before and after, but not during "proceedings." The warning also suggested the police could select an attorney for him. That he said "yes" when she read part of the advisement did not mean he understood and waived his rights, but could just as easily mean he was asking her to continue with the advisement. The advisal was not accurate and any waiver was not knowing. The court's error in denying the suppression motion required reversal.
id: 18655
Police committed a prejudicial violation of the Edwards rule by questioning defendant after a three hour break in custody following his request for counsel.Defendant was interviewed while in custody and requested an attorney. He was released but contacted a few hours later and told police had more questions. Under Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, police can’t ask more questions once the suspect requests counsel. The rule doesn’t apply if there has been a substantial break in custody and the suspect has a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. In Maryland v. Shatzner (2010) 559 U.S. 98, the court found police must wait 14 days before resuming questioning. Here, the break in custody was only a few hours and police questioning violated Edwards. id: 24361
The interrogating detective should have Mirandized the minor before asking if he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct.The detective interviewing the minor about killing his father began by asking questions from a “Gladys R.” questionnaire, designed to determine whether an arrestee under age 14 understands the wrongfulness of his actions. The detective erred by failing to read the Miranda warnings before asking whether he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. The error was harmless as the minor had previously made spontaneous statements to other officers, admitting that he just killed his father.id: 24126
Questioning arrestees about gang membership exceeded the scope of the booking exception to the Miranda requirement.Routine questions about gang affiliation, posed to the defendant while processing him into the jail on murder charges exceeded the booking exception to the Miranda requirement. The officers should have known the questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response because of the pending charges and gang allegations. While the officers were permitted to asked the questions for institutional security purposes, defendant’s un-Mirandized responses were inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief. However, the error in allowing the statements was harmless where defendant’s gang membership was otherwise convincingly established.id: 24151
A 13 year-old invoked his Miranda rights when he said “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me.” A 13 year-old boy’s statement - “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me” made during the course of a custodial interrogation after watching a video of a shooting was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his Miranda rights. id: 24004
Minor who had invoked Miranda did not impliedly waive those rights by asking the officer about her boyfriend’s custodial status. The minor invoked her Miranda rights when she told the interrogating officers that she no longer wanted to answer their questions. Her question about her boyfriend’s custodial status was not an implied waiver of those rights. If there was any ambiguity, the officer should have asked whether she now wanted to waive her rights rather than using it as an opportunity to further interrogate her.id: 22849
Miranda warnings were required before admitting comments defendant made while handcuffed in the police car, and before admitting results of field sobriety tests asking defendant to estimate 30 seconds.Following a collision, responding officers searched defendant and found two syringes. Defendant admitted they were used to inject methamphetamine and that he was on parole. The two officers then handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of the patrol car awaiting additional officers. His subsequent statements should have been suppressed due to the failure of the police to give Miranda warnings. He was in custody at that point and the officers’ questions were likely to elicit a response. The results of the “Romberg” field sobriety test should also have been suppressed. That test requires a drunk driving suspect to estimate the passage of 30 seconds and also required Miranda warnings. However, the error in denying the suppression motion was harmless in light of the other properly admitted evidence showing defendant’s intoxication. id: 22678
The prosecutor violated defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination by introducing evidence of his post arrest, pre-Miranda silence as proof of guilt.Defendant was convicted of vehicle manslaughter with gross negligence. He was under de facto arrest when he was driven from the scene of the accident in a patrol car and was not given Miranda warnings. The prosecutor erred at trial by eliciting testimony from the officers in the patrol car that defendant never asked about the welfare of the occupants of the other vehicle. The prosecution offered this evidence of defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt in violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The error required reversal of the conviction. The court also found the issue was not forfeited on appeal despite the lack of an objection on this ground where counsel did object to the related issue of the lack of Miranda warnings.id: 22634
Defendant invoked his Miranda rights when responding to the warnings by “I’m doing my right.”After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant remained silent for eight seconds and then said “I’m doing my right.” Although the word “doing” may be ambiguous in other contexts, in this circumstance that statement could only reasonably be construed as an invocation of his right to remain silent. However, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 22034
The trial court erred by permitting testimony and argument on defendant’s prearrest silence and lack of cooperation with police.The detective testified that defendant did not follow up on his promise to call when the detective was attempting to investigate the case. He also described his repeated efforts to contact defendant making it appear that defendant was evading the police. The prosecutor emphasized this fact in argument. The evidence and argument violated the Fifth Amendment because defendant was deprived of any meaningful right to refuse to talk with the police. However, the error was harmless where the issue before the jury was essentially one of the victim’s credibility and the verdict showed the jury accepted her testimony.id: 20912
The prosecutor and co-defendant's counsel erred by questioning defendant about his request for counsel during police questioning.The prosecutor and counsel for codefendant each violated defendant's rights by questioning him about his request for counsel during police questioning. While the questions were aimed at different objects, each made evidentiary use of defendant's assertion of the right to counsel. However, the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 18056
The trial court erred in allowing defendant’s assertion of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. The trial court erred in admitting defendant’s assertion of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in ending his interview with the police, as evidence of consciousness of guilt. However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt.id: 20845
Defendant’s statement was inadmissible where the detective who gave the Miranda warnings failed to advise defendant that his statements could be used against him.Prior to the interrogation, the officers discussed defendant’s knowledge of the Miranda warnings from prior arrests and watching television. When giving the warnings, the detective omitted the fourth required warning – that defendant’s statement could be used against him. The defendant later confessed. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the warnings given were not adequate. The statement should have been suppressed and its admission during the prosecution’s case-in-chief was not harmless.id: 20729
Supreme Court finds prosecutor's comment on defendant's post-Miranda silence was harmless.At petitioner's state murder trial, the prosecutor commented on the fact that, before he was given the <i>Miranda</i> warnings at arraignment, petitioner failed to tell anyone that the shooting was accidental. This was permissible, because the Constitution does not prohibit comment on a defendant's silence after arrest before <i>Miranda</i> warnings are given. <i>Fletcher v. Weir</i>, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982). However, the prosecutor also commented on petitioner's continued silence after he was given his <i>Miranda</i> rights. This violates <i>Doyle v. Ohio</i>, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1967). Nevertheless, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless, because the prosecutor's comments on post-<i>Miranda</i> silence did not substantially influence the jury's verdict. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor and Souter dissented.id: 11364
Statement was improperly admitted where officer continued questioning after suspect stated he did not really want to talk.At the police station following arrest, defendant given the Miranda advisements was asked if he wanted to talk. He responded Not really The officer then said I thought you wanted to come back here and straighten this out Defendant's subsequent incriminating statements were improperly admitted since the officer did not scrupulously honor his invocation of the right to remain silent as required under <i>Michigan v. Mosely</i>, (1975) 423 U.S. 96. A subsequent statement, also admitted, may have been inadmissible and the case was remanded to determine the voluntariness of that statement.id: 11359
Statement that defendant was not gonna say any more than that constituted an invocation of Miranda.After admitting that he knew about the car and the burglary defendant stated but I am not gonna say any more than that. After further questioning defendant said that he would save it for when he got to California. These statements indicated defendant did not want to freely discuss the case at the time. The fact that he asserted his rights more clearly at the end of the interrogation did not mean that his earlier less clear efforts to end the conversation were to be ignored. Such error is reversible per se.id: 11358
Miranda violative evidence admitted for impeachment cannot be considered to show consciousness of guilt.The trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider false exculpatory statements taken from the defendant in violation of <i>Miranda v. Arizona</i>, (1966) 304 U.S. 436, as evidence of consciousness of guilt. When <i>Miranda</i>-violative evidence is admitted for impeachment, but no limiting instruction is given, the court should not give CALJIC 2.03, instructing the jury to show consciousness of guilt.id: 11338
The prosecutor erred in referring to defendant's post-Miranda silence when asked about the crimes by a girlfriend.The prosecutor erred in referring to appellant's post-Miranda silence in violation of <i>Doyle v. Ohio</i>, (1975) 426 U.S. 610. The prosecutor not only insinuated in his closing argument that appellant's silence (following a question posed by a girlfriend) meant he was hiding something, his remarks about the matter were contained within his discussion about the insufficiency of appellant's defense. This indicated the improper purpose of the prosecutor's questions was to utilize appellant's silence to impeach his defense and thereby to solemnize the silence into evidence of guilt. Counsel's failure to object to the statements did not constitute ineffective assistance where counsel's stated reason that he did not want to call attention to the matter was reasonable and where references to appellant's silence played a minor role in the People's case.id: 11368
Request for counsel prohibits questioning even after counsel has been made available.In <i>Edwards v. Arizona,</i> 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court held that once an accused requests counsel, the police may not reinitiate questioning until counsel has been made available. In this case, the trial court refused to suppress statements made by the defendant in response to police-initiated questioning, because the questioning occurred after defendant had consulted with his attorney. In a 6-2 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that once counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. Thus the requirement that counsel be made available refers not to the opportunity to consult with an attorney, but the right to have the attorney present during custodial interrogation. Defendant's conviction and death sentence were reversed. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Souter did not participate.id: 11355
Officers' persistent refusal to honor defendant's invocation of Miranda was so egregious as to taint the subsequent confession.Following his arrest for murder, defendant was subject to lengthy interrogation by two police officers. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and made several statements indicating his desire to invoke his right to remain silent. Following numerous futile efforts at terminating the interrogation, the defendant made an admission so damaging as to amount to a confession. The interrogating officers' persistent refusal to honor his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination was so egregious as to taint the subsequent confession and disqualify it for admission at trial.id: 11348
Defendant's question regarding his extradition which he posed to officers leaving the room, did not open the door to interrogation after previously having invoked his Miranda rights.Defendant was arrested for murder and taken to the police station. He was advised of and invoked his <i>Miranda</i> rights. As the officers were preparing to leave defendant asked what was going to happen to him with reference to extradition. The officer then proceeded to describe the crime scene and stated defendant had occupied the motel room and the victim had delivered a pizza to the room before he was killed. Defendant responded I had to kill that boy and The boy would have identified me. The statements were the product of police-initiated interrogation following defendant's invocation of <i>Miranda</i> rights. However, the statements taken the next day following readvisement of <i>Miranda</i> rights were not the tainted product of the earlier confession as the defendant unilaterally initiated further communication specifically requesting to speak with the officers.id: 10920
Stone v. Powell restriction on habeas relief not applicable to violations of Miranda.. In <i>Stone v. Powell,</i> 428 U.S. 65 (1976), the Supreme Court held that when a state has given a defendant a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available to review the challenge again. In this 5-4 opinion, Justice Souter refused to apply the <i>Stone v. Powell</i> restriction to a state prisoner's habeas claim that his or her conviction rests on statements taken in violation of <i>Miranda</i>. In contrast to claims under the Fourth Amendment, <i>Miranda</i> safeguards a fundamental trial right by protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. <i>Miranda</i> also guards against the use of unreliable statements at trial and facilitates the correct ascertainment of guilt. While sharply divided on the <i>Stone v. Powell</i> issue, all the Justices agreed that the district court should not have considered the involuntariness of the statements respondent made after receiving the <i>Miranda</i> warnings because the habeas petition did not raise the issue and the state did not give implied consent to the litigation.id: 11361
Doyle error was committed where the prosecutor asked a single question regarding defendant's post-arrest silence and a defense objection thereto was overruled.During cross-examination of the defendant the prosecutor asked about defendant's post arrest silence following the <i>Miranda</i> advisement from the arresting officer. Defense counsel objected to the question without citing authority. The trial court overruled the objection and the question was asked. The improper questioning coupled with the violation of such questioning by the trial court constituted a violation of <i>Doyle v. Ohio</i>, (1976) 426 U.S. 610. However, such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 11328
A minor's request to speak to a parent constitutes an invocation of Miranda unless there is evidence demanding a contrary conclusion.A minor's request to speak with a parent during police questioning is not necessarily an invocation of <i>Miranda</i> rights. Instead, a juvenile's request to speak with a parent is an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights unless there is evidence demanding a contrary conclusion. In the present case, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation indicated the minor by requesting to speak with his mother, did not invoke his <i>Miranda</i> rights. The minor was 17 years old with substantial prior experience with police practices. When read his rights he indicated he had heard them before and understood them. When told that his mother could not be reached, he readily continued to answer the questions The court did not err in denying the suppression motion.id: 15675
Supreme Court says Miranda is a Constitutional decision that cannot be overruled by Congress.In <i>Miranda v. Arizona</i>, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) the Supreme Court required warnings to be given before a suspect's statements made during custodial interrogation could be admitted into evidence. In an effort to overrule that decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, stating that the admissibility of a defendant's statements should turn only on whether they were voluntary. In a 7-2 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that "<i>Miranda</i>, being a Constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule <i>Miranda</i> ourselves." In reaching this result, the majority said that "[whether or not we would agree with <i>Miranda's</i> reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of <i>stare decisis</i> weigh heavily against overruling it now." The majority added the "<i>Miranda</i> has become embedded in routine police practices to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture." Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas.id: 15059
Police may not ask a suspect why he wants to invoke his Miranda rights.After being advised of his <i>Miranda</i> rights defendant told the police that he understood the advisements but did not think he could talk at that time. The officers then questioned him as to the reasons that he could not talk. While police may ask additional questions to clarify an ambiguity as to whether the suspect invoked his rights, they may not question why a defendant wanted to invoke his rights. The trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements following the <i>Miranda</i> violation.id: 14930
Miranda warnings must advise an accused of the right to have an attorney present before and during questioning.The Miranda advise given by police was defective because the defendant was not advised of the right to have an attorney present before and during questioning. However, the error was harmless where defendant testified at trial and his testimony was virtually identical to his Miranda-violative confession. Moreover, despite the Miranda violation, defendant's statement was voluntary. There was no merit to defendant's argument that his voluntary testimony at the retrial was a product of his inadmissible confession.id: 16526
Asking defendant to identify his cousin before providing Miranda advice violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights since the question was likely to elicit an incriminating response.After defendant was arrested, but before Miranda advisements were given, police asked if he recognized the other person in the patrol car. Police were aware of the relationship between defendant and the other person. There was no legitimate purpose for the question, except to elicit an incriminating statement. The subsequent use of the statement at trial violated defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.id: 17356
Good faith exception does not apply to Fifth Amendment and suppression was required where deaf defendant unequivocally invoked his Miranda rights.Defendant who was deaf was accompanied by a sign language interpreter during interrogation. The officer advised defendant of his rights and, while there was some confusion through the translation, defendant invoked Miranda rights. He stated that he did not really want to talk and preferred to go to court. The officer attempted to clarify the response and defendant gave incriminating statements. Defendant's unequivocal assertion of his rights should have put an end to the interview. Contrary to the trial court's finding it was immaterial whether the officer was acting in good faith when he pursued the matter further. The error was prejudicial where the conviction was based in substantial part on defendant's statements.id: 10866
Updated 8/16/2023Officer’s ruse in telling defendant he wanted to interview him about his future sex offender registration status, and to keep him out of the “red file” did not render the Miranda waiver involuntary.Defendant argued his Miranda waiver was involuntary because he agreed to speak to the officer who said he was a sex crime investigator conducting a routine pre-release interview connected to the sex offender registration process. The officer said he had many files of sex registrants and the objective was for the defendant to stay out of the “red file” of people the officer was going after. However, despite the officer’s failure to disclose that he was investigating a murder, defendant knew the officer was investigating “past crimes.” The officer’s ruse was not coercive and the waiver was voluntary.id: 26257
Updated 8/10/2023After repeated Miranda violations by police, defendant initiated a conversation with a psychiatrist and that statement was admissible. Defendant shot and killed a police officer who was responding to a report that defendant had raped his wife. Defendant had been shot in the incident and was taken to the hospital. Officers repeatedly sought to question him even after he invoked his Miranda rights. The DA’s office sent a psychiatrist to interview defendant. Defendant initially refused to speak to the psychiatrist who had been instructed to stay close to, and observe defendant. Despite the repeated Miranda violations, defendant’s subsequent statement to the psychiatrist was admissible because defendant initiated the conversation. id: 27761
Updated 6/26/2023Imperfect Spanish translation of Miranda rights was not a problem given the earlier proper advisement.The Spanish translation of the Miranda advisement failed to clarify that the right to have an attorney for “the questions” applied during the interrogation. However, police had earlier given the proper advisements and the earlier admonition cured any error.id: 27596
Answers to routine booking questions as to the minor’s age were admissible under Miranda in a case where age was an element of the offense.The routine booking question exception to the Miranda requirement applies to all of the core “booking questions” (name, address, height, weight, date of birth, etc.) and authorizes the admission of a defendant’s answers to those questions into evidence without the need to assess those questions incriminatory nature on a case-by-case basis.id: 27063
No Miranda readvisement was necessary 14 hours after the first interrogation.The Miranda advisement given 14 hours earlier at the Long Beach interrogation was reasonably contemporaneous with the Placer Counter interview, and defendant’s Miranda waiver remained valid.id: 26968
Officer’s follow-up question after defendant said “no” to his request for a statement was proper given the lack of clarity of the officer’s question and defendant’s earlier Miranda waiver.Defendant argued that he unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent when he answered “no” in response to the officer’s question about whether he wanted to talk further. However, in the present context where the officer’s question wasn’t clear and the officer knew defendant had earlier waived his Miranda rights, it was not unreasonable for the officer to ask a neutral follow-up question designed to clarify defendant’s intent.id: 26842
Defendant, who was in the habit of responding “yeah, yeah” did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel with that response after being asked whether he wanted counsel.Defendant initially waived his Miranda rights after a proper advisement. 30 minutes into the interrogation he became frustrated and said “... then charge me, sir. A lawyer, lawyer.” The detectives then asked if he wanted a lawyer and he responded, “yeah, yeah. Do I, if anything....” Defendant’s statement,, “yeah, yeah” was not an unambiguous invocation of his rights given his speech pattern and the fact that he had of habit of responding “yeah, yeah” to many of the questions.id: 25804
Warned statements taken after Miranda-violative statements were admissible where they were voluntary and there was no police plan to circumvent Miranda. Defendant made un-Mirandized statements that were inadmissible. Police later provided Miranda advice and defendant made additional statements. Defendant argued the warned statements were inadmissible under Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600. However, there was no plan to undermine Miranda. The detectives had little or no plan at all when proceeding. The warned statements were voluntary even though made after defendant inquired about a phone call - he did not request a call at that time. The warned statements were therefore admissible.id: 25884
Miranda readvisement wasn’t required where the interrogation regarding the murder was reasonably contemporaneous with the questioning five hours earlier about the robberies.Defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the robberies during questioning by Detective De La Roca. Less than five hours later, he was questioned by Sergeant Keech about the murder. Defendant argued the confession to the murders was inadmissible because Sergeant Keech failed to readvise him of his Miranda rights However, even though there were two different police departments involved, the latter interrogation was reasonably contemporaneous with the former, and readvisement was unnecessary.id: 25782
Defendant’s statements were not coerced and the police are not required to reread Miranda rights, after defendant invoked but later asked what the police intended to do.Defendant was given his Miranda rights, spoke to the detectives for a while, but then invoked his right to remain silent and the detectives left. Another officer later gave defendant water and defendant asked for his medicine. He also asked if the officer knew what the police were going to do with him and the officer asked if defendant wanted to bring the detectives back. This interaction did not involve any improper psychological coercion designed to get the defendant to talk, and the officers were not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before they resumed questioning.id: 24873
Police were not required to Mirandize defendant before his conversation with an undercover informant. Defendant argued that statements made to an informant placed in his cell were inadmissible absent Miranda advisements. However, Miranda warnings were not required where defendant didn’t know he was talking with a police informant. Defendant also argued the statements were involuntary because of the pressure he felt to show respect to and gain protection from the gang member cellmate, but there was no evidence in the record showing defendant was pressured to make the statements.id: 26423
The social worker investigating a dependency case was not a law enforcement agent, so Miranda warnings were not required and there was no due process violation.Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting statements he made while in custody to a social worker performing an investigation in a dependency proceeding. He claimed Miranda warnings were required, and due process was violated because he was forced to choose between protecting his parental interests in the dependency proceedings and his right to remain silent in the criminal case. Miranda warnings were not required since the social worker was not a law enforcement agent, and so there was no Fifth or Sixth Amendment violation. Moreover, while defendant had a difficult choice, there was no due process violation, and it is up to the Legislature to expand defendant’s rights in this situation.id: 26422
Miranda advice was not required before police administered field sobriety tests at the police station.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements she made during field sobriety tests administered at the police station. However, asking a DUI suspect to perform physical tests is not an “interrogation,” and defendant’s volunteered statements were admissible despite the lack of Miranda advisements. The same was true of defendant’s response to the officer’s inquiry as to whether she would submit to a chemical test. The analysis may have been different regarding the request to guess how much time had passed in 30 seconds (Romberg test) but any error was harmless given the strong evidence of impairment.id: 26285
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by saying he’d feel “more comfortable” with a lawyer present.Defendant did not invoke Miranda when he told the officer he’d feel more comfortable with a lawyer present during the interrogation. Most people would feel more comfortable with a lawyer present but the statement did not establish an unwillingness to speak without counsel’s presence.id: 26258
The minor’s Miranda waiver was voluntary despite her claim that she was exhausted and suffering from PTSD after the death of her newborn. The minor argued the Miranda waiver she gave 10 days after giving birth was coerced given that she was exhausted and suffering from PTSD after the death of the baby. However, the waiver was voluntary where she spoke rationally and never indicated that she wanted to stop the questioning or speak to her parents. The officer’s offer to help obtain counseling was not an offer of leniency affecting the voluntariness of the waiver.id: 26107
The prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s post-Miranda silence was a fair response to defendant’s testimony that he cooperated fully with the police.Defendant testified that he was fully forthcoming with the police after his arrest. The prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s post-Miranda silence was a fair response to defendant’s testimony that he cooperated fully with the police. The prosecutor did not commit Doyle error by questioning defendant about his silence.id: 25270
Defendant’s response - “Why would I want to talk to you about something that happened back in 1979" was not an invocation of Miranda. After confirming that he understood his Miranda rights, defendant actively participated in a conversation with the officers. This was an implied waiver of his rights. His response to the detective’s asking if he wanted to talk - “Why would I want to talk to you about something that happened back in 1979" was a rhetorical question and not an invocation of his right to remain silent.id: 25271
The trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with defendant’s suppressed statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with his statements that were made after he invoked his right to counsel. However, the use of the suppressed statements promoted the truth-seeking function of the trial without diminishing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police misconduct.id: 25252
Miranda advice was not required where the officer responded to a call regarding a fight at the minor’s house and asked her what happened.The minor argued her statement to police was inadmissible because it was given without a Miranda warning from the officer. However, the minor was not in custody when she gave the statement. The officer responded to a call regarding a fight inside the minor’s house. The detention was not prolonged and she wasn’t under arrest. He simply asked her what happened.id: 25219
Defendant’s responses to jail classification questions were properly admitted where the charged crime took place after the questioning. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting his statements made in response to jail classification questions about gang membership. In People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, the court found the statements made without Miranda advisements were inadmissible. However, because the crime for which defendant was prosecuted had not yet been committed at the time he answered the deputy’s jail classification questions, those questions were not likely to elicit an incriminating response. Therefore, the questioning was not interrogation in that context and the statements were properly admitted.id: 25150
Miranda violation by asking gang-related questions during booking process was harmless, and defendant’s admission was not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause.Officer’s questions about gang affiliation to defendant being processed into jail required Miranda advisements if the prosecution would later seek to use the responses to prove a gang allegation. The improper use of defendant’s admission in the present case was harmless given the significance of the accomplices’ self incriminating statements and the other evidence of defendant’s gang membership. Moreover, the statements given were not testimonial and therefore did not implicate defendant’s confrontation clause rights.id: 24471
The 17 year-old, unsophisticated defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights by voluntarily continuing to answer the officer’s questions. Defendant argued he did not validly waive his Miranda rights by voluntarily continuing to answer the officer’s questions. While he was nearly 18 and unsophisticated, there was no evidence that he suffered from any mental or intellectual disability severe enough to impair his understanding of the warnings. No express waiver was required under the circumstances and the trial court properly admitted the statements defendant made before he requested to speak to his mother.id: 24376
Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel, after first waiving his right to remain silent, by asking whether he could have a lawyer present immediately. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant said he understood them and waived his right to remain silent. When asked if he would waive his right to have counsel present, he responded with a question as to whether he could have a lawyer “now.” In light of his evident intent to answer questions, a reasonable officer might have been uncertain whether the statement was intended to invoke his right to counsel. The two or three subsequent questions by the officers merely clarified defendant’s position.id: 21668
Defendant’s statement during the questioning that he wanted to see his lawyer was an expression of frustration rather than an invocation of his right to counsel and the officers properly asked clarifying questions.Defendant initially waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with police. He did not thereafter unambiguously invoke his right to counsel during the questioning when he said “I want to see my attorney because you’re all bullshitting now.” Under the circumstances, the statement was one of frustration rather than an assertion of his right to counsel, and police did not err by asking clarifying questions. Moreover, defendant did not later invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when responding to the question of what he did, by saying “I don’t want to talk about it.” id: 21669
Police were not required to readvise defendant with Miranda rights before a second interrogation 40 hours after the first at the same location.The officers were not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights prior to the second interrogation that was reasonably contemporaneous with the first, having occurred 40 hours later at the same location by one of the previous interrogators. id: 21670
Detectives did not deliberately violate Miranda by failing to seek an express waiver of defendant’s right to silence after the warnings. The failure of the interrogating detectives to obtain an express waiver of defendant’s right to remain silent after the Miranda warnings did not amount to a deliberate Miranda violation requiring the suppression of his statements.id: 24179
Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel by asking during the interrogation whether he “should have somebody here talking for me.” During the interrogation, defendant asked if he was supposed to have an lawyer for questioning. The statement suggested that defendant might want an attorney, but it was an ambiguous and equivocal request for counsel. The detective did not err by failing to terminate the interrogation after defendant’s comment.id: 24181
Conversation between defendant and his grandmother arranged by police at the jail did not constitute interrogation.The police brought defendant's grandmother to the jail for a conversation with defendant. The grandmother hoped the conversation would yield exculpatory evidence. The conversation was voluntary and did not constitute interrogation or its
equivalent for Fifth Amendment purposes.id: 19733
The minor’s request to call his father was not an invocation of his Miranda rights.A minor’s request to speak to a parent before or during custodial interrogation is not necessarily an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Instead, courts must examine the circumstances to determine whether the minor has waived his Fifth Amendment rights. People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3rd, which held to the contrary, is no longer good law. In the present case, defendant’s request that police notify his father of his arrest was not an invocation of his Miranda rights.id: 21373
The minor's request to speak with his father during the interrogation was not an invocation of his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances.The 16 year-old suspect's request to speak with his father did not constitute an invocation of his Miranda rights. The minor was not inexperienced in this respect and continued answering questions after indicating he wanted to notify his father about the arrest. The detectives' violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 627, subd.(b) by not providing the minor a phone call was only one factor to consider in the analysis.id: 20274
Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel by saying “I think I should probably change my mind about the lawyer now... I think I need some advice here.” Defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to counsel by saying (after an earlier Miranda advisal) “I think I should probably change my mind about the lawyer now... I think I need some advice here.” Words like “probably” and “I think” show defendant was thinking about invoking his right to counsel but don’t demonstrate a clear intention to do so.id: 24059
Deputy’s question during the booking process about the last time defendant was booked did not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes. During the booking process the deputy asked defendant the last time he was booked, and defendant made an incriminating response. The deputy’s question did not amount to interrogation but rather was innocuous and common to the booking process. Admitting the incriminating response at trial did not violate Miranda.id: 24060
Officer clarified an equivocal Miranda invocation by telling defendant the decision to talk was up to him and he could stop at any time.Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel when, after being given his Miranda advisement, he responded “Sometimes they say it’s better if I have a lawyer.” However, because the equivocal statement was made before a Miranda waiver, the officer was permitted to clarify defendant’s intentions. The officer did so here by informing defendant the decision on whether to talk was entirely up to him and he could stop at any time.id: 23478
A second officer who questioned defendant 23 minutes after the first officer left was not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights.Defendant waived his Miranda rights, and after talking to an officer for over an hour, said he was “numb.” He asked if the other officer was still around. That officer came in 23 minutes later and resumed the questioning. There was no Fifth Amendment violation where the second officer did not repeat the Miranda advisements before questioning.id: 23479
That sheriffs deputies may have allowed an inmate manufactured assault against a suspected child molester did not establish outrageous government conduct.Defendants were prison inmates convicted of the murder of a suspected child molester following a brutal beating. They argued outrageous government conduct as the sheriff’s deputies authorized the beating, failed to protect the inmate victim, violated protocol by investigating the matter themselves, and conducted a biased investigation. However, most claims of outrageous government conduct involve an interference with the defendant’s right to counsel. That the deputies may have allowed an inmate manufactured assault did not establish outrageous government conduct, barring prosecution.id: 23708
Defendant must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to benefit from it so the court did not err in admitting evidence that defendant failed to ask about the others after the accident.At defendant’s gross vehicular manslaughter trial, the prosecution relied in its case-in-chief on defendant’s failure to ask about the occupants of the other vehicle as evidence that he was driving without due regard for their safety. Admitting the evidence that following his arrest, but before Miranda advisements, defendant expressed no concern about the welfare of the others did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. A defendant must make a timely and unambiguous assertion of the privilege in order to benefit from it.id: 23721
Defendant’s relevance objection did not preserve the issue of a Fifth Amendment violation by admitting evidence of defendant’s precustody silence reflected by her failure to keep interview appointments with a police investigator. Defendant argued the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of her lack of cooperation with police, i.e. that she failed to keep at least one appointment or otherwise talk to the police about the charged offenses prior to her arrest. However, she objected at trial on relevance grounds and therefore forfeited the Fifth Amendment claim. Moreover, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 23181
Defendant did not unambiguously invoke Miranda by saying that he needed a lawyer if he was going to be charged. Defendant argued that his statement “I need to know, am I being charged with this, because if I’m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer,” was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. He claimed the police should have informed him that based on the amount of information they had at that time he would certainly be charged, and that the detective was deceptive by answering that he wasn’t being charged “at this time.” However, defendant’s statement was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. And the detectives failure to inform him of the severity of his predicament did not render the Miranda waiver involuntary.id: 23573
There was no Doyle error where the prosecution referred to the codefendant’s silence when questioned by a private party during a jail visit. Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to question defendant’s brother, about the codefendant’s silence when questioned about the incident during a jail visit. However, the prosecution’s use of the codefendant’s silence here did not violate Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, because the codefendant was silent in response to the questions of a private party and there was no showing that the conduct was an assertion of his right to silence and counsel. id: 23584
Small talk initiated by guarding officers waiting for evidence technician after defendant invoked Miranda rights did not amount to interrogation.Defendant was arrested and Mirandized, and agreed to talk but soon invoked his right to remain silent. He was then placed in the care of security officers while waiting for the evidence technician and the phlebotomist. The officers made small talk about defendant’s life interests to calm him down in a potentially volatile situation. This was not interrogation and the statements later used to establish his sanity at the time of the offense were not taken in violation of Miranda.id: 23103
Statements made after defendant reported threats to correctional officers during the intake interview were not involuntary and did not violate Miranda or Massiah.During a routine prison intake interview, defendant reported threats to his safety. When the officers questioned him about the source of the threats, he made incriminating statements. The statements were not coerced. Moreover, they were analogous to statements admitted under the "booking exception" to the Miranda requirements. Finally, they were not deliberately elicited by the officers and did not violate Massiah.id: 23075
Defendant’s response “If you can bring me a lawyer” to the officer’s question whether defendant would speak to him “right now” was ambiguous and clarifying questions by the officer were appropriate.Defendant was suspected of murder, and was given the assistance of an officer interpreting for him in Spanish. He indicated clearly that he understood the advisements. When asked if he was willing to speak with the officers “right now” he responded “If you can bring me a lawyer, that way I can tell you everything that I need to tell you and someone to represent me.” The officers then sought to clarify the response and defendant agreed to talk without a lawyer. Defendant’s response was not a clear invocation of the right to counsel and was sufficiently ambiguous to clarify whether he was trying to waive his right to counsel “right now.” id: 22858
17 year-old defendant who had just been released from the hospital and asked to see his father impliedly waived his Miranda rights.Defendant argued the trial court erred in finding he impliedly waived his Miranda rights because he was 17 years old, in pain, and asked to see his father. However, the video showed he was alert and responsive despite the pain to his hand. And while he asked where his father was, he never said he wanted to stop the interview until his father arrived. There was no evidence that defendant, because of his age, intelligence or medical condition, did not understand the rights he was waiving or the consequences of his talking to police.id: 22900
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by saying “I ain’t talking no more and we can leave it at that.”Defendant repeatedly told officers during an interrogation that he was not present at the crime scene and did not know what happened. After showing some frustration, he said “Well I know I wasn’t there. I ain’t talking no more and we can leave it at that.” This statement was not an invocation of defendant’s right to remain silent as it was not unambiguous and unequivocal.id: 22992
The officer’s question “What guy?” in response to defendant’s volunteered remark did not constitute custodial interrogation. Defendant was arrested for selling drugs. An officer was assigned to transport her to the jail. She was already in handcuffs when he arrived. When they arrived at the jail her phone rang. She commented “It’s probably the guy looking for his money.” The officer asked”What guy?” She replied it was the guy who gave her friend the drugs to sell. The statement was not taken in violation of the Miranda rules because the officer’s question “What guy?” following her volunteered remark did not constitute custodial interrogation.id: 22955
Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel by saying he wanted to speak to an attorney before submitting to a polygraph. Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel during questioning by saying that if a polygraph test was required, he would first want to consult with a lawyer. id: 22845
Miranda warnings were not required where an inmate wearing a wire spoke with defendant about the murders which had not yet been charged.A fellow inmate wore a wire which recorded his conversation with defendant while they were being transported in a sheriff’s van. Assuming the inmate was acting as a government agent, Miranda warnings are not required whenever a suspect converses with someone who happens to be an agent. Miranda forbids coercion not strategic deception, and although defendant misplaced his trust in the inmate, his statements were voluntary. Moreover, the questioning did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right under Massiah because he had not yet been charged with the murders at the time of the conversation.id: 22323
Defendant’s gang affiliation admission during a jail classification interview was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing into evidence his statement made during a booking interview that he was a member of a gang. The evidence showed the gang questions were asked for purposes of housing the inmates and protecting the inmate and staff. There were asked in a legitimate booking context by an officer uninvolved with the arrest or investigation. Defendant’s responses were admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings.id: 22044
Statements made after the Miranda waiver were not the product of the police improperly “softening up” the defendant before the advisements were given. Defendant argued that the incriminating statements he made after waiving Miranda rights should have been suppressed because they were tainted by the earlier Miranda violation. He did not claim the earlier statements were involuntary, but rather that they were the product of the police “softening him up” with personal questions. However, the officers did not know defendant and did not seek to ingratiate themselves with him by unrelated past events and former acquaintances.id: 22402
The minor did not invoke his Miranda rights by requesting to see his mother during the interrogation.Juveniles claiming a postwaiver invocation of their Miranda rights are properly subject to the standard described in Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452. The trial court did not err in finding the 15 year-old’s requests to speak with his mother and references to a lawyer, made three and one-half hours into the interrogation, were not sufficiently clear to require cessation of the interrogation.id: 22560
Instructing that defendant’s silence in response to police questioning could be considered an adoptive admission wad not Doyle error where the silence was not induced by the Miranda warnings.Defendant argued the trial court erred by instructing the jury that his silence in response to police questioning could be considered an adoptive admission. However, defendant’s decision not to respond to some of the detectives questions was not induced by the Miranda warnings. Absent such an inducement, the rule described in Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, does not apply. id: 22536
The exclusionary remedy for a Miranda violation does not apply in probation revocation proceedings.Defendant argued the trial court erred in considering evidence at the probation revocation hearing of an admission from defendant elicited by police in violation of the Miranda requirements. However, the Miranda exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. Defendant also failed to show prejudice where the challenged testimony was not necessary to meet the prosecution’s burden of proof.id: 22183
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by suggesting it would probably be a good idea to get an attorney.Defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights when he told the interrogating officer “I think it’d probably be a good idea for me to get an attorney.” His later statement to the officer “talk to me” was not ambiguous and was shown to indicate that defendant was indeed asking the officer to talk with him. Even if the phrase was ambiguous, the officer did not go beyond the proper boundaries to seek clarification by responding “I mean I’m giving you the opportunity to talk.”id: 21837
Claim that the statements were coerced did not preserve a challenge as to the adequacy of the Miranda warnings and there was no IAC by failing to object where the defendant represented herself at the retrial. Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting statements she made to the police because the Miranda warnings were defective. At her first trial where she was represented by counsel, she argued the statements were coerced but did not challenge the adequacy of the warnings. She represented herself following a mistrial, and again argued coercion but did not challenge the warnings. This was not sufficient to preserve the issue of defective Miranda warnings for the appeal. Because she represented herself at the second trial she could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to make a proper objection. Even though retained counsel failed to object at the first trial, the court at the second trial permitted new arguments.id: 21939
The court did not err in denying evidence of an uncharged robbery to show third party culpability where defendant had confessed to the crime and the confession was later suppressed.Defendant confessed to an uncharged robbery but that confession was later found to be in violation of Miranda and suppressed. He later sought to use evidence from that robbery to demonstrate third party culpability. The trial court relied on defendant’s confession to deny the admission of such evidence. The refusal to admit the evidence did not violate the presumption of innocence, the right to present a defense, or the Miranda protections, and the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in doing so.id: 21898
Defendant impliedly waived her Miranda rights by continuing to talk after the advisements and the detective’s deception did not render the statements involuntary.Defendant impliedly waived her Miranda rights by continuing to participate in the interrogation after being advised of her Miranda rights which she understood. That an officer referred to the advisements as “clearing a technicality” did not change the result. Moreover, that the interrogating officer lied by telling her that she was captured on a surveillance video and encouraging her to tell the truth did not render the statements involuntary.id: 21897
Defendant reinitiated discussion with the police for Edwards v. Arizona purposes where he summoned police to tell them his wife was not involved in the killing.Evidence supported the trial court’s finding that it was defendant who reinitiated communication with the police after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, rather than police, where he summoned a detective to discuss his wife’s lack of involvement in the shooting. The record therefore established a knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights and the statements from that discussion were properly admitted.id: 21467
Dectectives were not required to stop and clarify an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent and defendant did not later invoke the right where he said he did not want to talk anymore after a lengthy interrogation.Defendant argued the “stop and
clarify” rule which does not apply to an ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel, should nevertheless apply to the related but more important ambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent. However, there is no reason to distinguish these concepts. Clarification of the invocation was not required where defendant told police “That’s all I can tell you” in response to police
questioning. Defendant’s later statement “I don’t want to talk anymore right now” was not an
invocation where it was made after a lengthy interrogation.id: 21347
Evidence supported the trial court’s finding, based largely on the officer’s demeanor at the hearing, that police did not engage in an improper two-step process to circumvent Miranda.The trial court found the police did not use an improper two-step method to circumvent Miranda (question-warn-question). This was a factual finding supported by substantial evidence. While the police should have terminated questioning after realizing defendant was a suspect, defendant was not a classic suspect and was eventually tried under the provocative act murder doctrine. There was no evidence to dispute the finding that the questioning officer was credible - a finding made in part by the trial court’s observation of his demeanor at the hearing. Moreover, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to urge the court to read the transcript of the second interview before ruling on its admissibility. id: 21816
The officer’s statement that the victim had been hurt rather than killed did not render the Miranda waiver involuntary or unintelligent.Defendant argued the police deceived him into waiving his Miranda rights by failing to tell him they were investigating a homicide, telling him instead that the woman who owned the stolen car had been “hurt.” However, the officer’s statements informed defendant that this was more than a car theft, and after being told he was in the homicide division he likely understood the injury was fatal.id: 21675
The prosecutor did not commit “Doyle error” in questioning defendant about his failure to tell police of his alibi because he had provided various explanations to the police.Following his arrest, defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave two statements to the police. The prosecutor questioned defendant at trial about his failure to inform police of the alibi he described on direct examination. The prosecutor later emphasized the point during closing argument. However, the questioning and argument did not amount to improper “Doyle error” - improper comment on defendant’s silence - because defendant had not remained silent but had provided various explanations to the police.id: 21591
Defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights by answering questions and the rule described in North Carolina v. Butler was not abrogated in Seibert. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights in the back of a police car but did not expressly waive them. The officer left but returned in 10 minutes and began questioning defendant. The trial court did not err in finding defendant impliedly waived his Miranda right. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the implied waiver rule set forth in North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, was not abrogated by the decision in Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600.id: 21263
Supreme Court says police may initiate questioning of defendant for whom counsel has been appointed. After being charged with first-degree murder, defendant was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing, and the judge appointed counsel for defendant. Later that day, two police officers visited defendant in jail, read him his Miranda rights, and obtained an inculpatory statement from him. Defendant argued that his statement should be suppressed under Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which held that once a defendant has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, police officers may not initiate interrogation with the defendant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant must affirmatively ask for counsel at his arraignment in order to trigger the
Jackson rule. Instead of resolving that question, the Court overruled Jackson and held that a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights is not presumed invalid if police initiate interrogation after counsel has been appointed for the defendant. Instead, the Court held that regardless of whether counsel has been appointed, police officers may initiate interrogation with a defendant in custody and may question the defendant if, after receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant waives his right and agrees to talk to the police. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion; Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer wrote dissents.id: 21422
Defendant’s statement upon arrest that he wanted an attorney was not an invocation of Miranda since he was not being interrogated at the time.Defendant argued that he invoked the Miranda protections when he was arrested on the probation violation at the Henry Road house and said he wanted a lawyer after being handcuffed and taken into custody. However, his statement was not an unequivocal assertion that he wanted a lawyer to deal with custodial interrogation by the detectives.id: 21170
Statements to police four days after an invocation of Miranda were admissible under the “rescue doctrine” where the kidnap victim had been missing for 64 days.Four days after defendant had invoked his Miranda rights and 64 days after the victim (Polly Klaus) was reported missing, police reinitiated contact with defendant and asked where the victim was. The police actions did not violate Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, and the statements were admissible under the “rescue doctrine”. This is different from the “public safety exception” to Miranda and the length of time the victim was missing was not dispositive of whether a rescue was still possible. id: 21007
Defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights when he said “Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer.” Defendant discussed the crime following Miranda advisements. Once the police directly accused him, he said, “It’s over and done now. Well then book me and let’s get a lawyer and let’s go for it man, you know.” This was not an unambiguous request for counsel. Defendant later clearly invoked his right to counsel when he said, “Get me a lawyer.” id: 21006
Defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights as shown on the video was unequivocal despite the blank on the waiver form. Defendant argued that his hesitant oral responses to police questions as well as his failure to answer the Miranda waiver question in the police form showed there was no valid waiver of Miranda rights. However, defendant’s waiver was unequivocal and the blank in the Miranda form was inconsequential where the form had been prepared by the officer.id: 21005
Even though detectives did not ask for a Miranda waiver, defendant impliedly waived where he understood the advisements and spoke freely.After receiving the Miranda advisements, defendant said he understood them. However, he was never asked if he waived them, and argued on appeal that he did not expressly or impliedly waive them. However, the totality of the circumstances shows an implied waiver where defendant freely spoke to the police without requesting counsel or a break in the questioning and the police did not pressure him or resort to improper interrogation techniques. id: 20911
The campus officer’s search of the minor’s backpack was reasonable where minor had been passed out and admitted in the school nurse’s office that he had cigarettes. The campus police officer’s search of the student’s backpack did to violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer initially found the minor passed out with no odor of alcohol. He was then awakened and taken to the nurse’s office. The officer then asked the minor if he had anything he shouldn’t have in his backpack and the minor replied that he had cigarettes. The officer’s question was reasonable and the minor’s answer justified a further search.id: 20844
There was no Edwards v. Arizona violation where defendant requested counsel at his disciplinary hearing and was later questioned by police following Miranda advisements.Defendant was charged with possessing weapons in jail. He requested counsel at the disciplinary hearing at the jail even though he was not entitled to counsel at the hearing. Five days later a detective brought him into an interview room at the jail, advised him of his Miranda rights, and (following a waiver of those rights) questioned defendant about the incident. Defendant argued the police were prohibited from requestioning him about the incident after his request for counsel at the disciplinary hearing. However, the disciplinary hearing was not a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. Moreover, the question of whether defendant’s request for counsel constituted an invocation of Miranda was objectively ambiguous and therefore the police were entitled to clarify the ambiguity by giving the Miranda advice before the interview.id: 20508
Defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights during the interrogation by telling the officers he wanted to stop because he had a headache.Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent during his first interview with the detectives when he informed them that because of a headache he wished to return to his cell.id: 20265
Introduction of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rules is not reversible per se.California has long followed the rule that introduction into evidence of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda rules is automatically prejudicial and therefore reversible per se. However, in light of the recent case of Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, the harmless error test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, now applies. In the instant case, since one valid confession, consisting of several telephone calls to defendant's supervisor was introduced into evidence, the improper introduction of another confession obtained in violation of Miranda was not prejudicial because the jury could properly infer guilt from the properly admitted confession.id: 11334
"I don't think I should be talking now" was not an invocation of Miranda.During discussion with officers defendant said I don't even think I should be talking now, and my lawyer told me not to say nothin' about the case unless I had a lawyer present. The statements were not an equivocal assertion of the right to counsel, but instead were intended to communicate that despite the advice he received from the public defender, defendant was willing to talk to the officers in the hope of obtaining his girlfriend's release.id: 11376
"Well what do I say, I don't know" was not an invocation of the right to remain silent.After being read his Miranda advisements defendant said: Well, what do I say, I don't know. The trial court properly concluded that defendant was not expressing confusion about the nature of his rights, but rather was seeking clarification as to how to waive them.id: 11377
Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel where he stated "maybe I ought to talk to my lawyer. You might be bluffing" and then did not respond to officer's question as to whether he wanted an attorney.During an interrogation defendant stated: Maybe I ought to talk to my lawyer, you might be bluffing, you might not have enough to charge murder. Officers then asked if defendant wanted a lawyer and he simply repeated that they were probably bluffing. Defendant argued the statement constituted an invocation of the right to counsel and should have induced the officers to terminate the interview. However, in light of the whole record, including defendant's overall conduct and demeanor during the interrogation, the ambiguous and tentative nature of his reference to an attorney, the officer's immediate attempt to clarify the remark and defendant's refusal to respond thereto there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel.id: 11313
Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent by stating "I don't know if I wanna talk anymore since its someone killed, you know."Defendant argued that he invoked his right to silence during the course of an interview when he stated: I don't know if I wanna talk anymore since its someone killed, you know. Although a suspect's assertion of the right to silence need not be unequivocal, defendant's statement did not amount to even an equivocal assertion of the privilege.id: 11314
Defendant's comment that he was confused and repeated question "What can a lawyer do for me? " did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.Defendant argued that he invoked his right to counsel while being advised of his rights when he stated that he was confused and repeated the phrase What can an attorney do for me? However, a review of the transcript and cassette including the tone and inflections of defendant's voice revealed that defendant's questions were rhetorical in nature and linked to his repeated explanation of the reasoning behind his waiver of rights. Even if defendant's comments could be construed as an ambiguous request for counsel, the conduct of the interrogators was proper and the subsequent waiver was not valid. The interrogators did not ask defendant substantive questions until defendant's position was clarified and a valid waiver was obtained. Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant actually understand the types of assistance an attorney can provide.id: 11317
The statement "No tape recorder I don't want to incriminate myself" did not amount to a full invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.Defendant argued he invoked his right to remain silent at the outset of his interview with police by remarking: No tape recorder. I don't want to incriminate myself. However, defendant's remarks indicated only a partial restriction on his willingness to speak with the officers. They were entitled to continue the interrogation once they clarified the situation by giving Miranda advisements and obtaining defendant's express consent to be interviewed.id: 11369
Defendant's question "Did you say I could have a lawyer?" without more, did not constitute an invocation of Miranda rights.Following <i>Miranda</i> advisements defendant said Did you say I could have a lawyer? The officer responded yes but defendant did not respond. In view of the entire record including defendant's statements and disruptive conduct immediately following the arrest, the interrogatory nature of defendant's reference to an attorney, the officer's immediate repetition of the advice that had been given and defendant's failure to respond thereto - there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that defendant's statement did not constitute an invocation of his right to counsel.id: 11322
Defendant's statements were properly admitted when in response to the question of whether he waived his Miranda rights he responded "Yeah. Can I talk to you later?"Defendant was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. When asked if he waived those rights defendant responded Yeah, can I talk to you later? Thirty minutes later, during booking, he provided information about the arson. Defendant later argued his earlier response was ambiguous and did not constitute a waiver. However, there was no evidence defendant was undecided whether to talk with the investigator, only when he would do so. His statements were properly admitted.id: 11325
The court reasonably concluded that defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent by refusing to allow the interview to be tape recorded.Defendant claimed he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination when he refused to allow the first interview with the police to be tape recorded. However, a suspect does not invoke his or her right to remain silent merely by refusing to allow a tape recording of an interview, unless that refusal is accompanied by other circumstances disclosing a clear intent to speak privately and in confidence to others.id: 11367
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by asking how long it would take to get an attorney.During police questioning, defendant repeatedly asked how long it would take to get a lawyer produced. Contrary to defendant's claim, this did not constitute a clear and unequivocal request for counsel.id: 19873
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach the defense mental health expert with Miranda-violative statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to impeach the defense mental health expert with
Miranda-violative statements. In James v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 307, the court held the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to defense witnesses other than
the defendant. However, the James rule did not apply where the prosecutor cross-examined the defense expert - whose testimony was voluntarily proffered in a retrial from which defendant's
illegal confession had been excluded - about the foundation for the expert's opinion.id: 19056
The prosecutor's questions and argument regarding defendant's refusal to make a statement were a fair response to his testimony that he was never given a chance to tell his side of the story.Defendant testified that he was never given an opportunity to tell his side of the story. The prosecutor thereafter questioned defendant about his refusal to make a statement when given the chance by police. The prosecutor's questioning and later argument to the jury was not an improper comment on defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. Rather, it was a fair response to defendant's claim that he was never given a chance to tell his side of the story. Moreover, the court's instruction that defendant's exercise of his right could not be used to infer guilt could have included an admonition that the exercise of his right could not be used to draw an inference as to his credibility, but the instruction given was adequate. Even if there was an error it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 18863
Defendant did not assert her right to counsel by attempting to call her lawyer during the arrest.Defendant argued she unequivocally asserted her right to counsel when she attempted to call her attorney during the arrest. She claimed police later violated her right to counsel by approaching her at the station, obtaining a Miranda waiver, and interrogating her. However, because the arresting officer did not attempt to question her, and gave no indication that he would do so later, defendant did not invoke her right to call her lawyer.
id: 18754
Defendant's statement "actually, you know what, I'm gonna call my lawyer" when taken in context was not a clear and unambiguous request for counsel.Defendant's inquiry "If I sign this would I be able to make a phone call to get my lawyer?" was an ambiguous and equivocal reference to his constitutional right. In fact, he immediately engaged the officers in conversation and never indicated a desire to stop the interrogation. His later statement, "Actually, you know what, I'm gonna call my lawyer "was also ambiguous and equivocal as it was sandwiched between mundane conversation with the officers, their accusations of his criminality and his statements that he might implicate others but not himself.id: 18661
18 year-old who was advised of his rights and spoke to police did not invoke his right to counsel by asking if he could have his mom or his lawyer talk to the officer.Defendant was 18 and familiar with his Miranda rights based on numerous arrests. He initiated discussions with the officer and was advised of his Miranda rights while being driven to the police station. He again asked to speak with the officer at the station. He was reminded of his Miranda rights. His subsequent statement that he was confused and "Can I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?" did not constitute an unequivocal request for counsel.id: 18664
Defense counsel erred by allowing jurors to consider defendant's colorful invocation of the right to counsel as an adoptive admission.Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing the prosecution to argue defendant's colorful invocation of the right to counsel ("Fuck you. I want to talk to my lawyer.") was an adoptive admission. In context, the first part of the invocation was not severable as an adoptive admission. Moreover, there was nothing ambiguous about the invocation.id: 18594
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by asking the interrogating officer "Do we have to talk about this right now?"During an interrogation, defendant responded to a question by asking "Do I have to talk about this right now?" The question was not an invocation of his Miranda rights. He merely demonstrated discomfort with the question.id: 18568
Miranda warnings did not require explicit statement of a continuing right to cut off questioning at any time.The Miranda warnings given defendant were not defective for failing to explicitly advise his of his continuing right to cut off questioning at any time.id: 18569
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by suggesting he might "stop talking" and responding "Okay" when police told him that was his right.Defendant argued he invoked his Miranda rights by suggesting he might "stop talking" to police during the interrogation, and then responding "Okay" after police informed him he could stop talking. However, defendant's comments did not constitute an unambiguous assertion of his right to silence or counsel.id: 18447
Miranda claims are cognizable on habeas corpus but are subject to procedural bars where the issue has been or could have been raised on appeal.Miranda claims are cognizable on habeas corpus in California courts, but such claims are subject to denial on procedural grounds where, because it rests on facts in the appellate record, the claim was already raised and rejected, or could have been raised but was not, on direct appeal.id: 18400
After a valid Miranda waiver, defendant's statement that he wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged was conditional and ambiguous, and the police were not required to ask clarifying questions to determine his intent.During a custodial interrogation (after defendant validity waived his rights) he said "if for anything you guys are going to charge me I want to talk to a public defender too, for any little thing." The police assured him he could talk to a public defender "anytime you want to" but explained they planned to "book" him that night and release him the next day if the polygraph results showed he was not lying. Defendant's statement was conditional; he wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged. The conditional nature of the statement rendered it ambiguous at best because a reasonable officer could not have known whether the condition would be fulfilled since the charging decision is not made by the police. Moreover, the police explained the difference between being arrested and being charged. The statement was equivocal and the police were not required to ask clarifying questions to determine his intent.id: 18319
Miranda readvisement was not necessary where a psychologist entered the room and began questioning defendant a few minutes after the detective finished.Defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights by a detective. A few minutes later, a psychologist working for the DA, entered the room and began questioning defendant. A second advisement was not required before the doctor's questioning.id: 18238
Police did not violate defendant's Miranda rights after his invocation and later request for information of the case, followed by a statement.Defendant invoked his Miranda rights, and then asked another officer about his wife's condition. The officer informed the detective in charge who returned, reminded defendant of his Miranda rights and then proceeded to take defendant's incriminating statement. Defendant argued the police improperly reinitiated communication and were required to readvise him of his rights before interrogating him. However, the record revealed that police did not make any remarks to induce the defendant to talk. Rather, defendant initiated the conversation and expressed his desire to speak with the interrogating detective in the absence of counsel.id: 18107
There was no interrogation for Miranda purposes where defendant volunteered statements on the way to the police station.When en route to the police station, defendant was eager to talk to the police. When he began an "ongoing narrative" the police advised him of his Miranda rights. Defendant's statement was not made pursuant to interrogation for Miranda purposes.id: 18069
Failure to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights before initiating a second interrogation was not improper where the first interrogation was one hour earlier and defendant was sophisticated.Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the police. Questioning ceased when he said "I don't want to say anything else right now." The second interrogation was conducted by the same officer at the jail after the talk an hour earlier was conducted on a college campus. Defendant suggested they go somewhere more private to talk. Defendant was sophisticated and had prior experience with the police. Statements taken from the second interrogation were voluntary even though the officer failed to re-Mirandize the defendant.id: 17595
Defendant did not invoke Miranda by saying "I can't talk no more."Defendant argued that he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights in an interrogation by saying "I can't talk no more." However, evidence supported the trial court's ruling that, taken in context, defendant was conveying to the officers his difficulty speaking because of the pain of accepting responsibility for the victim's death.id: 17321
Miranda waiver was not vitiated by officer's brief statement in a long interrogation that anything defendant said would be kept "between us."Defendant argued his Miranda waiver was vitiated by the officer's promise that anything defendant told them "we're going to keep between us." However, the statement was a fleeting comment during a long interrogation that was meant to communicate to the defendant why the officers could not reveal everything defendant's associate had told them. The officers did not promise defendant that his statements would remain confidential nor did defendant understand the officer's comment to mean his statement would remain confidential.id: 16935
Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent by stating "okay, that one" in response to the officer's statement that he need not answer every question.Following the advisement of Miranda rights, the officer told defendant if there was any question he did not want to answer, he could "stop at any time." Defendant responded "okay, that one" followed by laughter. His response did not amount to an unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent. At most, it was an implied refusal to answer a particular question - perhaps the earlier question about providing his side of the story.id: 16899
Second interview by a different officer five hours later and in the same room was reasonably contemporaneous with the first interview where defendant waived his Miranda rights, so readvisement was not required.The prosecution introduced evidence at the penalty phase of a murder defendant committed while he was almost 14 years old. Defendant argued the confession was inadmissible since, although he was originally <i>Mirandized</i>, he was not re-<i>Mirandized</i> prior to the interrogation by a second officer which resulted in the confession. However, the five hours which elapsed did not reduce the effectiveness of the original waiver, especially where defendant was mentally alert and spoke freely. Moreover, both interviews took place in the same room, and defendant had prior experience with the police. Police were not required to re-<i>Mirdandize</i> defendant in the second interrogation since it was "reasonably contemporaneous" with his initial waiver.id: 16372
Defendant waived his Miranda rights when he said he would tell the officer what he would tell his attorney and then gave a taped interview.The officer advised defendant of his <i>Miranda</i> rights, and defendant understood them. Defendant said he would tell the officer whatever he would tell his attorney if the officer had time to listen. Defendant then voluntarily gave a taped interview. There was no evidence of coercion or intimidation. The trial court properly concluded the defendant waived his rights.id: 15680
Document filed by attorney outside the setting of custodial interrogation did not operate to invoke defendant's right to counsel.Defendant argued his Fifth Amendment right to have an attorney present during questioning was properly invoked by the document his attorney filed on his behalf. Counsel filed the invocation while defendant was in custody but outside the context of interrogation, thus purporting to prophylactically assert rights against actions defendant expected the government to take, but which had not yet occurred. Because the purported invocation occurred outside the setting of custodial interrogation, it could not operate to invoke defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.id: 15681
In light of defendant's testimony regarding his statement to police the giving of CALJIC 2.03 did not violate the Miranda rule.Defendant spoke to an officer and denied involvement in the robbery before receiving any <i>Miranda</i> advisements. Defendant introduced the statement into evidence on direct examination. He could not later claim that the <i>Miranda</i> rule prohibited the giving of CALJIC 2.03 that allows the jury to draw an inference of guilt from a willfully false or deliberately misleading un<i>Mirandized</i> statement.id: 15682
Miranda warnings were not required for prison inmate interviewed prior to administrative proceedings where there were no restraints other than those associated with his prison status.While <i>Miranda</i> advisements are required before interrogating prison inmates, there is an exception where no restraint is imposed upon the inmate over and above that associated with his prisoner status. Defendant was questioned by a fact finder for the purpose of assisting him in preparing to defend against the pending administrative charges. He was free to decline or terminate the interview at any time, which he acknowledged. The investigator did not summon defendant, but came to his cell, and talked to defendant in the presence of his cell mate. He was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained in his cell. He was not confronted with any evidence of guilt. Under the circumstances, <i>Miranda</i> warnings were not required since no restraints were placed upon defendant to coerce him into participating in the interrogation over and above those normally associated with his inmate status.id: 15683
Miranda warnings were not required where police inquired about the presence of weapons while executing a search warrant at the home of a known drug dealer.When police officers prepare to execute a search warrant upon premises occupied by a known drug trafficker, having probable cause to believe substantial quantities of illegal drugs will be found but not knowing who else might be present on the property, an objectively reasonable basis exists for permitting them to question the suspect about the presence of weapons and other potential dangers they might encounter without preceding such questions with the warnings ordinarily required by the <i>Miranda</i> rule.id: 15684
Officer did not err in seeking to clarify defendant's ambiguous reference to attorney's advice to remain silent.Defendant was taken into custody, waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights and told police he would take a polygraph test. When the officer returned to initiate the polygraph exam, defendant said he had since been instructed by an attorney not to say anything. The officer asked if the attorney was representing defendant. Defendant replied it was not his attorney, and neither he nor his parents had contacted the attorney. Thereafter, he was <i>Mirandized</i> again following the officer's tape recorded recitation of the facts regarding the contact with counsel. Under the circumstances, the officer was justified in clarifying the ambiguous reference regarding the invocation of the right to remain silent.id: 15685
Statement on the record that defendant voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station was not an improper "softening up" of the suspect.The interrogating officer noted "for the record" that defendant and his wife voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the station as a means of showing cooperation. This statement was not an improper "softening up" of defendant and his <i>Miranda</i> waiver was therefore not induced by improper false promises of leniency.id: 15686
Where an officer deliberately fails to honor a suspect's request for counsel, subsequent statements may be used for impeachment.Where a police officer conducting a custodial interrogation deliberately fails to honor a suspect's request for counsel, with the objective of securing evidence for impeachment purposes, the statement is in fact admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness so long as the statement is otherwise voluntary.id: 15663
After defendant waived his Miranda rights, his refusal to answer certain questions or do certain things did not invoke Miranda rights and could be used for impeachment purposes.Defendant waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights after a proper advisal. While he answered some of the officer's questions he refused to demonstrate how the shooting occurred and he refused to take a polygraph. Defendant's actions did not suggest he was changing his mind and invoking his right to remain silent. There were no other factors in the record showing his statements were involuntary. Moreover, the court determined a defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once he waives his <i>Miranda</i> rights his refusal to answer certain questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent a formal invocation of <i>Miranda</i> rights. The prosecutor did not err in commenting on what defendant refused to do because the refusal was not based upon a <i>Miranda</i> invocation.id: 15676
Anticipatory invocation of Miranda prior to outside interrogation was meaningless.At defendant's arraignment on one charge, defense counsel filed a form seeking to invoke defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights regarding future attempts by police to interrogate defendant. However, since defendant's <i>Miranda</i> rights were invoked long before the custodial interrogation resulting in his statement, his assertion was anticipatory and therefore, meaningless.id: 15677
Court of Appeal erred in finding defendant did not impliedly waive his Miranda rights despite his low intelligence and the fact of the collision prior to the interviews.Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder arising out of a collision after he ran a red light at 75 miles per hour and collided with another car. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in admitting defendant's statements to police since there was no indication defendant waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights. The trial court had determined there was an implied waiver. The record showed defendant was willing to speak and there was no suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit statements. Moreover, although defendant had a relatively low I.Q. and was injured in the collision there was no evidence that during any of the interviews with police, his judgment was clouded or otherwise impaired by pain, medications, or surgical procedures. The record supported the trial court's finding of an implied waiver of <i>Miranda</i> rights and the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed.id: 15678
Defendant initiated conversation with Los Angeles detective following Miranda advisals despite defendant's earlier invocation when originally arrested at the Canadian border.Defendant was detained at the Canadian border after agents had been informed of the arrest warrant. Following <i>Miranda</i> advisals, defendant invoked his right to counsel. The following day, Los Angeles detectives arrived at the Vermont police station where defendant was detained. The officers intended to interrogate defendant and transport him back to California. When the L.A. detective was reading the <i>Miranda</i> rights, defendant asked what he could do for the officer and stated his intention to talk. These statements by defendant constituted the initiation of further conversation by defendant pursuant to <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i> (1981) 451 U.S. 477. That the detective initiated the encounter which followed defendant's earlier invocation was not relevant as long as defendant initiated the conversation. The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the confession.id: 15679
2 to 3 hour time lapse between interrogations was not significant and Miranda advice was not required before the second interview.Defendant was <i>Mirandized</i> and interrogated between 10:00 and 10:25 a.m. She was subsequently reinterviewed at 1:00 p.m. She was not <i>Mirandized</i> prior to the second interview. There was no showing that she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, sleep-derived, or otherwise impaired. Evidence supported the court's conclusion that the second interrogation was reasonably contemporaneous with the first, and new advisements were not required.id: 14928
Defendant waived his right to counsel by stating that he wanted an attorney but would answer questions until he believed he needed one.After being advised of the <i>Miranda</i> rights defendant responded that, yes he wanted an attorney present but that he would answer questions until he thought he needed one. While the initial portion of the response was an unequivocal request for counsel, the evidence supported the trial court's determination that he thereafter waived the right to counsel.id: 14929
The distinction in giving Miranda advice between "Did you understand?" and "Do you understand each of these rights?" is not significant.After reading the defendant her <i>Miranda</i> rights, the officer asked "Did you understand?" Defendant argued the advisement was improper since the officer did not ask "Do you understand each of these rights?" However, the distinction was not significant and the timing of the officer's question left no doubt that he was asking about the entire <i>Miranda</i> advisement.id: 14931
Police were not required to Mirandize defendant before taking a manuscript from his jail cell.Defendant was cross-examined at trial with portions of a book he wrote regarding murders similar to the ones with which he was charged. He argued that the officer erred in requesting the manuscript without first giving the Miranda warnings and without counsel being present. However, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in property within his jail cell.id: 11351
Public safety exception applies to the safety of an officer who can make a narrow inquiry as to dangerous objects before making a search.The officer arrested defendant for possession of a syringe the officer saw defendant drop. Before he searched defendant the officer asked if he any other needles or paraphernalia on his person. Defendant made an incriminating statement. Defendant argued the statement which preceded <i>Miranda</i> advisements was not admissible under the public safety exception (in this case the concern of an officer pricking himself with a dirty needle) because that exception to <i>Miranda </i>rules cannot be applied when the officer is concerned only with his own safety and not the public's at large. However, the court disagreed and found that allowing a simple and narrow inquiry ensures that an officer need not put his or her safety at risk while engaging in otherwise lawful conduct.id: 11352
Questioning arrested defendant after Miranda advisement but before an invocation or waiver as to the whereabouts of weapons fell under the police safety exception to the Miranda rule.Defendant was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Before he informed the officers as to whether he was willing to waive his rights officers asked where the guns were. Defendant responded there was a gun under the mattress of the bed. Upon lifting the mattress officers discovered a gun and a bank deposit bag. Defendant's response to the officer's question concerning the location of the gun was not the product of custodial interrogation violative of Miranda principles and the discovery of the gun and bank bag could not be considered tainted fruit of the Miranda violation. Officers' questioning fell under the public safety exception to the Miranda rule.id: 11353
Refusal to sign Miranda waiver or to allow the conversation to be tape recorded did not constitute an invocation of defendant's right to remain silent.Defendant was advised of his <i>Miranda</i> rights and agreed to talk with the officers. He refused to sign a <i>Miranda</i> waiver or to allow the conversation to be tape recorded. On appeal, he argued his refusal to sign the waiver and to be tape recorded were invocations of his right to remain silent. However, the trial court found defendant in fact understood his rights and waived them, and his conversations with the officers were voluntary. Such conclusion was reasonable and supported in the record.id: 11354
Second interview more than five hours after the first interview ended was reasonably contemporaneous and a readvisal of Miranda requirements was not necessary.Defendant argued statements made to officers during a second interview could not be used because of the officers failure to readvise him of his <i>Miranda</i> rights. The first interview started at 8:30 p.m. and lasted an hour. The second interview began at 2:43 a.m. It took place in the same detective bureau (although possibly in a different room) and was conducted by a second detective who was present but remained silent at the first interview. Evidence supported the trial court's finding the second interview was reasonably contemporaneous with the first and that a readvisal of the <i>Miranda</i> warnings was not required.id: 11356
Statement "there wouldn't be an attorney running around her now, would there?" did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.Defendant was arrested on the 17th for prowling and told police he wanted an attorney. He was then released on bail. The following day he was arrested for burglary. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant asked, "There wouldn't be an attorney running around here now, would there? ... I just don't know what to do." These ambiguous statements did not indicate a lack of present willingness to talk and did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.id: 11357
Statements intentionally taken in violation of Miranda were admissible for impeachment.Two officers admitted they intentionally continued their questioning of defendant after he invoked his Miranda rights for the express purpose of obtaining statements against him should he elect to testify at trial. Notwithstanding the officers' conduct the statements taken were admissible against defendant for impeachment purposes.id: 11360
Suppression was not required where the minor invoked her right to counsel in San Francisco, and six weeks after her release, made incriminating statements to the same officer in San Diego.A minor was arrested in San Francisco and questioned about a homicide. After being advised of her Miranda rights, she requested an attorney. She was later released. Six weeks later she was arrested in San Diego. She was again Mirandized and questioned by the same officer that questioned her in San Francisco. During the interrogation she made incriminating statements. There is no public policy reason a good faith break in a minor's custody should not dissipate the rule that once a suspect asserts his or her Fifth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation, the current questioning and any further questioning initiated by the police about the current or any other offense must cease until counsel is present.id: 11362
Supreme Court declines to require clarifying questions when suspect might want a lawyer.Justice O'Connor, writing for five members of the court, held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the <i>Miranda</i> rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. Here, the suspect made an ambiguous statement, [m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer, and the officers asked clarifying questions to determine that he was not asking for an attorney. The majority said that this may be sound practice, but clarifying questions are not required. Justice Scalia concurred, but complained about the Justice Department's failure to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3501. Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the officers were free to disregard the suspect's reference to a lawyer entirely.id: 11363
Supreme Court permits questioning on unrelated offense even after defendant invokes right to counsel during judicial proceeding.Defendant was arrested for armed robbery. He refused to waive his <i>Miranda</i> rights, but did <i>not</i> request an attorney. A deputy public defender represented him at his initial appearance. After his appearance, the police contacted him about an unrelated murder. This time he waived his <i>Miranda</i> rights, and he eventually signed a statement admitting his involvement in the murder. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's invocation of the right to counsel on the armed robbery charge was offense specific, and therefore did not apply to unrelated offenses. The majority contrasted this with the general invocation of the right to counsel in <i>Arizona v. Roberson</i>, 486 U.S. 675 (1989), where the court held that once a suspect invokes the <i>Miranda</i> right to counsel on one offense, he may not be re-approached on <i>any</i> offense unless counsel is present. Justice Kennedy concurred, suggesting that <i>Arizona v. Roberson</i> was wrongly decided. Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun dissented.id: 11365
That nine hours intervened between the Miranda advisement and confession did not, as a matter of law, vitiate the advisement.Appellant argued his confession was improperly admitted as the Miranda advisement and waiver were not reasonably contemporaneous with his confession. He was Mirandized and interviewed at 9:15 a.m. He was interviewed again at 6:15 p.m., where he signed a confession. That approximately nine hours intervened between advisement/waiver and confession did not, as a matter of law, vitiate the advisement.id: 11366
The trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the inculpatory statement may only be admitted to determine defendant's credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte admonish and instruct the jury that prior inculpatory or inconsistent statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be admitted for the purpose of judging his credibility but not as evidence of his guilt. However, such limiting instruction is not required when it has not been requested.id: 11370
There was no Doyle error regarding defendant's post arrest silence where there was no indication on the record that defendant was Mirandized.Defendant was charged with burglary. He argued the prosecutor erred in questioning him and commenting on his failure to tell the police or anyone about his version of how he came to possess the items. Defendant claimed these questions and comment about his silence violated <i>Doyle v. Ohio,</i> (1976) 426 U.S. 610. However, <i>Doyle</i> prohibits such comments after a defendant has been given Miranda warnings. In the instant case there was no evidence that defendant was ever Mirandized. He testified on redirect examination that police officers never questioned him. A defendant who is never questioned need not be Mirandized.id: 11371
There was no Doyle error where the prosecutor's question regarding defendant's post-Miranda silence was asked to correct the impression created by defense counsel that defendant was given no opportunity to explain a damaging statement.Officer testified on direct examination that defendant made a damaging spontaneous statement prior to being given Miranda warnings. Defense counsel then asked on cross-examination if when the remark was made the officer provided defendant with an opportunity to make a full and complete statement. The officer testified he did not. On re-direct the prosecution asked if <i>Miranda</i> warnings were subsequently given. The officer stated <i>Miranda</i> warnings were given and defendant declined to make a comment. Defendant argued the reference to his post-<i>Miranda</i> silence violated <i>Doyle v. Ohio</i>, (1976) 426 U.S. 610. However, there was no <i>Doyle</i> violation as the prosecutor's purpose on re-direct examination was to correct the impression created on cross-examination that defendant had not been afforded an opportunity to explain the apparently damaging statement.id: 11372
Trial court did not err in failing to give a limiting instruction on the proper use of post-arrest statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that his post-arrest statements, taken in violation of Miranda, could be used only for the purpose of evaluating his credibility. The court instructed with CALJIC 2.13 that prior inconsistent statements could be used as substantive evidence of guilt. However, absent a request for a limiting instruction the court has no sua sponte duty to give one.id: 11373
Voluntary statements made to a corrections officer regarding defendant's participation in other crimes did not require Miranda advisements.While in prison on an unrelated offense defendant told a corrections officer he wished to discuss his involvement in other crimes. The corrections officer, who was not a peace officer, told defendant he would record the statements and deliver them to police. No <i>Miranda</i> warnings were given and defendant confessed to the instant crimes. <i>Miranda</i> advisements were not necessary since defendant's statements were not the product of interrogation. Defendant volunteered this information for purely personal reasons. The encounter did not become coercive where the corrections officer asked questions since the brief questions did not influence defendant's statement which was given in a narrative form.id: 11374
Words now I ain't saying no more did not amount to an invocation of the right to silence.After being advised of, and waiving his Miranda rights, defendant talked with officers. During the questioning, defendant said now I ain't saying no more and don't say no more. Within their context defendant's words did not amount to an invocation of his right to silence. He spoke to his interrogators; he uttered the words in question; and without hesitation he proceeded to speak to them further. He evidently sought to alter the course of the questioning, but he did not attempt to stop it altogether.id: 11375
Defendant's conversation with his own father in a police interview room was not the equivalent of custodial interrogation.Defendant argued the officers' conduct in placing defendant's father in an interview room alone with defendant was a form of custodial interrogation because it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. However, a defendant's conversations with his own visitors are not the equivalent of police interrogation. Moreover, the trial court specifically determined defendant's father was not a police agent during his conversation with defendant.id: 11318
Defendant's fourth statement (following three Miranda -violative statements) was admissible where it was totally voluntary and made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.Defendant received <i>Miranda</i> warnings prior to his first statement and invoked his right to counsel. Separate statements given to two officers violated defendant's rights after continued interrogation and those statements were properly suppressed. Statements given during the booking process were also improper. However, the fourth statement to another detective was not inherently coercive. It was admissible since it was voluntary and made after defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.id: 11319
Defendant's inquiry regarding his girlfriend's health after invoking his right to remain silent constituted an initiation of conversation regarding the crime.Defendant invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda. He subsequently asked to speak with an officer regarding his girlfriend's health. While defendant's initiation of the conversation may be said to have been ambiguous in that it did not make clear his willingness to engage in a generalized discussion of the crime, it could reasonably be interpreted by the officer as opening a generalized discussion, and that the officer understood the request in that light. On these facts, the officer did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by engaging in a generalized discussion of the crime, after first obtaining a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to have counsel present.id: 11320
Defendant's Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent despite his request to speak with one officer he trusted and a sweep of the interrogation room for bugs.Just before defendant confessed to an officer he asked to sweep the room for concealed electronic recording devices and asked all but one officer to leave. The other officers subsequently reentered the room and defendant confessed. He argued his actions taken to speak to the one officer off the record showed he did not realize his confession could be used against him and thus he did not knowingly and intentionally waive his <i>Miranda</i> rights. However, even if defendant's request to sweep the room for bugs could be construed as a mistaken impression that his conversation with the officer could not be used against him, he abandoned any expectation of privacy when he acceded to the officer's indication that the other officers should reenter the room to continue the interrogation.id: 11321
Defendant's request for counsel in one case did not amount to an invocation of counsel before interrogation in another case.Defendant's initial invocation of the right to silence after the Santa Ana arrest for auto tampering was respected by the original arresting officers, and all interrogation ceased. After a few days a separate officer contacted the suspect and asked him if he would discuss a separate crime committed in Newport Beach. Defendant was fully cooperative and agreed to discuss the separate case. He was fully advised of his Miranda rights and waived them. Just because defendant invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the first case did not mean he was simultaneously invoking his Fifth Amendment right on another case. His statement was properly admitted.id: 11323
Defendant's statement to a private citizen that he wanted to speak with an attorney did not preclude an interrogation by officers after a Miranda advisal and waiver.A police officer learned from a private citizen - an investigator from the public defender's office - that the defendant may have been involved in the shooting and that he asked to speak with an attorney. The police later Mirandized the defendant, who indicated a willingness to talk. The statement to the private citizen that he wanted to speak with an attorney did not preclude the officers from interrogating defendant after a Miranda advisal and waiver.id: 11324
Defendant's voluntary statement after the termination of his non-Miranda interrogation was properly admitted.After his arrest defendant volunteered certain incriminating statements. The arresting officer then called for a Spanish-speaking officer to advise defendant of his <i>Miranda</i> rights. About 20 minutes later, before the officer arrived, defendant volunteered another statement. Under the principles of <i>Oregon v. Elstad</i>, (1985) 470 U.S. 298, and <i>McDaniel v. California</i>, (1976) 429 U.S. 847, where a defendant's statement obtained in violation of <i>Miranda</i> is otherwise voluntary, a later utterance willingly volunteered in the absence of police interrogation is admissible against the defendant.id: 11326
Defendant's off the record request pertained only to sentencing and did not apply to statements not involving sentencing.During an interrogation regarding two murders defendant abruptly stated: This is off the record. The officer replied: You're doing all the talking. Go ahead. Defendant then asked: Can you get me 10 years? The conversation then turned to sentencing possibilities. Defendant argued that all statements following his initial off the record request should have been suppressed because the officer never informed him that the interview was no longer off the record. The trial court excluded the statements regarding possible sentencing to which the off-the-record request was directed. The court also properly found the Miranda waiver remained valid as to discussion not involving sentencing.id: 11327
Failure to issue Miranda warnings prior to the fourth interview at the hospital following three at the police station was not erroneous.Defendant turned himself in for questioning the day after the crimes. He had three consecutive interviews with the police. He was Mirandized prior to each interview and waived his rights. Defendant was then admitted to a hospital as a suicide risk. Two days after the initial interviews the same officers went to speak with defendant at the hospital. They asked if he remembered them and referred to the prior interview. No Miranda advisements were given at the hospital. There was no Miranda violation. It was clear from the circumstances that he was still in official custody and could reasonably be expected to know that any statements he made could later be used against him.id: 11330
Failure to Mirandize defendant before asking him for the combination to the safe was harmless.Defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude his disclosure to an officer of the combination to the safe and evidence that he opened the safe at the officer's request. However, defendant's personal business records were found in the safe and since the only relevance of his knowledge of the combination went to whether he possessed the contraband in the safe, failure to exclude the statement of the combination and the request to open the safe was harmless.id: 11331
Failure to readvise defendant of his right to have counsel present during questioning was not fatal.Defendant argued the interrogating officer's advisement did not comply with the mandate of <i>Miranda</i> because it did not state he had a right to have counsel present <U>during</U> questioning. However, the Miranda advice given by the arresting officer was complete and although it was not included in the restatement of his rights, it was implicit in the interrogating officer's question regarding whether defendant wanted to waive the rights and speak to me now without an attorney.id: 11332
Interrogating officer was not required to re-Mirandize defendant who recited the basic Miranda rules himself after his arrest.Defendant had a twenty year history of criminal offenses. After his arrest for the instant aggravated assault he recited the basic Miranda rules himself. His self-admonition did not expressly recite that he was entitled to the presence of an attorney before and during questioning. However, defendant could not wait to speak with the officer and repeatedly interrupted the officer to discuss his alibi. The officer thereafter informed defendant of his right to speak with an attorney. This was not qualified as to future time and a reasonable person would have understood that he or she had a right to counsel at that time. Contrary to defendant's claim, the interrogating officer was not required to re-Mirandize defendant after he had recited the basic rules. The record establishes that defendant understood his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them.id: 11333
Minor's request to speak with a parent did not enlarge his Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees.Even when the police honor a minor's request to see a parent as an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, subsequent communication between the minor and parent is not protected under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The minor's request to speak with his parent did not enlarge his Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees nor invoke the right to bar otherwise admissible statements.id: 11335
Miranda advisements were not required before placing appellant in the police car with codefendant where there was no interrogation.Appellant argued that at the time of his arrest and before being placed in the squad car, he was not read his Miranda rights. However, when appellant and co-defendant conversed in the back of the police car, secretly being recorded, there was custody but no interrogation. Therefore, Miranda advisements were not required.id: 11336
Miranda advisements were not improper despite defendant's claim that the interpreter was also an investigating officer and therefore a guilty party.Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to exclude his statement to the police on due process grounds because the officer acting as an interpreter acknowledged a lack of fluency in Spanish and the police interpreter was also an investigating officer and an interested party. However, the officer testified that her Spanish might be lacking only when it came to an intellectual discussion. Moreover, defendant's characterization of the officer as an interested party and improper interpreter was premised on authorities and standards relating to court interpreters at trial. The officer was not acting as a court interpreter; she functioned as a facilitator for the police investigator. Thus, the standards for court interpreters have no application.id: 11337
Miranda waiver was valid where police lured defendant into custody on a misrepresentation but revealed the misrepresentation before his statement.Defendant argued that because the officer had misrepresented to him over the telephone that he was not a suspect in the murder, he did not realize that he was a suspect at the time of his statement and therefore did not knowingly waive his right to remain silent. However, the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver is not called into question when, as in this case, the police use a misrepresentation to lure a suspect into custody, yet reveal the misrepresentation before the suspect makes a statement.id: 11339
Miranda warning need not inform defendant of the possibility of the death penalty.Defendant argued his Miranda waiver was ineffectual because he was not specifically informed of the possibility he could receive the death penalty if found guilty of the killings. However, Miranda warnings need not include possible punishment for the charges if proven.id: 11340
Miranda warnings need not specifically advise defendant of his right to have appointed counsel present during questioning.Defendant argued the Miranda warnings were defective because they did not specifically advise him of his right to have appointed counsel present during questioning. However, defendant was told of his right to be represented by an attorney, to have an attorney present during questioning and that an attorney would be appointed to represent him. These warnings were sufficient.id: 11341
Miranda warnings were not required prior to videotaped reenactment of statement given six hours earlier.Defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and made a statement to the police. He argued the officers were obligated, but failed, to properly repeat the Miranda advisement prior to the videotaping session conducted six hours later. However, where the subsequent interrogation took place only a few hours thereafter, the earlier advise was sufficient.id: 11342
Miranda was not implicated where appellant telephoned the victim who tape recorded the conversation.Appellant argued the trial court erred in admitting his post-arrest statements made during the course of a telephone conversation with the victim. He argued the victim was acting as a police agent at the time of the conversation and that he had previously invoked his Miranda rights. Appellant initiated the telephone contact withthe victim but did not know of any police involvement in taping the conversation. Since appellant was not forced to contact the victim and since he did not know that she was acting as a police agent, there was no coercive atmosphere and nothing about the challenged conversation implicated <i>Miranda</i>.id: 11343
Modified Miranda advisement did not require reversal where it failed to expressly state defendant had the right to counsel both before and during questioning.Defendant argued that the <i>Miranda</i> warning he received deviated from the standard form in failing to expressly state that he had the right to counsel both before and during questioning. However, the officer's advisement was not so confusing or ambiguous as to lead defendant to believe that counsel would be provided for questioning and then summarily removed once questioning began.id: 11344
No Miranda violation where appellant cut off questioning regarding Buena Park robbery without requesting an attorney and five days later was questioned by LA sheriffs regarding other crimes.After appellant received <i>Miranda</i> warnings in Buena Park he invoked his right not to talk about the Buena Park case, and his right to cut off questioning was honored by the Buena Park police. He never indicated a desire to speak with an attorney. Five days later he was questioned by Los Angeles Sheriffs regarding crimes other than the Buena Park robbery. There was no <i>Miranda</i> violation as police immediately ceased the interrogation when he stated a desire to cut off questioning, resumed questioning only after significant passage of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.id: 11345
Officer may question a suspected narcotics overdose arrestee without Miranda advisements if it appears his life may be in danger.Police may ask questions of an arrestee which are prompted by a concern that the arrestee's life is in danger as a result of a possible overdose of narcotics without first advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights.id: 11346
Officers use of the first person in reading the Miranda advisements did not render the waiver invalid.Defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was invalid because the detective's use of the first person rather than the second in reading defendant his rights was confusing. However, the use of the first person could not have been confusing as it was obvious whose waiver was being sought. It was also clear that the interrogator's preliminary and follow-up questions provided an adequate context to make clear to defendant that it was his rights he was waiving. Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent.id: 11347
One-day nonpretextual break in custody was sufficient to remove the Edwards v. Arizona claim.Nevada police arrested defendant on the 17th for prowling. When arrested he stated "I want an attorney." He was then released on bail. On the 18th he was arrested again, this time for burglary. Following a Miranda advisement on this occasion he spoke to the police. Defendant argued pursuant to <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i>, (1981) 451 U.S. 477, that once having invoked his right to counsel, the subsequent questioning initiated by police as improper However, the <i>Edwards </i> ban was dissolved by the break with respect to defendant's request for counsel during his first custody.id: 11349
People are not required to prove the defendant initiated conversation with police to discuss the charged offenses rather than routine matters.After invoking his rights under Miranda, defendant initiated a conversation with police during which he made incriminating statements contrary to defendant's argument. <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i> (1981) 451 U.S. 477, does not suggest the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that an accused who has initiated a conversation after invoking his rights intends to discuss only routine matters.id: 11350
A confession taken in violation of Miranda requirements is subject to a harmless error standard of review.A confession held inadmissible by reason of having been obtained in violation of the Miranda requirements is subject to the harmless error analysis set forth in <i>Chapman v. California</i> (1967) 386 U.S. 18. Officers obtained defendant's confession in violation of his Miranda rights. However, admission of the confession was not prejudicial as the sole defense offered was that defendant lacked the intent to kill and the evidence of such intent, independent of the confession, was overwhelming.id: 11306
Advice that attorney would be appointed if and when you go to court did not violate Miranda.In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that advising a suspect that the police could not provide him with a lawyer but that one would be appointed if and when you go to court was sufficient to comply with <i>Miranda v. Arizona</i>, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). <i>Miranda</i> does not require that attorneys be producible on call, but only that the suspect be informed, as here, that he has a right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurred, adding that <i>Stone v. Powell</i>, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) dictates that the suppression remedy not be available to this habeas petitioner seven years after the events because the marginal possibility that police adherence to <i>Miranda</i> will be enhanced by suppression ... is outweighed by society's interest in punishing and incapacitating those who violate its criminal laws. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens dissented.id: 11307
After surrender, the officers' refusal to allow defendant immediate access to his father was not conduct likely to elicit an incriminating response without the benefit of the Miranda advisements.Defendant argued that at the time of his surrender officers engaged in conduct likely to elicit an incriminating response from defendant without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Officers told defendant earlier that if he surrendered they would allow him to speak to his father. Officers did not respond when defendant later asked to see his father. He argued the officers present should have known defendant would interpret this equivocation as an implied demand that he cooperate by making incriminating statements. However, it was clear from defendant's conversation that he regarded his father's presence as an assurance of his own physical safety during the surrender. Once that process was complete the officers had no reason to believe defendant's visit with his father was so important that he would need to incriminate himself to persuade the officers to grant his request.id: 11308
Confession to probation officer four minutes after he had been Mirandized by police officer was not invalid.Appellant argued that the <i>Miranda</i> advisements were inadequate because he was never told by the police or his probation officer that statements made to his probation officer could be used against him. However, the probation officer was present when appellant was initially Mirandized and the police officer told appellant the probation officer was assisting in the murder investigation. The confession occurred two to four minutes later when the probation officer was alone with appellant. Under the circumstances, the prior advisement was within a reasonably contemporaneous period of time, and no further advisement by the probation officer was required.id: 11309
Conversation between police negotiators and an armed suspect who has taken refuge in a building surrounded by police does not constitute custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes.The public safety exception to Miranda applies during police negotiations to obtain release of a hostage held at gunpoint. The statements defendant made while speaking to police negotiators over the phone from the residence he had taken over were not unlawfully obtained and did not violate Miranda principles.id: 11310
Court did not err in admitting appellant's spontaneous utterance when the searching officer stated, I think I have something because there was no interrogation or its equivalent.Appellant argued the trial court should not have admitted her statement, oh, oh when she saw that the deputy conducting the strip search had discovered the methamphetamine, because no Miranda warning had been given. However, no Miranda warnings were required where the deputy's statement, I think I have something here, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent.id: 11311
Court has no sua sponte duty to instruct statements taken in violation of Miranda may only be considered for impeachment.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the statements taken in violation of Miranda were to be considered only on the issue of credibility and not as evidence of guilt. However, absent a request by a party, there is no duty to give an instruction limiting the purpose for which the evidence may be considered.id: 11312
Defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights.During the course of the interrogation, the officer stated There is no death penalty here. Defendant subsequently confessed. Given the length of the interrogation, the officer's brief, but incorrect statement did not render the confession involuntary. The police activity was not coercive and the officer's comment about the death penalty did not constitute a promise of benefit or an inducement.id: 11315
Defendant's comment about hiring a high priced lawyer from New York was not a request to consult with an attorney during the present interrogation.During interrogation defendant stated: My mother will put out money for a high priced lawyer out of New York. When the officer asked for the name of defendant's lawyer he refused to furnish it stating: I don't want you talking to my lawyer. The statements did not amount to an invocation of the right to counsel. Defendant was merely bragging about his ability to secure high priced legal representation for future proceedings.id: 11316
Supreme Court says undisclosed view that person is a suspect, is not relevant for Miranda purposes.In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question of whether the individual is in custody for purposes of <i>Miranda</i>. The court said its prior cases make it clear, in no uncertain terms, that any inquiry into whether the interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being questioned (assuming those suspicions remain undisclosed) is not relevant. Accordingly this case was remanded to the California Supreme Court to determine whether, based on the objective circumstances, the defendant was in custody during the interrogation.id: 11265
Physical evidence seized as a result of Miranda violation is not excludable under the Wong Sun doctrine.Defendant argued the seizure of cocaine base and marijuana occurred as a result of a custodial interrogation that was not preceded by Miranda warnings and therefore the court erred in denying her suppression motion. However, even though evidence was seized as a result of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda principles, exclusion of such evidence is not required by federal law and therefore such evidence may not be excluded under California law.id: 10876
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Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850