Impeachment of Witnesses, generally
Category > Impeachment of Witnesses, generally
The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the relevance of the alleged rape victim’s sexual conduct earlier in the day as an alternative explanation of her injuries.Defendant sought to present evidence of the complaining witness’s sexual conduct on the morning of the day on which the acts charged against him occurred. The trial court erred by denying the motion without conducting a hearing concerning the relevancy of the witness’s sexual conduct earlier that day as an alternative explanation for her oral and vaginal injuries. However, the error was not prejudicial since the court eventually held a hearing, following the new trial motion which established the earlier sexual conduct could not have caused the vaginal injuries and the omission of an alternate explanation for her oral injuries was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence to the extent it was offered to corroborate the defendant’s testimony.id: 21632
Prior murder conviction was invalid under double jeopardy principles where it followed a juvenile manslaughter adjudication, and the prosecution could not allege the prior as a special circumstance in a death penalty case.In support of a prior murder special circumstance (Penal Code section 190.2, subd.(a)(2)) the prosecution alleged defendant’s 1971 murder of Allen Rothenberg. However, the murder conviction in adult court in that case took place after a juvenile adjudication finding involuntary manslaughter in the same case. In Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 531, the court found the same action violated double jeopardy principles. Breed applied retroactively here and the prosecution could not use the 1971 murder conviction as a special circumstance. Neither could the prosecution use the invalid murder conviction to impeach the defendant’s testimony. id: 24111
The trial court erred by precluding cross-examination of the witness regarding a pending civil suit against San Diego authorities but the error did not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.The trial court erred by denying cross-examination of a witness regarding a civil lawsuit the witness had filed against San Diego authorities, claiming he had been wrongfully arrested and held for the present murder. The witness had a strong financial interest in testifying against defendant, and the ruling prevented defense counsel from impeaching the witness on an important point. However, the error did not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment confrontation clause violation where the jurors knew the witness was trying to avoid prosecution for the two murders. id: 23765
Trial court erred in admitting an involuntary statement defendant made to police officers to impeach his testimony.Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights during interrogation. He stated that he would not say another word without his attorney. Officers continued to question defendant who then made incriminating statements that did not constitute a confession. The officer testified at trial that he had continued to question defendant after the invocation of Miranda so that if defendant testified at trial, the statements could be used for impeachment. The officer testified that this tactic was taught at a seminar. Defendant's statements were coerced and involuntary and should not have been introduced to impeach his trial testimony. However, the erroneous admission of the involuntary statement was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.id: 11248
The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the SVP expert regarding other cases where he concluded the defendants were not SVPs. Defendant produced an expert at his Sexually Violent Predator trial to testify that he could control his behavior. The prosecutor cross-examined the expert regarding three other cases
where he had testified that the defendants were not SVPs. The facts from the other cases and the psychologist's opinion in those cases were not relevant to show bias or prejudice. However, the error in admitting the evidence was harmless where there was no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome.id: 19696
Allowing impeachment of a testifying defendant with statements he made to mental health professionals appointed to determine his mental competency violated his privilege against self-incrimination.The trial court violated defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination when it allowed the prosecution to impeach him at trial with statements he made to the two court-appointed mental health professionals who were to determine his competency to stand trial.id: 19258
Court erred in excluding evidence that state paid for witness' tatoo removal where the witness stated he only received $40.00 for his testimony.Defendant introduced evidence that the inmate witnesses who testified for the prosecution had gained benefits from the state. One witness testified on cross-examination that he received $40.00 from the state and denied receiving other favors. Defendant sought to have a tatoo specialist testify that he had been paid $100.00 from the state to remove a tatoo from the witness. The court excluded the evidence after the prosection asserted the privilege of nondisclosure of confidential information (Evidence Code section 1040). However, section 1040 did not apply because once the defense learned of the information it was no longer confidential. Moreover, the court erred in refusing defendant's requested admonition that the witness received additional benefits. The error was not prejudicial where the witness was thoroughly impeached by other means.id: 12814
Court erred in excluding resident child molest victim's previous false accusation implicating her mother in sexual misconduct.Defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under age 14 (Penal Code section 288.5). He argued the court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's precocious sexual knowledge pursuant to Evidence Code section 782. The evidence that the victim had seen her brothers naked had minimal probative value on the issue of whether the source of her precocious knowledge of sexual matters was something or someone other than defendant. However, the court did err in excluding the victim's statement falsely accusing her mother of sexual misconduct as such statement was relevant on the issue of credibility. Nevertheless, the error was not prejudicial as there was ample evidence impeaching the victim's credibility and the jury had an opportunity to observe the witnesses, including the victim, testify.id: 12813
Use at trial of cumulative evidence of bias in the form of gang-affiliation evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion.The trial court abused its discretion in admitting gang-affiliation evidence to impeach defendant's alibi since other evidence of bias was admitted. However, the error was harmless where defendant and his companion were videotaped committing the robbery and the videotape was shown to the jury.id: 12822
A witness' refusal to talk with the defense was relevant to his credibility but denial of cross-examination on the issue did not violate the Sixth Amendment.The trial court erred in restricting cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding the witness' refusal to discuss the case with the defense. A witness' refusal to talk with a party is relevant to that witness' credibility because it shows the possibility of bias against that party. However, the error did not amount to a confrontation clause violation since it did not produce a significantly different impression of the witness' credibility.id: 16708
Defendant need not testify to preserve for appeal a challenge to the use of a statement for impeachment when the statement was obtained in violation of a constitutional right.When a defendant raises a pure issue of law concerning a fundamental constitutional right, the defendant need not testify to preserve error in the trial court's rulings on impeaching evidence.id: 12816
Statements obtained in violation of Massiah may not be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant.Following his arrest for rape, the defendant was told the victim wanted to speak with him so he telephoned her from the jail. The victim recorded the conversation during which the defendant admitted the rape. Because he had invoked his right to counsel, defendant later moved to suppress the statements on the ground they violated the Sixth Amendment. The statements should have been suppressed because the victim was working for the public and was paid with a hotel room at taxpayer expense. Moreover, the statements obtained in violation of Massiah may not be used to impeach the testimony of the defendant.id: 11389
Supreme Court rules that illegally-obtained statements may not be used to impeach defense witnesses.In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the exclusionary rule, holding that statements obtained from the defendant after his illegal arrest were improperly used by the prosecution to impeach a defense witness. The majority ruled that permitting illegal evidence to be used to impeach defense witnesses would significantly weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct because the occasions for introducing illegally obtained evidence at trial would vastly increase. Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor and Scalia.id: 10881
Prosecutor properly cross-examined witnesses who testified to defendant’s good character by asking if they would change their mind if they knew he had committed other specific acts.Defendant argued the prosecutor improperly cross-examined the character witnesses by asking if they would change their opinion if they knew about other specific acts the defendant had committed. Because the witnesses testified to an opinion about defendant’s good character based in part on their perceptions, it was proper to cross-examine them about whether it would change their opinion if they knew or learned about instances of defendant’s bad character.id: 27258
Because defendant did not testify, he was precluded from challenging the court’s refusal to exclude prior impeachment evidence. Defendant argued the trial court abused it’s discretion by refusing to exclude prior misconduct impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352. However, because defendant did not testify, he did not preserve the purported error for review.id: 25001
The trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the alleged trafficking victim’s acts of prostitution committed after defendant’s arrest. Defendant was convicted of human trafficking of a minor and pimping and pandering of a minor. He argued the trial court erred by not excluding evidence of the victim’s acts of prostitution that occurred after he was placed in custody. However, the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1161 (b) for credibility or impeachment of character. The provision applies to acts committed before and after defendant’s arrest. id: 26340
The trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with defendant’s suppressed statements.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to impeach expert witnesses during the sanity phase with his statements that were made after he invoked his right to counsel. However, the use of the suppressed statements promoted the truth-seeking function of the trial without diminishing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police misconduct.id: 25252
The trial court did not prejudicially err by excluding impeachment evidence against detectives involved in one of the cases. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence during pretrial hearings that two detectives gave false testimony and violated a suspect’s Miranda rights in an unrelated matter. However, the officers were not critical prosecution witnesses, in fact, one testified for the defense. The trial court also found it was possible for the jury to properly exclude the photo lineup independent of considerations about the officers’ intent. Finally, there was strong evidence of guilt and it was unlikely the absence of the collateral evidence caused the jury to convict defendant of that count.id: 23758
The trial court did not err in failing to hold a hearing on the proffered evidence of the young victim’s prior sexual history because the alleged conduct was not similar and not probative of their credibility.Defendant was convicted of molesting his girlfriend’s young sisters. He argued the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing to determine the admissibility of the victims’ sexual history under Evidence Code section 782. However, the court did not err in failing to hold a hearing because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently similar to the charged conduct in this case and therefore not highly probative of the victim’s credibility.id: 23265
The prosecutor could properly cross-examine the defense expert about her mishandling tapes in a previous case to show her bias against the prosecution.The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the defense expert about her mishandling of interview tapes in a previous case. The evidence was relevant to establish a basis upon which the jury could find the witness’s failure to comply with the subpoena in this case was not the result of an innocuous misunderstanding, but rather an expression of antipathy towards the prosecution.id: 23243
The trial court did not err by precluding cross-examination of a prosecution witness whose fraud charges were dismissed.Defendant argued the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses by precluding cross-examination of a prosecution expert witness regarding MediCal fraud charges brought against him in the 1980's. The doctor had later been determined factually innocent of the charges. The defense presented no evidence that the fraud charges were dismissed as a reward for the doctor’s prior service as an expert witness for the prosecution.id: 23130
The trial court properly allowed the impeachment of the defense expert’s opinion with contrary statements made while testifying at the suppression hearing.Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to rebut the opinions of the defense expert witness, a psychologist who testified about defendant’s educational level and writing ability, by presenting the jury with statements defendant previously made at a pretrial suppression hearing, concerning whether he had the ability to express himself in writing. Allowing the statements to impeach the defense expert did not violate James v. Illinois (1990) 49. U.S. 307, because when a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing is contrary to a defense expert’s opinion that was partly based on his discussions with defendant, the rule established in James does not apply.id: 23016
The trial court did not err in denying the defense request for a witness’s psychiatric records where the witness had no condition affecting her credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying his request for the psychiatric records of a key prosecution witness. However, denial of the request did not violate his rights to due process or confrontation as the records did not show the witness suffered from a mental health problem affecting her credibility.id: 22645
The trial court did not err by limiting defense cross-examination regarding the details of the witness’s prior conviction for robbery and assault.The trial court did not err by limiting the defense impeachment of the primary prosecution witness in defendant’s murder trial. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the court did not categorically exclude evidence of the details of the witness’s prior convictions. Moreover, the defense thoroughly challenged the witness’s credibility with other evidence.id: 22208
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant on a collateral matter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to call a rebuttal witness and impeach defendant’s claim that he had worked as a mechanic for a year and he used the van for that work. Evidence of defendant’s employment and how he used the van was collateral to the issues at trial but relevant to his credibility. Moreover, Evidence Code section 352 did not preclude use of the evidence where defendant never showed how it was confusing, inflammatory or consumed too much time.id: 22382
The trial court did not err by precluding defendant from presenting evidence that a prosecution witness had received psychiatric care.Defendant argued the trial court erred when it precluded him from presenting evidence that a prosecution witness (Tucker) had received psychiatric care. However, the witness who was asked the question had no knowledge that Tucker had been hospitalized. Moreover, the court did not err in precluding testimony as to whether Tucker had previous episodes of unusual laughing or crying as such testimony would have required significant collateral inquiry.id: 21718
The trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during direct examination to impeach the witness.Defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions of a witness during direct and redirect examination. However, the court properly allowed the prosecutor to ask two leading questions to revive the witness’s recollection as to a certain point, and in confronting the witness with prior statements that contradicted his testimony.id: 21592
The trial court did not err in allowing defendant’s mental health expert to be impeached with the reports of the court appointed competency experts. Defendant presented expert testimony in support of a mental health defense at the guilt phase. The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the expert with the evidence on which he based his opinion, including the hospital records and reports of the court appointed competency experts.id: 21530
The trial court did not improperly exclude evidence of possible bias of a witness who was on probation during trial and may have wished to curry favor with the prosecutor. Defendant argued the trial court erred by excluding evidence of possible bias by a prosecution witness. The witness was on probation for a battery conviction but the court found evidence of the conviction was inadmissible since it did not involve moral turpitude. The prosecutor did not even know the witness was on probation until the trial started. Moreover, defense counsel adequately demonstrated the inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony during cross-examination. id: 21739
Supreme Court finds post-charge statement obtained by jailhouse informant admissible to impeach defendant.After defendant had been charged with murder, police officers put a confidential informant in his cell. The informant elicited from defendant an admission that he had committed the murder. At trial, defendant testified that his accomplice committed the murder. Although the State conceded that the defendant’s statement had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to use the statement to impeach defendant’s testimony. Dividing 7-2, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that a statement obtained by a confidential informant in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies at trial. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.id: 21416
The record did not support defendant’s claim that a prosecution witness lied when he testified he did not receive benefits in exchange for his testimony. Defendant argued a witness perjured himself when he testified he did not receive benefits for his testimony, but only promises of safety. While the witness received benefits in pending cases, there was no evidence the prosecutor in this case had engineered those deals, and the prosecutor’s notes consistently showed he did not offer benefits in exchange for the testimony.id: 20974
Any error in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior battery conviction was harmless where there was substantial evidence of guilt and the jury knew defendant and the victim often fought.Assuming the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the murder victim’s prior misdemeanor battery conviction, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the admission of evidence regarding past fights between the victim and defendant, and their tumultuous relationship.id: 20864
The trial court did not err by admitting rebuttal evidence in the form of specific instances of defendant’s bad character to impeach his testimony and that of the defense psychiatrist.Defendant testified on direct and cross-examination that he did not hate women or mistreat prostitutes, denied excessive substance abuse, and denied carrying a bag of guns. The trial court did not err by admitting rebuttal evidence in the form of specific instances of conduct relevant to these assertions. The rebuttal evidence was properly admitted to attack the basis of the defense psychiatrist’s testimony and as direct impeachment of defendant’s testimony.id: 20745
The trial court did not err by allowing impeachment of the defense psychiatrist with incidents that were relevant to the expert’s opinion that defendant did not have the character of a murderer.Defendant argued that trial court permitted improper impeachment of the defense psychiatrist and that the prosecutor’s questions were an improper attempt to offer specific instances of irrelevant and inadmissible character evidence on a specific occasion. However, the cross-examination was proper as the incidents mentioned were all relevant to the expert’s opinion that defendant’s character was inconsistent with that of a murderer.id: 20744
The trial court did not err by preventing impeachment of a prosecution witness with evidence of lies he told his probation officer.The trial court did not err by excluding evidence that the prosecution witness had lied to his probation officer. The court found the failure to keep certain promises did not amount to “lies.” Moreover, the alleged failures were numerous and could have resulted in lengthy questioning. Finally, the witness’s truthfulness was already compromised by other factors presented to the jury.id: 20546
Section 782 which allows for the impeachment with the complaining witness’s sexual conduct, does not apply to prior false claims of rape.The procedure required by Evidence Code section 782 for admitting evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct to attack the victim’s credibility does not apply when the defense attempts to introduce evidence that the victim made prior false complaints of rape. Moreover, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false complaints of rape under section 352 because there was no conclusive evidence showing the prior complaints were false. id: 20406
The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant using his suppression hearing testimony.The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to impeach defendant at the trial with his testimony from the suppression hearing which he claimed was limited to his state of mind and should not have been used to impeach his testimony about the actual truthfulness of his confessions. However, defendant put the truthfulness of his earlier confessions at issue. There was nothing improper in admitting the suppression hearing testimony.id: 20267
The trial court did not err by limiting cross-examination as to the prosecution witness's drug addiction at the time of his 1992 misdemeanor conviction.The trial court did not violate defendant's Confrontation Clause rights by preventing inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a prosecution witness's prior conviction. Any testimony by the witness that he was or was not in the "midst" of his crack cocaine addiction at the time of his 1992 misdemeanor receiving stolen property conviction would not have produced a significantly different impression of his credibility where the jury already knew he had a drug relapse prior to the present crime.id: 20258
Defendant was properly impeached with statements from a pretext call with his daughter which predated the attachment of his right to counsel.Defendant argued that impeachment with his statements from a pretext call with his daughter violated his constitutional rights to silence and counsel since she deliberately acted as a police agent to secure incriminating statements from him. However, contrary to defendant's claim, the language of
Siebert v. Missouri (2004) 542 U.S. 600, about police questioning that intentionally violates Miranda, did not put an end to the impeachment exception set forth in Harris v. New York
(1971) 401 U.S. 222. Moreover, there was no violation of Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, since defendant's daughter made the pretext call eight days before he was charged with the crime.id: 19283
Dickerson did not affect the court's ruling in Peevy allowing impeachment of a defendant with Miranda-violative statements.Defendant argued the court erred in allowing impeachment with Miranda-violative statements. He claimed the holding to the
contrary in People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, should be reexamined in light of Dickerson v. U.S. (2000) 530 U.S. 428. However, Peevy did not rest on the premise that Miranda rules are
nonconstitutional, and therefore Dickerson did not affect the holding in Peevy.id: 19148
The court properly prohibited the defense attempt to impeach a witness by psychiatric testimony that was obtained by the defense without notice to the prosecution.At the request of two defense investigators, a prosecution witness voluntarily agreed to psychiatric testing at the office of a defense retained psychologist. The defense was seeking
evidence to impeach the witness's credibility. The trial court did not err by excluding the test results and the psychologist's opinion where the examination took place without notice,
involvement or awareness on the part of the court or the prosecution. Encouraging litigants to engage in this kind of trial preparation is fraught with the potential for abuse. Moreover, the witness was subjected to full cross-examination and impeachment by other, more traditional methods.id: 19050
Evidence of defendant's extramarital affairs was properly admitted since it was relevant to his credibility.Defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of girlfriends that he did not tell them he was married when he was seeing them. This evidence of defendant's deceit in the recent past was relevant to his credibility, and the credibility of the women. Moreover, the court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant about his extramarital affairs. Defendant testified that he had a good relationship with his wife. The evidence was relevant to his credibility, and was relevant to prove motive.id: 18605
Court did not err in precluding defendant from raising the pending rape charges as evidence of the witness's motive for testifying.Defendant argued the trial court erred in prohibiting defendant from raising the pending rape charges as evidence of the witness's motive for testifying. However, any slight impeachment effect of the possibility that the witness hoped for leniency in the rape case (which was not established in the record) was outweighed by the undue consumption of time the evidence would require. Moreover, any error was harmless where the witness's testimony was largely consistent with that of the other witnesses.id: 17514
A prior consistent statement is admissible if made before one of the alleged grounds for bias existed, but after another such ground.After the defense presented evidence of a witness's favorable plea bargain, the prosecution sought to rehabilitate him by presenting evidence of a prior consistent statement he gave to police before he was charged with the crime. Defendant argued the witness feared prosecution for the murder and therefore had a motive to blame defendant as soon as the police contacted him. The court properly admitted the statement because it was made before the plea bargain was struck and thus before the existence of one of the grounds alleged in defendant's charge that the witness was biased.id: 17398
Admitting evidence of a defense witness' involvement in an uncharged murder where there was a decapitation, for the purpose of bolstering the credibility of a prosecution witness, was not prejudicial error.Defendant was charged with murder. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a defense witness' alleged involvement in another murder involving a decapitation. However, there was no implication that defendant was involved in the murder. Moreover, the evidence was admitted only to impeach the defense witness and to bolster the contrary testimony of a prosecution witness. Any error in admitting the evidence to bolster the credibility of a witness was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.id: 15980
Reasons why witness was unavailable at trial was relevant to credibility but the court did not abuse its Evidence Code section 352 discretion in excluding the evidence.The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce Mr. Mercado's preliminary hearing testimony. Defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to admit testimony as to why Mr. Mercado was unavailable at trial. He claimed the witness' former gang association was relevant to his refusal to testify. He also argued the evidence should have been admitted under Evidence Code section 780, subdivision (j), which allows the attitude of a witness towards giving testimony to be considered in evaluating credibility. While the evidence was relevant on the credibility issue, the court did not abuse its section 352 discretion in excluding the evidence. Questioning of the officers as to their efforts to locate the witness would have had minimal probative value and would have consumed time. Moreover, the fact that the witness was a former gang member would not show why he did not testify and would have been inflammatory.id: 15981
Minor's statements during fitness evaluation may be used for impeachment purposes at a criminal trial.The prosecutor may impeach a minor defendant at a criminal trial with the inconsistent statements he made to a probation officer who was evaluating him in preparation for a juvenile court fitness hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (c). The minor's statements made during a fitness evaluation may not be used as substantive evidence of guilt against the minor at a subsequent criminal trial.id: 15773
Attacking alibi witness' credibility with evidence he and defendant participated in a robbery in 1961 was not cumulative of other less probative evidence.The defense presented the testimony of a witness who provided an alibi for defendant. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the witness and defendant participated in a robbery in 1961. The evidence was admissible on the question of credibility to establish bias. Defendant claimed the evidence was cumulative because bias was established by showing defendant and the witness had celebrated defendant's birthday together the night of the instant robbery and the evidence was therefore cumulative. However, evidence the two men had committed a crime together many years ago was more probative to show the witness might be willing to perjure himself to aid defendant than the mere fact that they celebrated a birthday together.id: 12811
Counsel waived the right to impeach young victims with statements from a pretrial settlement meeting where she was given an opportunity to assess the boys as witnesses in exchange for the waiver.The trial court did not err by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine one of the minor witnesses about statements purportedly made by the minor witness during a pretrial settlement meeting which purportedly were inconsistent with statements made by the minor witnesses at trial. Defense counsel essentially admitted she agreed to give up the possibility of using the statements for impeachment at trial in exchange for the opportunity to personally interview the boys and assess them as witnesses. The agreement constituted a partial waiver of defendant's right to confrontation.id: 12812
Court properly limited impeachment of witness who testified as to a bomb threat where counsel asked questions regarding the witness' child custody dispute.Defendant was charged with the murder of two officers who died while dismantling a bomb in his garage. Nine witnesses testified as to an earlier bomb threat by defendant. The only impeachment of the witness the court did not permit was a question as to whether the witness had taken his children to North Carolina in violation of a court order. However, the subject question was impeachment on a collateral issue, was marginally probative, if probative at all, and would have consumed undue time.id: 12815
Evidence of charges currently pending was admissible to rebut defendant's no incident testimony.Defendant testified that he had not been involved in an incident since he had been out of prison. The prosecution's evidence in this case of prior specific acts of defendant's conduct was properly admitted on the issue of his credibility, even though such evidence also related to defendant's prior conduct that rebutted evidence of his recent good character.id: 12817
Evidence supported the court's finding that the witness was truthful regarding his memory loss, so prior interview tapes could not be used to impeach him.During cross-examination of a witness, the defense asked the court to find the witness was being untruthful when he testified he did not remember many details about his relationship with the victim. This would have permitted the defense to use the interview tapes as prior inconsistent statements whenever the witness claimed memory loss. However, substantial evidence supported the court's finding that the witness was truthful when he claimed he could not remember. His lack of memory was neither total nor suspiciously selective, and his testimony in general was consistent with earlier testimony and interviews. His loss of memory of so many facts could have been attributed to his limited intellect and emotional trauma. Moreover, although his memory of certain details was weak, he recalled far too much to justify a finding that he was unavailable as a witness.id: 12818
Failure to permit impeachment of the People's witnesses on collateral matters did not deprive defendant of his right to confront witnesses.Defense counsel advised the court he intended to impeach prosecution witnesses with the fact that they failed to reveal their income as prostitutes when they applied for county welfare benefits. Because the evidence in question would impeach the witnesses on collateral matters, and was only slightly probative of their veracity, application of Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the evidence did not infringe upon defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.id: 12819
Masturbation constitutes sexual conduct within the meaning of Evidence Code section 782.Evidence Code section 782 provides that certain procedural requirements must be met before evidence of the victim's sexual conduct may be introduced to attack the victim's credibility. Masturbation is sexual conduct within the meaning of section 782. The trial court therefore properly excluded evidence of the child molest victim's masturbation where defense counsel failed to comply with section 782.id: 12820
The trial court properly allowed impeachment as to a witness' failure to disclose facts which might exculpate defendant before trial.Defense witness was aware before trial of information that he understood tended to exculpate the defendant. A witness' failure to report such information before trial is relevant and admissible subject to a prejudice evaluation pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the witness' failure to present the facts to authorities prior to trial.id: 12821
Witness' statement rebutted defendant's testimony that homosexual conduct made him angry.Witness testified that he had solicited defendant to perform an act of oral copulation and that defendant had displayed no anger at the proposition. This statement tended to contradict defendant's testimony that homosexual conduct made him angry and was thus relevant for impeachment.id: 12823
Trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution to impeach defendant with evidence which had been revealed to them in the course of plea negotiations.The trial court did not err by permitting the defendant to be impeached with evidence of his prior statements, even though that evidence had been communicated to the prosecution solely for the purpose of plea negotiations. The rule that evidence of statements made or revealed during plea negotiations may not be introduced by the People must be limited to those situations in which those statements are offered as substantive evidence of guilt, either in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise. That rule does not prevent the prosecution from using evidence of those statements for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant regarding testimony which was elicited either during the direct examination of the defendant or during cross-examination which is plainly within the scope of the defendant's direct examination.id: 11513
Trial court did not err in permitting statements taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be used for impeachment.The exclusion of a defendant's voluntary statements, obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, from the case-in-chief sufficiently vindicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. However, when the defendant takes the stand and testifies inconsistently with those statements, protection of the truth-finding purpose of a criminal trial requires that such statements be admissible for impeachment.id: 11396
Statements intentionally taken in violation of Miranda were admissible for impeachment.Two officers admitted they intentionally continued their questioning of defendant after he invoked his Miranda rights for the express purpose of obtaining statements against him should he elect to testify at trial. Notwithstanding the officers' conduct the statements taken were admissible against defendant for impeachment purposes.id: 11360
Court has no sua sponte duty to instruct statements taken in violation of Miranda may only be considered for impeachment.Defendant argued the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the statements taken in violation of Miranda were to be considered only on the issue of credibility and not as evidence of guilt. However, absent a request by a party, there is no duty to give an instruction limiting the purpose for which the evidence may be considered.id: 11312
About Pat Ford
Pat Ford is a criminal defense lawyer in San Diego who works on appeals in some of the most difficult cases around the state. He has a great record for success and integrity. Pat has also published a criminal case law digest since 1984 that's used by judges and lawyers around the state. He also speaks and writes articles for criminal lawyers as well as consumers interested in the law. The consumer-related articles are intended to be informative but do not constitute legal advice.
Case of the Day
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Geofence search warrants were impermissibly overbroad and violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment but the good faith exception applied and suppression was not required.Defendants were identified as murder suspects after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as the victim on the day of the murder. The geofence warrants complied with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2016 (Cal ECPA) but they violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were impermissibly overbroad as the warrants placed no meaningful restrictions on the police search. However, suppression of the evidence was not required where the officers reasonably relied on the new geofence warrant in good faith.id: 27850